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This thesis argues for performative ways to write trauma, ghosts and silence 
against the particularities of German post-war experiences. It begins with the 
re-discovery of a photographic image that provides a starting point. I unfold 
linguistically uncalibrated yet embodied knowledge into insecure or uncertain 
registers of traumatic intergenerational reverberations. Drawing on 
psychoanalytic theory of trauma, I chart a trajectory from individuated self 
towards one pledged on intersubjective conditions for an iteratively-emergent 
subjectivity. Trauma framed in terms of interrelational silence is woven into 
the material fixicity of the image, with its fleetingly evoked and fragmented 
slivers of memory. Positioned on the cusp of an inquiry that troubles the 
coherence of a subject-who-knows, I argue for an eruptive heterogeneity that 
speaks creatively to possible ways of re-presenting the significance and 
specificity of familial and national silence in the aftermath of an abject war. 
The discreetness of trauma, ghosts and silence is reconfigured in terms of an 
in-betweenness of generational reverberations; these echoes form the layers 
into and against which I write silenced, repressed and marginalized voices, 
voices shaped predominately by absence from dominant discourses. The 
transgressive nature of writing against the grain, of writing against the 
primacy of certainty is developed further through the chapters, mapping a 
complex methodological and theoretical possibility. I trouble notions of ‘data’ 
in light of contestations that favour ambiguous possibilities pertaining to 
hauntings and ghosts, aware of the paradoxical nature of linearly constructed 
arguments in support of fragmentary and fragmented knowledge claims. The 
complexities are further accentuated through texts written in different genres, 




which seek to mirror context and emergent content. The thesis builds into an 
enmeshment of reverberations within which space is given over to Other, 
drawing fictitious and fictionalized voices into contestations around 
narrativization and finitude. 
 
Keywords: Trauma, Silence, Ghosts, Psychoanalysis, Generational 
Reverberations, Performative Writing, Intersubjectivity 
     
  






Language is how ghosts enter the world. 
They twist into awkward positions 
to squeeze through the black spaces. 
The dead read backwards, 
as in a mirror. They gather 
in the white field and look up, 
waiting for someone 
to write their names. 
 





One. Accidental Beginnings: Caught by Reverberations of 
Trauma 
 
When I took hold of my parents’ things after my father died a few years ago, I 
found, amongst the detritus of lives lived, a framed photograph of a little girl 
holding a doll. It was a black and white print, slightly faded around the 
margins, behind glass the surface of which held on to fingerprints. If I recall 
correctly, the photograph was taken in the small studio of our local 
photographer, whose name I cannot remember. I laid the print aside, and 
continued with unpacking. What I was searching for I cannot really say with 




any certainty. Over the coming months, the little photo would often slide into 
view; it kept emerging in odd places, almost as if it had wandered there on its 
own accord. 
Many days later, while folding laundry into neat piles, my thoughts were 
interrupted once again by the photo. Eyes and mouth begged me to look and 
I began to feel shy about my gaze. I felt drawn into the moment, and all I took 
in was this girl, maybe five years old, dressed in a warm coat, with a small 
scarf tied in a lose knot under her delicate chin. Lips tightly pressed into 
themselves, holding back any sounds, seemingly convinced of their utter 
uselessness. Eyelids slightly slackened, held open more out of convention, she 
looks up out of the frame into a beyond behind the camera, dark eyes closed 
off to whatever she sees, devoid of curiosity. A finite image, taken as memento 
before an exodus, or so it seems.  
I barely remember being taken to the photographer, cannot recall if I was being 
asked to remove my coat, to turn round and to smile at the camera. I am not 
sure if I remember folding my hands around the plastic hands of my doll, 
holding her as one would take hold of another. I seem to recall the leaden grey 
darkness of a room that encircled me, cut through by the sharp brightness of 
a singular light. I seem to remember acrid smells. I seem to remember someone 
standing in the corner watching me, watching over me, but I have no 
recollection who that might have been. I acknowledge the girl in the photo as 
me, and I guess, but don’t really know, that a disjuncture of this kind is 
somehow meaningful.   
I remember more. 




I remember an excursion in my wicker pushchair, my mother pushing me past 
the brewery on our way to her mother, my grandmother. 
I remember lying in my cot, next to my parent’s bed, slipping my finger into 
the joints where wallpaper meets wallpaper, and creating little crevices in the 
plaster. I remember the sun shone brightly that day. I remember I was happy.  
I remember the night the distillery behind our house burnt down. I remember 
my mother waking me to show me the raging flames and me screaming 
because I did not want to see. I remember the next days and weeks, unable to 
look out of the bedroom window because I would see burnt and devastated 
buildings. 
I remember liking to be taken to the shoe shop, not because I wanted to have 
a new pair of shoes, but because I liked the machine which would x-ray my 
feet and I could see right into my bones. 
I remember the many nights my parents went out and left me alone. I 
remember getting up to dial the telephone number of their friends to check if 
they had arrived safely. I remember I would not go to sleep otherwise. 
I remember the time I asked my mum for an empty cigarette packet and 
collected little caterpillars from the bushes in the yard. I remember that she 
asked me to release them back outside as soon as I took them upstairs. 
I remember playing with a little girl who went to the wrong school. I 
remember that I never played with her again.  
I remember being sent into the cellar to pick up coal for our stove. I remember 
holding my breath from the last step of the stair - open the wooden door, down 




the dark corridor, into the small hatch, scuttle coal into the bucket, close the 
wooden door - and exhaling on reaching the first stair up to our flat. 
I remember the range in our kitchen, but I cannot remember where I sat at the 
dining table. If truth be told, I cannot remember if I sat at the table. 
I remember my mother feeding me raw liver, because I needed the nutrients 
to counter a slow decline into what was thought to be leukaemia but which 
later turned out to be less harmful. I remember being very slight, thin, 
emaciated. I remember that there was never any conclusive diagnosis for my 
ailment. 
I remember being sent away to a Kinderheim1 a children’s recuperation home, 
before I began primary school. I remember crying myself to sleep every night. 
I remember giving up crying after more than three weeks. I remember my 
parents picking me up and feeding me cake on our journey home.  
I carry little memories, I carry slivers. I carry barely narratable fragments, often 
hewn out of the stories others left behind. I carry imperceptible silences whose 
residue is smeared across me like a stain. I am stained by what is beyond 
words. I have become a wordsmith, working with marks I can barely trace 
against the solid ground of absences.  
I cast words onto the smooth whitish background of the computer screen, have 
done so for longer than I care to recall, for longer than I have written this thesis. 
There is a certain solidity in the ‘smithyness’, the place where heavy metals 
melt into unctuous flows only to cool down into definite forms. This thesis 
breaks some of the codices around definitiveness; it interrogates the fragments 
                                                          
1 Literal translation: children’s home 




of stories I was told as a child, as if they would suffice to placate my curiosity, 
would stop me from wondering about, and maybe from wandering into 
terrain which, in its exclusionary silence, became incontestable.  
This thesis, of sorts, is an attempt to let trauma speak. It consists of writing into 
and out of collapsing certainties, ways of meaning making when embodied 
knowledge troubles, and is troubled by, familial and socio-cultural discourses, 
or their lack. It offers a way into making sense of disjointed experiences, 
memories, silences. It speaks ghosts, hauntings, ephemeral flights.  
The text you are about to read does not offer assured finitude; it offers little in 
terms of referencing a grand theoretical overarching framework. What it does 
do, however, can be understood as a process of unfolding what had previously 
been kept tightly under wraps, an unfolding of articulations around loss, 
around trauma and its reverberations, always under some proviso, some 
means of retracting, of troubling certitude and conviction, as if trauma and 
ghosts can only be made meaning of through fragmentary and refracted 
narrativization. I iteratively visit themes from a slightly different angle, use 
creative forms not only in respect of the empirical work of this thesis, but also 
in my attempt to draw you into debates around trauma, epistemology, or 
methodology. This is a ‘forewarning’, of sorts, of a long wait for more personal 
stories; at times, I imagine, it is a frustrating and, possibly, even unbearable 
wait, purposefully undertaken to evoke some of the imponderables I needed 
to negotiate in my coming into language.  
My vocabulary is knotted into linguistic sequences that pay as much attention 
to form as to content; but such is the nature of knots that whatever is linearly 
aligned has the propensity of breaking when tugged, or ending up knotted 




into knots! Narrations into and out of such writing practices problematize 
what I understand as re-presentations of research which do not always ‘play 
by the book’, even if THE book has been closed on account of its persistent 
lack around ambiguous, or possibly dubious knowledge claims. Narrations 
into what appear to be uncharted waters offer, once one steps into the flow, 
stepping stones in the form of others who negotiated such hazards 
successfully (Gannon, 2013). The ‘narrative turn’, articulated initially by social 
constructionists (Hyvärinen, 2010) in response to hegemonic assumption 
around what Bochner (2013:52) calls “the sanctified scientific doctrine of truth 
through method” sought to deconstruct grand narratives in favour of 
knowledge situated in small stories, stories told from the margins, in voices 
often omitted from prevailing discourses. In addition, I seek to problematize 
narrations which are buttressed by a rather categorical assumption of a 
cohesive subjectivity, offering instead an ‘I’ that gives merely an impression of 
coherence. That my endeavours break with some of the conventions of what a 
thesis should look like is intentional: built on a telling, as theses are generally 
wont to do, this text is interlaced with showings in that it purposefully hurtles 
the reader into complexities which seek to convey traumatic flashes, acting as 
diffractive (Barad, 2003) device to the experiences that have come to underpin 
my understanding of traumatic reverberations.  
To be iteratively caught in performativity, is that not the nature by which life, 
or what we take for it, is laid out? In repetitious encounters, so often out of the 
blue, with fears, anxieties, horrors, unwanted memories, we had perpetually, 
and erroneously, thought to have suffused with enough re-enactments to put 
them ‘to rest’, only to start again, somewhat differently, somewhat adjacently, 
but always invested in bringing to the fore what has lain in deep shadows? 




Is it the fixicity with which the ‘laying to rest’ trope substantiates the majority 
of first-person accounts of trauma that mainly informs my critique? Is there a 
way of reading Denzin (2013:126), who suggests that “in writing an 
autoethnographic life story, I create the conditions for rediscovering the 
meanings of a past sequence of events”, without being troubled by the way in 
which the ‘autoethnographic life story’ seems to slip effortlessly into an 
amalgam of autonomous conditions that seek insightful foreclosure through 
epiphanies of an ‘and-it-all-becomes-clear-in-the-end’ type? While such 
narrations would show, as Bochner (2013:52) attests, “characters embedded in 
the complexities of lived moments of struggle, resisting intrusions of chaos, 
disconnection, fragmentation, marginalization, and incoherence; and trying to 
preserve or restore continuity and coherence”, how can I possibly find 
resonance in their ulterior goal “to make happiness more probable” (2013:54)? 
I find Bochner’s reflection on the sine qua non of autoethnography not only 
contentious but also reductive. What he suggests, if I understand him 
correctly, is a way of appropriating experience by proxy, as an amalgamation 
of the writer’s and the reader’s affective response, the ‘epiphanic moment’ 
(Ellis, Adams, & Bochner, 2011), in order to “experience an experience” as 
suggested by Ellis (Ellis,1993, cited in Ellis et al., 2011:277). Apart from the 
impossibility of doing just so, after all, the subject who thinks and writes 
experience is always already different to the subject of the experience (and 
which should be understood as a newly constructed and interpreted event), I 
certainly do not want to deny a certain pull towards sharing narratives. After 
all, as Sawrey (2005:792) says, “people share plot lines and recognize their lives 
in the life of others”, it is its purpose I find harder to swallow – coherence, 
continuity, and happiness. And yet, with “the question of happiness [as] the 




most urgent calling of autoethnography” (Bochner, 2013:53), is it entirely 
spurious to follow its trajectory and arrive at a ‘healing’ trope as overarching 
principle in writing autoethnographic accounts of trauma?  
“My suggestion that the textual self is a performance draws attention to the 
artfulness of ethnographic writing that is responsive” says Gannon (2013:229). 
I respond to my situated particularity through writing. I write in a variety of 
genres, from dialogue, by way of a letter, a riff on repetitious beginnings 
towards a take on multi-layered polyvocality. As such this text can be read in 
terms of what St.Pierre (1997:407) might call “figurations […] that tear through 
the orderliness of humanist language”, a tear that resonates with what has 
remained, and most likely still remains, elusive. I write into silence, into 
shreds, seek out a modicum of terra firma from which I can begin to locate 
myself at the cusp of the unspeakable. Such fragmentary writings, or writings 
into marginal borders, form a substantial part of the frame informing this 
thesis, and from which I begin to trouble the ground of autoethnographic 
performative accounts of trauma. I am unable to demarcate a defining line 
between autoethnographic and performative writing; it seems wilful, arbitrary 
even. There is indeed “no longer a God’s eye view which guarantees absolute 
methodological certainty”, so Denzin (2013:70) , in a riff on Haraway (1988a), 
assures me. I nevertheless ask if autoethnography, informed by a narrative 
“that critiques the situatedness of self with others in social contexts” (Spry, 
2001:710), is sufficiently marked by iterative resonances between self and other 
to be comparable to a performance practice, “whose essence”, as Pelias 
(2013:397) so poignantly contends, “is found in its disagreement about its 
nature”, and, if so, whether it holds on to a value system deeply embedded in 
interrelationality. I return to the argument later on when drawing on the 




notion of a self whose account, as Butler (2005:8) would have it, is always 
“implicated in a social temporality that exceeds its own capacity for narration; 
indeed, when the ‘I’ seeks to give an account of itself, an account that must 
include the conditions of its own emergence, it must, as a matter of necessity, 
become a social theorist.”  
This thesis reflects some of the balancing acts (Holman Jones, 2005) I 
performed into and out of my writings. “It is” says Speedy (2013:29), “as if I 
keep meeting myself arriving at the same brief clearing […], but each time I 
arrive it is from setting out along a different pathway.” My writings are, at 
times, purposefully difficult, in an attempt to mirror some of the difficulties I 
have experienced in grappling with flights into absences which became 
vividly present in language, only to disappear at the blink of an eye. My eyes, 
whose gaze was held by what was at the time not recognizable, not 
calibratable or accessible to concerns I, much later, began to understand as 
“culpability of history’s legacy” (Alexander, 2005:434). I wrote into intimate 
familial and national silences in the wake of a perfidious war; I wrote into 
trauma, into melancholia and mourning, as a means of grasping what was at 
stake: “ 
[Performative writing] operates metaphorically to render absence present – to 
bring the reader into contact with ‘other worlds’ ” says Pollock (1998:80), “to 
those aspects and dimensions of our world that are other to the text as such by 
re-marking them.” I am unsure if what I did could be considered in terms of 
‘re-marking’, rather than suturing an embodied probability onto a linguistic 
possibility. I marked, and was marked by, utterances whose flow I was at 
times barely able to contain within the terms of available discourses. I took 




solace in Phelan’s (1993:168) remark that “in the sociality of the production of 
meaning, words and symptoms mutate as they pass across the thresholds 
housing us in different bodies”. I read her ‘sociality’ against the isolative 
qualities I am familiar with, where thresholds marked less a traverse into 
potentiality as their inherent danger. I knew from early on that words had 
meaning only in singularity and specificity, dedications, if you will, to 
immutable significance.   
I am sitting at my desk; the strong fingers of an autumn storm play an 
orchestral piece on the single string of the flagpole, and then – silence, only to 
be punctuated again by an intense staccato. White noise, I believe it is called, 
undiscernible background racket against which thoughts surface to an 
unknown rhythm. Ta-ta-ta-ta-tttt-tat-tat-ta-ta-ta. Again, always different, 
again. And again.  
And it is by way of repetitiousness that I begin to seek out discursive 
undergirdings to what is so delicately and complexly interwoven into the 
particularities of narrative uncertainties, in order to settle on psychoanalytic 
and, to a lesser extent, psychosocial theory. How do I read this body, my body, 
in all its alienable and alienated dispositions, its ‘paralytic pauses’, against the 
script of theories which, while “believing their own terms to be the most 
comprehensive, the most basic, the most fundamental route to establishing or 
unsettling the stability of the real” (Phelan, 1993:3), know of its paradoxical 
axiom, that is, the mapping of the unconscious as “that chapter in my history 
which is marked by a blank or occupied by a falsehood: it is the censored 
chapter” (Lacan, 1973:21)?  




Psychoanalysis offers, on reflection, the definitiveness of a theory which 
thrives on what is censored, impenetrable, what is ghostly and haunting; it 
thrives, in a sense, on what it does not know, on what needs, necessarily, to 
remain unknowable. Yet, it offers a ‘something’ onto which I can hang 
memory-fragments and their enmeshment with fissures and gaps. I write 
psychoanalytic theory in order to anchor myself, as if writing into trauma and 
ghosts cannot be done without a metaphorical theoretical safety jacket. 
Furthermore, psychoanalytic theory offers an extensive lead into trauma 
theory, serves as paradigmatic marker in order to make sense of what I begin 
to think of as “the ineradicable legacies of violent histories through 
generations”, as Schwab (2010:1) so succinctly puts it. Often referred to as 
‘transgenerational transmission of trauma’ with its rather mechanistic and 
directive undertones, I rename the process, call it ‘reverberation’, with notions 
of repetitious reflections in all directions.  
It might be a truism to say that psychoanalytic theory is the theory of trauma, 
considering that trauma has been underpinning psychoanalysis for more than 
a century ever since Freud and Breuer (1893/1956:6) developed a specific 
theory in response to their studies on the nature of hysteria: “In traumatic 
neuroses the operative cause of the illness is not the trifling physical injury but 
the affect of fright – the psychical trauma”. While Freud refines theories in 
light of an ever evolving understanding of his patients’ afflictions, in particular 
around his work with soldiers marked by what they had to bear witness to in 
the trenches, he remains firmly accountable to the epistemic certainties at the 
beginning of the 20th century with their unprecedented drive towards 
scientization. My investment in Freudian territory, however, is not an attempt 
to trace the seemingly ineradicable momentum towards an ideology of 




psychological pathologization underpinned by notions of individuated 
autonomy, but rather a search towards a less foundationally defined, more 
ambiguous, fluid subjectivity, constituted in and through the other. 
And it is by way of the other that this text, this thesis, accrues momentum. 
Drawing on theories of performativity, positioned adjunct, but not necessarily 
in opposition to ethnographic subjectivity, my suggestions can be read as 
means of writing into registers which contest hegemonic knowledge claims of 
“coherence, centering, singularity, and authenticity” (de Freitas & Paton, 
2009:484). The ‘I’, in all her heterogeneous incohesive subject position gives 
over to an ‘in-betweenness’ to settle on an always already ‘more than’, or what 
Spry (2011:506) calls “an embodied communion (pleasant and difficult) with 
others.” Entangled with what is not of me, what can, possibly, never be 
rendered into a sufficiently-defined linguistic idiom, I circle around the notion 
of ‘data’, offering in turn a variety of beginnings into the complex, and often 
implicit undergirdings that contribute to its figuration. Contesting the 
Deleuzian argument that relies on inchoate intensity bereft of signifiers in 
order to propose a plane of multiplicities, I locate myself against what I 
consider the terror of deterritorialization and side with an amalgam of 
uncertainty and calibration, performative to the extent that it always speaks to 
its own “reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of meaning already 
established” (Butler, 1999:178), yet is undercut by the impossibility of doing 
just so.  
Ghosts, I suggest, slide into such radical instability, they settle on the cusps of 
waves, large swells which unmoor the most secured anchors. They ride into 
view when least expected. Nothing is as it seems, they whisper silently from up 




close afar. Imagine. And listen. And I don’t know what comes first – the listening 
or the imagining – but, possibly, such distinctions have become unnecessary 
in the entwinement of fear and love, informing, as they do, not only “the 
domains of the speakable, but are themselves bounded through the 
production of a constitutive outside: the unspeakable, the unsignifiable” 
(Butler, 1997:94).  
And here I am, here we are, you with me, you and me, folding stories into each 
other, conjuring voices, colliding with theory, failing theory, but always, 
always writing, because, frankly, what else could I possibly do? 
  




Two.  Kitchen Conversations: Theorizing Trauma and its Echoes 
 
I drink the last drops of tea, smooth the rim of the cup against my lips. My 
thoughts are like fish that don’t want to be caught; they slip around, and I 
follow headlong into memories, theories, cul-de-sacs, fail to grasp anything 
long enough before the distraction of another promise – of clarity, or of 
theoretical steadfastness - stops me right in my tracks, and I feel disloyal to 
what I have not yet clutched, rendered into language with which I can begin. 
Beginnings. 
I stay put, look intently at the framed photo which is propped against a vase 
of daffodils. There she is, I think, there she is, and yet, apart from the image 
right here in front, what else can I say? It is not, I whisper almost inaudibly, as 
if there is nothing to say, I just don’t know how to. How to proceed in 
uncovering what has been tightened into a dense mass of silence, until she, I, 
needed to look beyond the wooden frame, the boundary that defined what I 
was privy to know and what was ‘out of bounds’.  
‘What are you up to, mum?’ My daughter Kitty’s voice is soft, slips into my 
reminiscence like a cool fan. 
‘I am trying something. I am trying to make some sort of sense,’ I answer, 
‘some way of beginning what has so far been devilish hard to get hold of…’  
‘Hmmm, not sure I get you.’  
‘I’m not sure I get myself, Kitty. I am looking at this,’ I point at the image, ‘and 
then… then I just seem to get sucked into into a maelstrom of thoughts, 
feelings, nothings.’ 




Kitty takes the photo, strokes the glass in a gesture that is as much cleansing 
filaments of dust as shy comfort. She looks at the image, looks at me, back to 
the image.  
‘This is…’ her voice is hesitant. 
‘I was four or five, I think.’ 
‘Mum… you look as if you have to go somewhere else, as if you don’t belong 
any more, and this…’ she hesitates, ‘this makes me sad. It looks like you had 
left way before the picture was taken. What happened, what on earth 
happened?’ 
Yes, I muse, what on earth happened? 
 
I wrote the above intermezzo as entry point into what is to follow, that is, as 
the beginnings of thinking of significant dissonances, of silences, in terms of 
multifarious reverberations of trauma. In what is to follow, I adopt a 
psychoanalytically-informed frame of reference in an interweave of theory 
and contextual particulars of a life in Post-War Germany in the 1950s, a life 
lived against the backdrop of unimaginable loss. It stands to reason that 
attempts to render into words what had been shifted into margins, or what 
had been pushed into recesses carry their own set of ghostly presences, in the 
way that gaps or fragmentations of language, the recalibrations into speech, or 
writing, stir up some of the resonances in which these hauntings have arisen 
in the first place. To conjecture that my experiences fall within the categories 
of trauma should not be read as overarching claim; it is but one way of making 




sense of the profound questions I have had in relation to an embodied sense 
of being, of being wordless in the context of what needed to be spoken.  
‘What on earth happened?’ addresses more than just an incidental event, to be 
passed over, slipped into a category labelled ‘experience’, and almost 
forgotten about. As I unravel further later on, any event, no matter how 
seemingly insignificant, has the propensity of sliding into the foreground. 
“Somehow, day-to-day events in my life have a way of triggering memories. 
Somehow, ordinary daily occurrences are not so ordinary when they become 
gateways to recovering memories” says Poulos (2012:319). The difficulties 
arise, I think, when these occurrences fail to make the leap into recovering 
memories associated with the incidents to which they were initially tied. I 
missed the stepping stones which connected the dots between events when I 
was young, and for a long time I have remained tethered to the liminal space 
of, what to me, feels like ‘more than nothing, yet less than something’. And is 
there not an altogether other incongruity at play here, in that accounts of 
trauma inevitably omit such ambiguity and neatly present a package devoid 
of its very nature? Is this, after all, the nub of what is so difficult? The 
im/possibility of speaking trauma, silence, ghosts, in a way that acknowledges 
its own paradox?  
I am caught by the preceding sentence. I hover over the paradoxical nature of 
writing first-person accounts of trauma, as if the ‘I’ can speak coherently of its 
own demise, its own fragmentation. Undoubtedly, autoethnographic 
literature attempts to write and offer insights into the nature of trauma 
through accounts infused with the researcher’s subjectivity, ‘sitting in the 
gore’ as Tamas (2009) so compellingly puts it – but, as Gannon (2006:477) 




attests, “much autoethnographic work leaves the speaking self relatively 
untroubled in the text.” The autoethnographic field is rich in evocative 
narratives which, I suggest, assume a rather homogenous subject position, 
weighted towards consistency rather than authorial ambiguity and 
incoherence. 
Of course, the writing of autoethnography is always embedded in the actuality 
of the narrator’s life, where “every telling is constrained, partial, and 
determined by the discourses and histories that prefigure, even as they might 
promise, representation” (Britzman, 1995:232). A testimony, as Tamas 
(2011:55) argues, “cannot offer totalized, complete accounts. It is both formally 
and temporally complex, and may behave like a fantasy.” The issue, I have 
come to realize, is not how to write trauma, but the manner in which the 
elusiveness, ambiguity and silence associated with trauma can be approached, 
by turning “back on the very act of writing, making it difficult if not impossible 
to make sense, to make claims, to make meaning” (Pollock, 1998:73). 
What I offer in this thesis is a beginning of sorts, a beginning into incomplete 
narratives that interweave psychoanalytic theory of trauma into the discovery 
of the photographic image in a balance of telling and showing. I continue by 
way of dialogue, the invocation of an other as reflective interlocutor, in 
awareness of Jackson and Mazzei’s (2008b:303) warning that “the notion of a 
coherent , explanatory subject who gathers up meaning and reflexively lays 
bare the process of knowledge-production, as if that process is self-evident” 
would suffice in allaying my fears that any process of meaning-making is not 
always inherently problematic.  




So, where do we go from here? I mean, what you are about to undertake is tricky, 
particularly if you draw on psychoanalytic theory and juxtapose a THEORY with 
your last claim of not making any claims! 
We have a rather wonderful saying in German: Nichts wird so heiss gegessen wie 
es gekocht wird. What that means is that ‘nothing gets eaten as hot as when it 
comes just off the stove’.  
I’m not really sure what you are saying… 
I am somewhat troubled by the assumption that we can speak ‘healing’ or 
‘coping’ with trauma. And while I certainly do not mean “to trivialize the 
trauma written about in autoethnography” (Clough, 2000:287), I suggest that 
we begin by inquiring into the nature of trauma before attempting to ‘do 
something to it’ - think it, speak it, write it – that is, consider it as acts of 
interpretation the purpose of which is not necessarily embedded in ‘healing’. 
Let’s talk theory, theory that has possibly, and most likely, something to say 
to my perplexed question of ‘What on earth happened?’ 
What on earth happened? 
I cannot give an explanatory answer, and yet, something of a sufficiently 
significant nature might have happened for me to forget. And it is in light of 
my forgetting… 
That what has happened can possibly be understood as trauma? 
Not everything we forget is due to trauma. However, traumatic memories 
often provoke such profound anxieties that they become unavailable to 
conscious thought. We, simply, cannot but forget. Or rather, our ego is 




invested in keeping itself in a relative state of equilibrium, and we repress in 
order to prevent a release of anxiety. 
This is a bit fast right now. I mean, you speak ego and repression and anxiety as if I 
should know and frankly, I don’t, so if you don’t mind… 
Of course, I am sorry. In order to locate ourselves in psychoanalytic theory… 
I reckon we start with – well, I do get an inkling with whom we need to start! 
We might have to detour deep into Freudian territory, and this, I’m afraid, 
might well take a while, and… (Pause). 
I’ve got time. 
No time but the present, no? Ego, repression, anxiety - when Freud argued 
almost a century ago that “the data of consciousness have a very large number 
of gaps in them” (1915/1964c:166), he sought to draw on a concept that tried to 
make sense of experiences which could not be grasped otherwise. Dreams, 
slips of the tongue, neurotic symptoms – these expressions were hinting at 
unacknowledged wishes, impulses, urges and ensuing anxieties which needed 
to be kept at bay (Nicholas Abraham & Torok, 1994; Frosh, 2012). Freud names 
this process Verdrängung, or repression, as that which has been ‘pushed away’.  
If I understand Freud correctly, he suggests that behind every conscious thought lies 
the miasma of what needs to be shoved into the margins, or repressed? 
Yes. But he goes further. He surmises that the unconscious is solely graspable 
through the return of what has been repressed. Freud says: “Thus we obtain 
our concept of the unconscious from the theory of repression” (1923-1925/ 
1961:15). What seems imperative in his theory is the causal relationship 
between symptom, and the uncovering of its unconscious source. In fact, he 




states that “symptoms are never constructed from conscious processes; as soon 
as the unconscious processes have become conscious, the symptom must 
disappear” (1916-1917/1963:279).  
1916 – a bare two years into the First World War.  
I am in no doubt that his ideas were deeply marked by the war experiences he 
came to witness. But we should not forget that he began his writings in the 
1890s and continuously revised his theories on account of his extensive 
casework. In any case, were we to extend the line of thought further, we cannot 
but ask what kind of links might exist between the Great War, the 
development of psychoanalytic thinking, and “what happened when the 
psychoanalytic movement was brutally faced with the requirement to defend 
or repudiate its Jewish identity” that is, when “it met its great political 
adversary, Nazism” (Frosh, 2009:3). 
The period your parents were born into, and your grandparents… 
But of course! Both sets of grandparents lived through World War 1, and my 
parents were born in the 1920s; they belonged to the first post-war generation, 
just like me.  
And? 
Irrespective of what an inquiry into trauma and its reverberations will shed 
light on, is it not interesting to think through the possible implications of these 
linkages? How much should be made of what Frosh (2009:1) calls the ‘Jewish 
science’, in the sense that most psychoanalysts at the time had been Jewish, 
“but those who are not Jewish are frequently thought of as if they were”? And, 
were we to concur with Frosh’s argument, in how far are the advances in 




psychoanalytic theory counterpointed by the steady and unstoppable rise in 
anti-Semitism? The inter-war period spoke to traumatic echoes, reflected and 
generated in the socio-cultural and political discourses of its time. What was 
played out in my parents’ families, what was talked about, and, possibly more 
importantly, what was rendered unsayable? Can the suggestion hold that 
something of a repetitious nature might make itself known, when we think of 
the previous generation held in the grip of “encapsulated and imprisoned 
anxieties, terrors and confusions of the adults surrounding them, and in 
particular from the words and even the phonemes with which these terrors 
were transmitted, apparently over their heads but in reality unconsciously 
penetrating and dis-easing them” (Bacon, 2010:16)?  
Hmmm  
Indeed! These questions do not necessarily require an answer; they hint, I 
think, at inflections that permeate your life, my life; palimpsests, or, as Bacon 
(2010:5) would have it, “the welter of half-heard, half-understood but intensely 
felt ‘other’ voices which the child is surrounded by and through which he is 
trying to orient and understand himself and the world.” What we are 
beginning to grapple with are theoretical underpinnings to processes where a 
child’s orientation and understanding of the world are compromised to such 
an extent that only fragments remain available to the adult, shards of memory, 
intersected by silences, inhabited by ghosts. (Pause) 
Trauma?  
I would think so. (Pause)  
Voiceless?   




Sometimes. (Pause). The haze of what needs to be repressed, to paraphrase 
Freud. (Pause). The symptom, as he says, is solely the “derivative of 
unconscious processes” (1916-1917/1963:279). 
Ergo - if we become aware of the processes by which the symptom is produced, it should 
just disappear? 
It seems so simple, doesn’t it? The freeing from the shackles of the 
unconscious… Mind you, it needs to be read against the context of its time, 
when the endeavour to prove psychoanalysis’ contribution to science had to 
be underpinned by a positivist vision of true humanist possibilities. The 
concept of the unconscious became the lens through which previously 
incomprehensible behaviour or traits not only began to make sense, but 
offered a way out of the “isolating, frustrating, conflictual clutches of the 
remnants of infantile mental life” (S. Mitchell, 1993:16). 
So if we go into analysis, we do so in order…  
“to uncover the fragments of the patient’s latent dynamics embedded in the 
associations and to reconstruct their original configurations” (S. Mitchell, 
1993:58). Similar to an archaeological dig, the analyst uncovers what has 
always been there, albeit kept hidden. Lacan (1973:21) calls the unconscious 
“that chapter of my history which is marked by a blank or occupied by 
falsehood: it is the censored chapter.” It is, in contrast to consciousness, not 
governed by rational or logical restraints (Frosh, 2012). In dreams, for example, 
time and space condense or expand, they “paint a timeless montage, brushed 
freely by remnants of past, present, and possible future experience” 
(Schneider, 2010:521).The paradox seems to be that while we can ascertain 
from Freud’s description that “the repressed is the prototype of the 




unconscious” (1923-1925/ 1961:15) - which he, incidentally, subdivides further 
into the preconscious and the unconscious - 
Hold on a minute! How can something be so finitely categorized that can only be 
apprehended through inference?  
I don’t really know. I imagine that Freud needed a matrix which could explain 
the processes whereby ideas, on the cusp of rising into conscious thought, 
needed to be repressed. “The reason” Freud (1923-1925/ 1961:14) says “why 
such ideas cannot become conscious is that a certain force opposes them, that 
otherwise they would become conscious”. The beliefs or ideas which can never 
come into conscious thought are subject to ‘Verdrängung’2, they are pushed 
aside or away because “they are so shocking or painful that something stops 
them from making that journey” (Billig, 1999:16). We keep those ideas hidden 
in the recess of our unconscious, even from ourselves.  
And given that we need a certain equilibrium to live our lives, your original question 
begins to make sense. ‘What on earth happened’ is an inquiry into what you had to 
keep under wraps, not because you wanted to, but because you couldn’t do otherwise. 
And was the post-war earth not truly a devastated and devastating place? (Pause).  
I would think that something of that nature played its part. (Pause). The image 
of the little girl in her coat and headscarf speaks quietly to a home that did not, 
does not feel safe, imbued with “childhood memories, just as impenetrable as 
are such documents when I do not know their source” (Lacan, 1973:21). 
(Pause). But back to Freud for now: you recall he argues that not everything 
that has been hidden in the depth of the unconscious is solely a derivative of 
                                                          
2 repression 




trauma. Furthermore, he suggests, that “repression is not a defence 
mechanism which is present from the very beginning” (1914-1916/1964:147). 
Billig (1999:17) puts it quite categorically: “We have to create our unconscious. 
Unless we do something – unless we repress or push aside thoughts – we 
won’t have an unconscious. In this respect, the unconscious has to be created 
by an activity”.  
And the activity in question…  
I am unclear if the dominant activity is repression. But what can be argued is 
a foregrounding of language. The unconscious is dynamic, a dynamic storage 
facility for ideas or wishes, which are of prime importance to a person who 
cannot express them. It “needs time to reveal itself” according to Lacan 
(1973:77). Psychoanalysis’ axiomatic task could be understood as being in the 
service of such revelations, or, in Billig’s (1999:40) terms, “undoing the 
blockage, allowing the unconscious thought to flow into conscious 
awareness.” 
Is this your investment? Are you invested in ‘undoing the blockage’? Is that behind 
writing yourself into fragments of memory? Do you intend to grasp what is hidden 
behind the story of the little girl who needed to look to what lay beyond the picture 
frame?  
Questions, questions, questions… Patience, my dear! I am not sure if the term 
‘undoing the blockage’ does not align itself rather too smoothly with my 
substantive critique in relation to autoethnographies of trauma, in that the 
process of ‘undoing’ results ultimately in an ‘undone’ – as  healing, as moving 
on, or as coping with. Besides, I am equally unsure if there is a finitude to grasp 
‘behind the story’ or ‘beyond the frame’. (Pause). 




(Pause). And yet, here you are, invested in psychoanalytic theory to begin to make 
sense of what has been elusive.  
What a paradox, isn’t it? The search for coherence and meaning-making in the 
face of profound meaninglessness. Where were we? 
The unconscious is dynamic… 
And some ideas or beliefs are so anxiety-provoking that they cannot be 
allowed to rise to the surface of consciousness. Terrifying unconscious 
impulses need to be defended against. All defence mechanisms can be thought 
of as arbiters in a continuous negotiation between unconscious ideas and 
anxiety arising out of those ideas. But instead of working retroactively, 
defence mechanisms ward off threats “before the attack materializes. This still 
involves identifying a threat, but now well in advance of its actually making 
itself felt” (Billig, 1999:56). 
A threat to what or to whom? 
In short – to the ego. Freud (1923-1925/ 1961:17 original in italics) says that “we 
have formed the idea that in each individual there is a coherent organization 
of mental processes; and this we call his ego”, and he goes on like this: “The 
ego represents what may be called reason and common sense, in contrast to 
the id, which contains the passion” (1923-1925/ 1961:25). 
So the ego feels threatened by unconscious beliefs and defends itself? How so? 
Remember that the ego is invested in the repression of ideas which challenge 
its equilibrium. Hence material which is too anxiety-provoking needs to be 
shut off from conscious thought, through denial, projection, displacement, 
reaction-formation (Frosh, 2012), for example. Traumatic memories often 




provoke such profound fears that they become unavailable to conscious 
thought. 
And we repress in order to prevent a release of anxiety? 
Freud calls these repressions: repression proper, or after-pressure (1914-
1916/1964), in contrast to primal repressions, which act on the representation of 
drives, in the way “that the ideas attached to the drives are so troubling that 
they are repressed before they are even known” (Frosh, 2012:60 original in italics).  
So we repress in order to not know what we don’t know? This ties us into a Gordian 
knot. And how would we know what we don’t know? Is this preventative forgetting? 
I think that Freud tries to solve it partially by offering a very ambiguous and 
ultimately too ill-defined concept: “The ego is not sharply separated from the 
id; its lower portion merges into it. But the repressed merges into the id as 
well, and is merely a part of it” (1923-1925/ 1961:24). The difficulty arising here 
is that the unconscious ego tries to protect the conscious ego by means of 
unconscious repression (Billig, 1999).  
Hmmm  
Maybe we can content ourselves for the time being with concepts that 
understand repression as an unconscious strategy of ego defence.   
Hang on a minute. What about the id? I assume that we cannot conceptualise one 
without the other?  
Indeed. And let’s not forget the super-ego, which acts as internal judge in 
setting up particular idealised norms or values, firmly held in the unconscious. 
To recap: Freud saw the id as the unconscious ground inhabited by drives and 
repressed ideas, with the ego developing into a complex system of negotiation: 




“As a frontier-creature, the ego tries to mediate between the world and the id, 
to make the id pliable to the world and, by means of its muscular activity, to 
make the world fall in with the wishes of the id” (1923-1925/ 1961:56). 
So the ego is an arbiter between self and environment?  
It seems that way. And it does so on account of a process called internalization:  
“What this means is that the ego takes as its paradigm the experiences, 
fundamental to early life, of taking things in to build itself […], and getting rid 
of things in order to free itself from discomfort” (Frosh, 2012:73). For Bollas 
(2011:60), a “child who internalizes generative parents – who contribute to the 
evolution of his personal idiom – aims to develop such inner processes and to 
seek the excitation and novelty as means of triggering personal growth”.  
And in childhood trauma such processes are somewhat compromised?  
Could the suggestion be upheld that a child whose parents have been unable 
to be generative in Bollas’ sense is thoroughly curtailed in making sense not 
only in relation to itself, but also in relation to the Other? That a child who 
witnesses “and [is] afflicted by the collapse, disappearance or transformation 
of trusted and idealised figures and symbols while at the same time finding 
ways to survive and make some sort of sense of not only what was said and 
could be seen, but perhaps as important what was not said, what [she is] 
believed not to have heard or seen or felt” (Bacon, :9) is caught in perpetual 
liminality? (Pause).  
(Pause) 
We are engaged in iterative processes where the ego tries to consolidate the 
demands of the super-ego, at the same time as the libidinal drives of the id.  





Colloquially, it is what keeps us in check, the prohibitions we have 
internalized, “the compelling obedience” as Frosh (2012:74f) puts it, “to an 
internal authority”. He goes on: “Unconscious ideas pump away, demanding 
things, and the ego has to mediate between them and reality so that the 
individual does not suffer too much. They are amoral and potentially 
dissolute, and it is the task of the superego to maintain standards, even if by 
doing so the individual becomes overly constrained”. We are all, in a return to 
Freud, driven by instincts which fall outwith the realm of external pressure. 
He says: “In the first place, an instinctual stimulus does not arise from the 
external world but from within the organism itself” (1914-1916/1964:118). For 
Freud, these stimuli are the “signs of an internal world, the evidence of 
instinctual needs” (1914-1916/1964:118), and these needs seek satisfaction. 
Freud draws a definitive line between an instinct or drive whose aim is 
satisfaction, and the object which might offer such aim. Frosh (2012:46 original 
in italics) says: “Drives […] are basic biological forces operating all the time 
and fuelling the psychological activities of the mind”.  
But surely we cannot function if we were to follow Freud’s dictum? We cannot just 
let our drives run riot! 
Of course not! Remember that we spoke about the task of the ego as mediator. 
A strong case is to be made, however, for locating the root of Freud’s vision in 
conflict, in our need to repress our instinctual stimuli in order to attain a 
modicum of order. Conflict plays out against what Freud calls the “instincts 
and their vicissitudes” (1915/1964a) with their desirous inclinations. Billig 
(1999:74) argues that “two sets of processes – the social and the repressing – 




unfold in parallel”. We can think of these conflicts as counterbalances in order 
“to prevent the ego being overwhelmed by anxiety” (Frosh, 2012:51 ). 
Go on! 
Is the notion of an ego overwhelmed by anxiety not familiar? Are we not 
talking trauma? Freud is familiar with phenomena he begins to term 
‘traumatic neuroses’, on account of his observations of soldiers returning from 
the Front with particular unfamiliar phenomena. Conceptualizations of 
trauma as psychopathology accrued relevance in light of a shift from the 
medico-physiological model of wounding, breaking of the skin due to 
excessive force, and its effect on the whole body. Freud’s appropriation of the 
term defines trauma as wounding of the mind due to an emotional shock.  
Wounding of the mind due to an emotional shock… (Pause). I am beginning to get a 
sense of your inquiry - and ‘What on earth happened’ somehow accrues more 
relevance. (Pause). 
Trauma consigns itself to perpetuity, as Freud argues in his lecture ‘Fixation 
to traumas – the unconscious’ (1916-1917/1963:275): “We apply it to an 
experience which within a short period of time presents the mind with an 
increase of stimulus too powerful to be dealt with or worked off in the normal 
way, and this must result in permanent disturbances of the manner in which 
the energy operates.” Furthermore, these phenomena, like flashbacks, 
nightmares, dreams of terror, incomprehensible events, have a tendency to re-
present themselves, as making themselves present, in what Freud calls the 
‘compulsion to repeat’: “He [the patient] is obliged to repeat the repressed 
material as a contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would 
prefer to see, remembering it as something belonging to the past” (1920/1964:18 




original in italics). The compulsions, Freud begins to argue, to repeat what is 
profoundly unpleasant could be related to “an urge inherent in organic life to 
restore an earlier state of things” (1920/1964:36).  
I’m not sure I understand you. (Pause). 
Freud theorized what has become known as drive theory as early as 1905, 
when he came to recognize a primary drive invested in sexuality – 
underpinning the seminal ‘pleasure principle’ He revised his 
conceptualizations in the 1920s on the grounds that not everything can be 
attributed to sexuality in need of satisfaction. In offering instead a dualistic 
model (after conceding that “the aim of all life is death” (1920/1964:38)), he 
seeks to account for an inherent conservatism, and sets the death drive in 
opposition to the sexual drive. Both drives, Eros and Thanatos, are invested in 
the reduction of tension. In 1923, Freud refines his concept further. Eros 
comprises uninhibited and inhibited sexual instincts as well as ego-
preservative instincts, whereas the death instinct, with “sadism as its 
representative” (1923/1961:40) is invested in destruction. “Both [instincts] 
would be endeavouring to re-establish a state of things that was disturbed by 
the emergence of life” (1923/1961); the struggle, if you will, is part of the 
“complex interplay of the Eros–death instinct” according to Tauber (2012:44), 
without which the ego remains thwarted by the vicissitudes of the id.  
And what about the ‘re-establishment’ to a state of things prior to disturbances? It 
sounds somewhat biblical. 
You recall that we talked about drives and the need for satiating objects? That 
the other, or object, in the Freudian sense, is purely a means for satisfaction? 




Eros is permanently on the hunt for objects, initially, as Freud would have it, 
narcissistically inflected… 
Hold on a minute. Are you saying I can be the object of my desires? 
Freud argues as early as 1917 that he thinks of auto-eroticism as “the universal 
and original state of things, from which object-love is only later developed, 
without the narcissism necessarily disappearing on that account” (1916-
1917/1964:416). Finding such object, however, is “fairly complex and no 
comprehensive account has hitherto been given of them” (1916-
1917/1963:329). He goes on to conclude, however, that “the first object of the 
oral component of the sexual instinct is the mother’s breast which satisfies the 
infant’s need for nourishment. The erotic component, which is satisfied 
simultaneously during the [nutritive] sucking, makes itself independent with 
the act of sensual sucking [lutschen]; it gives up the outside object and replaces 
it by an area of the subject’s own body. The oral instinct becomes auto-erotic, 
as are the anal and other erotogenic instincts from the first. Further 
development […] has two aims: firstly the abandonment of auto-erotism, the 
replacement of the subject’s own body once more by an outside object, and 
secondly, the unification of the various objects of the separate instincts and 
their replacement by a single object” (1916-1917/1963:328f italics in original). 
And it all begins with the mother. In fact, it’s all and always about mother. (Pause) 
Mother, and mothers. (Pause).  
Hmm. (Pause.) 
(Pause). And yet, is Freud’s description of erotic desire sufficient? Is there not 
also a reciprocity at play?   





Rose (2014) puts it quite succinctly when she asks “why does the 
psychoanalytic representation of the infant focus on the baby’s sexual 
impulses towards the mother and remain silent on those of the mother 
towards her child”?  
Are you making a case that motherhood curtails Eros? And what, frankly, has that got 
to do with trauma? 
Following her suggestion that “mothering [seems to be] one of the ways our 
culture purifies itself of the sexuality that in most cases still brings motherhood 
about” (Rose, 2014), can we spin Rose’s thread further? Imagine a mother who, 
in whatever way, is unable to reconcile herself with the mutual sensuousness 
of mothering, is ambivalent about its inherent eroticism, not because she is 
adverse to displaying what she considers her erotic markers, but because 
interwoven into the fabric of sexuality are repetitious failures at bearing a 
child, at mothering. (Pause). Might she unconsciously impart in the infant a 
sense of shame, of blame – the reminder of what was not to be? And a little 
girl, whose gaze is firmly directed outside the wooden picture frame, might 
possibly know something of the nature of unconscious concealment. (Pause). 
(Pause). 
In any case, and in returning to Freud, we can begin to understand internalized 
objects, with the mother being the first love-object, as an introduction into 
more relational aspects of psychoanalysis. But of course, as Billig (1999:73) 
would have it, “the demands of civilized life […] conflict with the instinctual 
demands of human biology. […] These instincts have to be curtailed if humans 
are to live orderly social lives.” We are, in the words of Butler (1997:2), 




dependent on “a discourse we never chose but that, paradoxically, initiates 
and sustains our agency.” The very process of becoming subject entails, to a 
certain extent, subjection, and there is always an other, even if the other is self. 
Through a tentative link of Freudian biological drive theory with relational 
concerns we embed the argument of subjectivity in a social and historical 
situatedness – there cannot be one without the other.  
I understand that the infant/mother relationship has profound implications, being, I 
assume, the blueprint for any subsequent relationships. And? I mean, is there a link 
to the nub of ‘what on earth happened’? 
I am offering, as it were, a comment on two particular aspects of an infant’s 
development. Firstly, that the infant is invested in seeking the object – mother, 
mother’s breast – in order to satiate a need according to Freudian drive theory, 
that is, as “the isolated individual contending with endogenous drives, 
conflicts, defences”  (Applegate, 1999:202). Secondly, that the infant is always 
already relationally embedded, that is, held in processes, which  “account for 
a subject who comes into being as a consequence of language”, as Butler 
(1997:106) would have it. Bacon (2010:5) argues along similar lines by 
suggesting that “we are born not only into language, but more precisely into 
words. We are formed and pre-formed by the language of others; spoken of, 
through and around long before we can speak and speak for ourselves.” In 
other words: the subject not only seeks the object, but our understanding of 
self is irrevocably connected to an other, in the sense that our subjectivity 
cannot be separated from our situatedness in the world. On returning to your 
question whether or not there exists a link… (Pause). I might tread on fragile 
ground here, but when I think through the implications for a young child 




whose world is less facilitative, or, coloured by silences rather than words, 
then a substantial potentiality is in danger of being squashed. (Pause). And is 
it not worth noting again the other trajectory, the one that posits my 
grandparents, my parents’ parents, into the timeframe of the First World War, 
with its potentially traumatizing impact? The last century was indelibly 
shaped by events of an incomprehensible magnitude. My parents, both born 
in the 1920s to parents whose lives were marked by such events, veered, in 
their teenage years, into another catastrophe. Yet how had they, in turn, been 
received, what kind of narratives were offered to them? “After all,” so Butler 
(2005:62f) “no one survives without being addressed; no one survives to tell 
his or her story without first being inaugurated into language by being called 
upon, offered some stories.” I would suggest that these considerations surely 
have had a bearing on what turned out to be a repetitious disaster. As to the 
nub – shall we see where we get to first? 
I understand you as saying that we are indelibly implicated in and by the narratives 
told all around us, we are always already in relationships. (Pause). 
That’s it! According to Applegate (1999:204), it is Donald Winnicott who has 
been credited with “germinating the key plots and subplots of the 
intersubjectivity story.” Winnicott’s focus is on early infant development and 
the relationship with the infant’s primary caregiver. The mother has the role 
of providing a ‘facilitating environment’ in which the child’s inner potential to 
develop a ‘true self’ can unfold (Frosh, 2012:110).  
Again the onus is solely on the mother. The role of the father is ill-defined. 
Undoubtedly, a certain criticism can be directed towards Winnicott and his 
view of gendered stereotypes with an idealized version of mother as arbiter in 




her infant’s development. Note the term ‘good enough mother’ which 
Winnicott coined, and which attests to her ability to name affect, and by doing 
so, ameliorate what has been fearful or anxiety-provoking to the infant. Held 
physically in her arms and emotionally in her thought, the mother offers 
security in order to enable her child “to gain a sense of trust in the world and 
of security in her or himself” (Frosh, 2012:110). The ‘good enough’ mother 
shuttles between the needs of her infant and her growing ability of self-
development.   
Was it not Winnicott who famously proclaimed that ‘there is no such thing as an 
infant’?  
He did. What he stated quite provocatively was his underlying developmental 
premise that there is no child without the attention and care of her mother. A 
child is born into a fluid and continuous matrix of language, social relations, 
culture. The ‘good enough mother’ facilitates “a mediating milieu that 
simultaneously protects and potentiates” (Applegate, 1999:205). What 
Winnicott argues is a gradual decrease of ‘primary maternal preoccupation’ 
from oneness with her infant to an increase in her affective self-regulation 
(Applegate, 1999; Frosh, 2012; Ogden, 2004). The infant is validated through 
her mother’s gaze, in that “the caregiver’s eyes reflect the infant’s gathering 
sense of self” (Applegate, 1999:207).  
And without such gaze… (Pause) 
(Pause). Indeed. One can surmise in how far a mother’s inability to name what 
could not be named could have imparted its own deep shadow not only over 
the infant, but equally over the mother/infant dyad. (Pause). The ‘good 
enough’ mother, to follow Winnicott, while attentive to her infant’s needs, 




does not take her over. “She is both there for the infant whenever needed, and 
capable of separating herself sufficiently so the infant can develop into her or 
his own self” (Frosh, 2012:111). The paradox is that the increase in the infant’s 
sense of self operates simultaneously to her disillusionment with her mother. 
Or, more precisely, it is through a sense of separateness from her mother that 
the infant can begin to sense herself. Such processes can be facilitated through 
transitional objects. 
I still have a teddy bear… 
Exactly! These objects are invested by the child with particular significance. 
“The infant – whose subjectivity had been previously tied to mother’s 
interpretation – now, for the first time, becomes the author of meaning, the 
interpreter of the blanket, teddy bear, mother’s breast, the creator/discoverer 
of the transitional object” (Gentile, 2008:936f). These objects are situated in an 
‘in-between’ space where the real meets the symbolic.  
I frankly don’t get this. What do you mean? 
We have briefly deviated into Lacanian theory and his suggestion that some 
objects have been given a privileged status, indexing “the passage from real to 
symbolic” (Leader, 2006:121); these objects are linked by absence and presence. 
While developmentally a newborn infant is “in a totally intransitive 
relationship to the world he cannot yet distinguish from himself” (Wilden, 
1968:163), and drawing on an interpretation of the Fort/Da game in Freud’s 
‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920/1964), Lacan, as read by Wilden 
(1968:163 original in italics), asserts that “for the object to be discovered by the 
child it must be absent.” In short, the object offers something of the mother 
without being the mother, it comes to re-present presence in light of her 




absence. In Winnicott’s terms, the transitional object stands for the mother and 
“for the internalized version of her which in favourable circumstances is all 
the time building up and forming the basis for belief, and for the capacity to 
suffer loss without loss of part of the self” (1955:437). 
And in less favourable circumstances, the capacity to experience loss is compromised?  
It seems to be the case, doesn’t it? Winnicott (1974:103) names such curtailment 
‘fear of breakdown’, as description of “the unthinkable state of affairs that 
underlies the defence organization.” According to him, failure in providing a 
facilitative environment may compromise the infant’s ability to regulate, or, in 
Winnicott’s words, “the ego integration is not able to encompass something. 
The ego is too immature to gather all the phenomena into the area of personal 
omnipotence” (1974:104). The paradox here is, according to Winnicott 
(1974:104 original in italics), “that clinical fear of breakdown is the fear of a 
breakdown that has already been experienced.”  
Are you saying what I think you are saying? That something of a breakdown happens 
outwith awareness of it happening? It reminds me of… (Pause). 
Trauma? Without doubt Winnicott places great emphasis on the maternal 
ability to provide a holding, and hence facilitated and mediated, environment 
to her infant; a failure to do so is registered, but “the victim of the trauma, 
caught unawares, suffers a disruption of his/her ego integration. A 
consequence of this is that the traumatic experience cannot be encompassed. 
[…] The traumatic reality cannot be met due to the limited capacity of the ego 
to process it” (Hernandez, 1998:137f). We remain, if you will, in the liminal 
territory of a non-experienced experience. (Pause). 
(Pause) 




Laplanche and Pontalis (1988:465) argue that a key component of trauma is 
“the subject’s incapacity to respond adequately to it”, ergo, we can surmise 
that trauma, in a sense, breaks into the self without possibility of protection. 
Mitchell (1998:121) suggests that “trauma, whether physical or psychical, must 
create a breach in a protective covering of such severity that it cannot be coped 
with by the usual mechanisms by which we deal with pain or loss.” Her 
definition, as you know, is closely aligned with the Freudian one: in ‘Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle’ (1920/1964:27), Freud conceptualizes an organism 
which defends against external aggression from the environment, and states: 
“Its outermost surface ceases to have the structure proper to living matter, 
becomes to some degree inorganic and thenceforward functions as a special 
envelope or membrane resistant to stimuli”. Freud thinks of the membrane as 
a barrier, or protection, which averts from the underlying layers the full impact 
of external stimuli. For excitations of a magnitude that breaks the membrane, 
Freud affords the term ‘traumatic’. On opening the metaphorical floodgates, 
so Freud, “an event as an external trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance 
on a large scale in the functioning of the organism’s energy and to set in motion 
every possible defence measure” (1920/1964:29). As indicated earlier in his 
observations of traumatized soldiers, he concluded that, instead of 
remembering traumatic events which belonged to the past, patients would 
regularly be “obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary 
experience” (1920/1964:18).  
I am beginning to get a sense of trauma and the ripple effects it must have left in its 
wake. The last century was marked by unimaginable events… (Pause). 




Caruth (1993:24) proposes that repetitious experiences of violent events, 
through flashbacks or nightmares, “can only be understood ultimately in 
terms of the absolute inability to avoid an unpleasant event that has not been 
given psychic meaning in any way”. Yet, what is particular to those incidents 
which surpass ‘psychic meaning’, or which have been repressed into the 
deepest recesses of the unconscious? Of course, not every horrific event leaves 
incomprehensible traces in our psyche. What seems to be undergirding 
trauma is its unexpectedness. 
What do you mean? 
“We cannot make use of anxiety as a preparatory signal”, as Mitchell 
(1998:121) would have it. The event falls outwith our expectancy, “and is 
therefore not available to consciousness until it imposes itself again, 
repeatedly, in the nightmares and repetitive actions of the survivor” (Caruth, 
1996:4). Freud argues that it is specifically the notion of fright, or what he calls 
“the factor of surprise” (1920/1964:12), which buttresses what he considers a 
key concept in trauma; he goes on to distinguish fright from fear and anxiety, 
and affords them distinct markers in relation to danger. He is aware that these 
terms are often used interchangeably, but they should not be considered to be 
of synonymous value. 
Go on. 
For the following to make sense, I shall read the passage in German: “Schreck, 
Furcht, Angst werden mit Unrecht wie synonyme Ausdrücke gebraucht; sie 
lassen sich in ihrer Beziehung zur Gefahr gut auseinanderhalten. Angst 
bezeichnet einen gewissen Zustand wie Erwartung der Gefahr und 
Vorbereitung auf dieselbe, mag sie auch unbekannt sein; Furcht verlangt ein 




bestimmtes Objekt vor dem man sich fürchtet; Schreck aber benennt den 
Zustand in den man gerät wenn man in Gefahr kommt, ohne auf sie 




She sat down. Yes, she thought, she would always find her way in books. Her fingers 
rested on the slightly sticky cover, moved along the spine, the indentations of the 
title barely tangible. Like braille, she thought. She pushed her glasses further up the 
bridge of her nose, looked out of the window, and down again. Where was I, where 
am I? She smiled. And then she remembered. How come, she thought, how come I 
read this in German? She opened the book.  
Mother tongue – mother’s tongue.  
I am somewhat perplexed and almost dumbfounded that I seek out Freud 
in its German edition, a rekindling of some kind of hope, I imagine, that I 
can find, in the text, what has been elusive for as long as I can remember. It 
seems too simplistic to draw parallels between Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory read in German and the pull of the primary relation, my mother’s 
tongue, my mother tongue. And yet, is that not what this thesis is partially 
about?  
To read in German is as familiar as the sound of my mother’s voice; the texts 
in front of me attach themselves to what I have grown into, call me into a 
reciprocal arrangement with a proposition by the eighteenth century 
German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder : “Every nation speaks the 




way it thinks and thinks the way it speaks” (Stroinska, 2001:2). I was forged, 
and in turn forged my self in a linguistic paradigm that I had more often 
than not tried to forget about, to leave behind, to obliterate even, only for it 
to return, in proverbial Freudian manner, through reading Freud!  
The return of the repressed. She smiled again. What is it that returns, she thought, 
if not that which had made no sense? Nonsense. Which did not fit into the words 
she had been taught? How come – as if there was indeed a coming into, a beginning 
to this tale, a beginning she needed to find in a language that had not enough words 
for her. She looked up. That was her beginning, her ‘coming into being’, a fabrication 
into lack. And now, she thought, now she is here. She looked at the words on the 
page, fuzzy ink soaked into paper, black onto barely white. Pentimento. 
Reminiscence. Faded yet readable. 
When, as Holman Jones suggests, “writing and reading, identities and lives, 
are performed in relation with and to others “ (2011:323), it follows that my 
identity and my life has been, and is, shaped by what I have internalized by 
way of my mother tongue (and mother’s tongue), just as much as it is 
inflected by the shift into a different socio-cultural and linguistic matrix, and 
my relationality within such shifting parameters. This ambiguity is played 
out in the context of reading myself into theory in German, to the extent that 
I often, but not always, offer you, the reader, my own translation of texts 
rather than draw on what is readily available in English. It is an offering 
through which I make a particular claim on belonging, even if what I belong 
to has been historically infused with perversity. The paradox is that any such 
claims are immediately undercut by translating German sentences into 
English idioms. I understand these ambiguous shifts from one matrix into 




the other and back again as markers of uncertainty, of indeterminacy, as 
means of iterative re-orienting and re-locating myself not only in relation to 
what I have left (but to whose siren calls I continue to respond eagerly), but 
also to what I since have found, in a different sense of belonging, or rather, 
in a sense of belonging differently. These offerings could hence uphold a 
particular argument, in that they are attempts to draw you into complex 
ambiguities, into difficulties, impossibilities rather, of declaring a self that is 
predicated upon cohesion, singularity, and unity.  
Such ambivalence is further played out in respect of my writings. From the 
beginning of the processes by which I formed, and was formed by, what you 
are about to read, I wrote in English, my adoptive tongue. Through more 
than thirty years I mothered my self in/to linguistic calibrations, until I learnt 
to speak it sufficiently to ‘know my place’, even if located knowledge is an 
inherently slippery concept. I am unsure if these ideas account for the 
impossibility of writing this thesis in German. I, simply, can/will not do so. 
I say ‘cannot’ not only because my German is at best rudimentary and would 
possibly not serve me sufficiently in fulfilling academic criteria laid down in 
respect to PhD accreditation. I say ‘cannot’ because I know that to write out 
of a matrix which paid scant attention in my childhood and adolescence to 
trauma, to ghosts, to death, would defeat me, would, possibly, return me to 
the site which had never been given words. 
She traced the outline of words, words she knew about but did not know. She shifted, 
looked up and smiled.  
 




I translate the passage as follows: ‘Shock, fear and anxiety are wrongly used 
as synonymous expressions; they are easily distinguishable in their relation to 
danger. Anxiety denotes a certain condition in expectation of and preparation 
for danger, even if the danger is unknown; fear demands a specific object one 
is in fear of; but shock is the name for the condition one gets into when one 
encounters danger without being prepared for it, it emphasizes the moment of 
surprise’. The Standard Edition translation differs only marginally from my 
own: “‘Fright’, ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’ are improperly used as synonymous 
expressions; they are in fact capable of clear distinction in their relation to 
danger. ‘Anxiety’ describes a particular state of expecting the danger or 
preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown one. ‘Fear’ requires a 
definite object of which to be afraid. ‘Fright’, however, is the name we give to 
the state a person gets into when he has run into danger without being 
prepared for it. It emphasizes the factor of surprise” (Freud, 1920/1964:12). A 
later translation (Freud, 1920/2003) substituted ‘dread’ for ‘fear’, but retained 
the term ‘fright’. The translation of Angst as ‘anxiety’ seems adequate, given 
that they follow a not dissimilar etymological trajectory (Oka). Furcht 
translated as ‘fear’ carries more ambivalence, as it is etymologically closer to 
‘fright’, the notion on which hinges Freud’s theory of trauma. ‘Fear’, on the 
other hand, links etymologically to Gefahr, which appears in its English 
translation as ‘danger’.  
Oh come on! Is this not just semantic? I mean, do we have to go into the minutiae of 
permutations, as long as we understand what each term defines? 
No, and yes! I believe that the question of adequacy or inadequacy of 
translation shies away from the difficulties within which complex concepts are 




disseminated. We continuously constitute and are being constituted by 
language, irrespective of the linguistic idiom; I suggest that ‘understanding’ in 
the sense you use it does not begin to acknowledge what goes on at the 
threshold between self and other, particularly if we fail to pay attention to 
those minutiae. (Pause). 
Point taken! (Pause) So, ‘Schreck’, or in its English translation ‘shock/fright’ speaks 
to an almost inevitable element of utter surprise at impending danger. 
For sure. It implies, say, the flooding of ‘the mental apparatus’ with stimuli. 
Frosh (2013:19) goes further and argues that we often unconsciously seek out 
‘the thrill’ and “avoid […] anxiety precisely in order to give ourselves a fright”, 
though I am not convinced by his argument: does the ‘thrill’ not link with the 
potentiality of danger without which the ‘thrill-seeking’ activity would remain 
mundane? I suggest that the term ‘shock’ rather than ‘fright’ might better serve 
to convey the vehemence with which the external world enters self and the 
devastation of the ensuing deluge, even though Freud used the term in a more 
derogatory manner. Suffice to mention that the term ‘fright’ as utilized by 
Freud more than 90 years ago has lost its intensity in contemporary English 
and barely registers in relation to traumatic experiences.  
What happens when we get a shock on the scale of Freud's proportion?  
Paradoxically, if “severe mechanical concussions, railway disasters and other 
accidents involving risk to life” coincide with physical wounding, such “a 
wound or injury inflicted simultaneously works as a rule against the 
development of a neurosis” (Freud, 1920/1964:12 original in italics). The 
inference here could be read twofold: can the argument be upheld which 
suggests that the visible break in the “shield against stimuli from the external 




world” (Freud, 1920/1964:28) might function as an external reference point to 
bind, or “master[…] the amounts of stimulus which have broken in” (:30)? In 
trauma, as suggested by Laplanche and Pontalis with a rather mechanistical 
approach, ideas about, or memory of the event are insufficiently bound to its 
affect, which is energetically free-flowing. Psychoanalysis endeavours to “re-
establish  
[…] the relation between the memory of the traumatic event and its affect by 
restoring the connection between the different ideas involved and so 
facilitating the discharge of the affect (abreaction)” (1988:62). 
Complete affective indifference comes to mind, a turning away into silence, into 
amnesia – I imagine they are effects of repressed affect, which undoubtedly returns. It 
haunts us, doesn’t it? (Pause). You spoke about the importance of wounds in traumatic 
events. Is there more?  
Wounds can, I imagine, be understood as stark reminders of having averted 
death, as external marks of the incomprehensibility of survival. At the same 
time, the visible wound binds, so to speak, affective response, pain, hurt, 
confusion. Caruth (1996:58) hones in on this point thus: “Trauma is not simply 
an effect of destruction but also, fundamentally, an enigma of survival. It is 
only by recognizing traumatic experience as a paradoxical relation between 
destructiveness and survival that we can recognize the legacy of 
incomprehensibility at the heart of catastrophic experience.” The wounding, I 
suggest, can hence be understood as an embodied signifier of events which 
fall beyond signification. A mark, if you want, of shattered membranes, where 
“the outside has gone inside without any mediation” (Caruth, 1996:59), but 
which, by its very nature, implies unmitigated yet unintegrated experience. 




The physical wound speaks to the dichotomy of violence beyond assimilation 
as it occurs, and the very act of survival. 
Do I understand you correctly that the underpinnings of trauma is its indirectness to 
experience? 
Some theorists argue that trauma can barely be articulated in those terms. “To 
say that trauma must be relived or re-enacted in order to be ‘surmounted’, 
assumes that trauma is or was a lived event. But trauma is an event of unliving. 
The unlived event becomes traumatic precisely because it is empty” (Phelan, 
1997:60). There is, if you will, no centre to trauma - the traumatizing event falls 
beyond that which is available to consciousness. In Lacanian terms, trauma 
signifies the impossibility of signification. “The breach in the mind – the 
conscious awareness of the threat to life” is due to ‘fright’, as Caruth argues, 
in that “the threat is recognized as such by the mind one moment too late. The 
shock of the mind’s relation to the threat of death is thus not the direct 
experience of the threat, but precisely the missing of this experience, the fact 
that, not being experienced in time, it has not yet been fully known” (1996:62). 
Our incomprehensibility of survival in the face of death marks the painful 
need to repeat, through dreams, symptoms, flashbacks.  
We cannot but relive the unlived experience? 
Indeed. Freud suggests to understand it as “endeavouring to master the 
stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the 
cause of traumatic neurosis” (1920/1964:32). We perpetually fail to grasp the 
gap or fissure between near-death experience and its rendering into meaning, 
that is, its assimilation into consciousness. These ‘threshold’ experiences 
prompt the repetitious return of what can only ever remain elusive, because 




they fall outwith the temporal sequential matrix. Our survival, in such close 
proximity to death, remains equally enigmatic, because it eludes means of 
signification.  
We are caught in the loop of a compulsion to repeat in the knowledge of its ultimate 
futility?  
So it seems, doesn’t it? For Caruth, “the incomprehensibility of survival […] is 
at the heart of Freud’s formulation of the death drive” (1996:64), which she 
extends to the trauma of ‘awakening’ into life: “In inanimate matter and by 
unimaginable force the characteristics of life were awoken.” (Freud, 1940:40 
translation by author). The inanimate precedes the animate, death precedes 
life, and it is by sheer force into unfathomable awakening from death into life 
that we begin our return towards death. Hence, “the aim of all life is death” 
(Freud, 1920/1964:38).  
And yet, we can never grasp the mere possibility of our own death. (Pause). What 
existential dilemma… 
In witnessing death in the other, or death of the other, I witness what Critchley, 
as cited in Stolorow (2007:48) describes as “relational character of finitude”. It 
is the fundamental bind towards our existential certainty, or, if you want, 
“virtue of our common finitude” (2007:49), which foregrounds our relational 
embeddedness in this world. Death, by that token, could be considered the 
closing bracket of our relational ‘Being in the world’ (Heidegger, 1993). 
(Pause). 
(Pause). Is this where we end?  




I am not sure as to where we end. (Pause). The notion of  a self is always 
engaged in some sort of relation to an other, as Mitchell would have it: “Being 
fully human (in Western culture) entails being recognized as a subject by 
another human subject” (2003:63f original in italics). The shift from the 
Freudian ‘object’ to interrelational subjectivity not only deconstructs notions 
of separated autonomy, but it considers the intrinsic reciprocity of such 
processes. To recognize and be recognized as a subject permeates the 
boundaries between self-agency and dependency, in what Mitchell (2003:64) 
calls “our efforts to have our own way […] and our dependence upon the 
other”. We are moving into a terrain which foregrounds a less homogenous 
self, a less coherent self, a self with more permeable boundaries - one who 
needs to be recognized in all her heterogeneity and dependency on one 
another. Benjamin (2000:297) frames it as the “tension between recognition and 
omnipotence” which in turn shapes our intersubjectivity. The process 
whereby we iteratively become subject, in what Wainrib (2012) calls 
‘subjectivation’. 
Subjectivation? What do you mean?  
The frame within which notions of subjectivation were initially thought about 
arose out of Foucault’s argument that any “person is subjectivated-she/he is at 
once rendered a subject and subjected to relations of power through 
discourse”(Youdell, 2006:517 italics in original). It was subsequently taken up, 
among others, by Butler in her argument that “no individual becomes a subject 
without first becoming subjected or undergoing ‘subjectivation’” (1997:11). I 
am, as it were, “initiated [as subject] through a primary submission to power” 
(Butler, 1997:2). The matrices within which I can pronounce an ‘I’ are not only 




never of my own making - and in that sense require subordination - they 
provide simultaneously the conditions of my ongoing becoming subject. 
Subjectivation unfolds hence through its relationality to others, to other, to 
alterity – from the very beginning. As Lacan suggests: “Symbols in fact 
envelop the life of man [sic] in a network so total that they join together, before 
he comes into the world, those who are going to engender him […]; so total 
that they bring to his birth, along with the gift of the stars, if not with the gifts 
of the fairy spirit, the designs of his destiny” (1973:42). We are enmeshed in 
processes of subjectivation, which operate in various registers “between 
psychic reality and shareable reality, between repetition compulsion and 
creating something new, between becoming the subject of our desires and a 
degree of subjection to others’ desire, as well as to the norms and limitations 
of the culture in which we are immersed” (Wainrib, 2012:1116). I suggest 
extending those registers further and thinking about subjectivation in the 
context of conscious and unconscious processes, and the repression or 
subordination of what cannot be made available to consciousness. My 
becoming subject can hence be thought of simultaneously as an iterative 
submission to the unconscious. (Pause) 
Hence to become subject is…  
A processural investiture into relationality, a relationality that precedes birth, 
undoubtedly. Think of the stories being told in utero which link parental 
expectations, or familial narratives into a contextual socio-cultural web of 
relationships. Or consider Winnicott’s affective attunement between a mother 
and her baby, rhythmical sounds, exchange of looks or gestures. Both invest 
themselves in, and constitute themselves through, a sensuously rich relational 




matrix which foregrounds differentiation as much as “mutual recognition by 
establishing a sharing of experiences” (Wainrib, 2012:1118). These processes 
operate as blueprint for ongoing reciprocal or mutual recognition.  
So what happens when these processes are foreshortened, when links are fragile at best, 
or not sufficiently reconciled? 
Hold on to that question, if you will. To continue: In his reflections on ‘Trauma 
and human existence’ Stolorow’s (2007) wide theoretical arcs draw not only 
on analytic theories, but equally on existential philosophy to argue 
intersubjective interdependency. Trauma, for Stolorow, is held not within the 
Freudian domain of an “isolated, faltering mental apparatus, unable to process 
the instinctual energies flooding it from within its own depth” (2007:9). 
Trauma arises out of “unintegrated affect states [which] become the source of 
lifelong emotional conflict and vulnerability to traumatic states because they 
are experienced as threats both to the person’s established psychological 
organization and to the maintenance of vitally needed ties” (2007:3). Stolorow 
foregrounds the relational context as benchmark against which future 
experiences can be gauged. He builds a case against Freudian drive theory in 
favour of affect as “something that from birth onward is regulated or 
misregulated, within ongoing relational systems” (2007:1).  
You spoke about a wide theoretical arc 
Stolorow draws on Heidegger, his notion of ‘being-in-the-world’, which is 
intrinsically imbued with relationality and context, and in particular on 
Befindlichkeit.  
Befindlichkeit?  




Befindlichkeit is the Heideggerian term for affectivity. Gendlin (1978/79) 
suggests that the German verb ‘sich befinden’ alludes to “the reflexivity of 
finding oneself; feeling; and being situated”. Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit shuttles 
between intra- and interpsychic experiences, the finding oneself, or sensing 
oneself in the context of our situatedness. It denotes “both how one feels and 
the situation within which one is feeling” (Stolorow, 2007:2). Befindlichkeit, for 
Stolorow, undergirds one of the philosophical arguments of intersubjective 
interdependency.  
And affect is primarily regulated within child/caregiver situations… And, coming 
back to my question I was asked to put on hold, I cannot but wonder what happens 
when the experiential context is lacking, when the situatedness forecloses a stable 
relational benchmark? 
Did we not earlier consider the repercussions of curtailment, the ‘agonies’ as 
Winnicott (1974:106) argues, “the awfulness of emptiness”, or Bacon’s (2010) 
“endless torment of the unsaid and the unsayable”? The levees break, leaving 
in their wake a child in an “unbearable, overwhelmed, disorganized state” 
(Stolorow, 2007:3). Trauma arises not because of said flooding, but because the 
painful emotional states are not met sufficiently by an other. It is, if you will, 
the persistent lack of attuned interrelationality which leads to developmental 
trauma. In order to maintain the relationship, however fractious it might be, 
overwhelming and unbearable affective states need to be defended against.  
Because the caregiver is insufficiently attuned to regulate those affects? 
Precisely. Repetitive experiences of malattunement arouse in the child the 
belief that she is bad or unlovable, leading in turn, so Stolorow (2007:4) argues 
to “a defensive self-ideal […], representing a self-image purified of the 




offending affect states”. These restrictions undoubtedly narrow the scope 
within which affect can be integrated or assimilated. The traumatized child’s 
prevailing experience is one of absence, absence of an other who validates her 
experiences and aides their assimilation. “Trauma”, says Stolorow (2007:10) 
“is constituted in an intersubjective context in which severe emotional pain 
cannot find a relational home in which it can be held”.  
And so the young girl in the photo looks to a beyond… (Pause). If trauma cannot find 
a home, it cannot be spoken. 
It cannot be brought into dialogue. Trauma is mute, isolated and isolating, not 
solely because of its intensity, but because it lacks the intersubjective context 
within which it can be spoken. It fails in what Coburn (2001:304) calls the 
“ubiquitous emotional resonance process”, and lingers, “inchoate, diffuse and 
largely bodily” (Stolorow, 2007:29). If emotional experience falls outwith the 
communicable matrix, it “remain[s] outside the horizon of symbolized 
experience” (Stolorow, 2007:30)… 
It remains unnameable. 
And what cannot be named foreshortens emotionality.  
What do you mean? 
Our emotional life diminishes, is less vivid or alive… The need to split off what 
cannot be named impoverishes our potentiality. We are closed off to the 
breadth of our experiences, because they remain unnameable and 
unsymbolizable. (Pause) What Stolorow clearly seems to argue for is the 
foregrounding of intersubjective processes and linguistic representations 
thereof. In doing so, he attends to, or undermines notions of self-articulating 




subjectivity. Such intersubjectivity stretches itself towards a beyond of that 
which can be known. Butler’s argument puts it succinctly thus: “I speak as an 
‘I’ but do not make the mistake that I know precisely all that I am doing when 
I speak in that way. I find that my very formation implicates the other in me” 
(2005:84). Stolorow attends to the unnameability of trauma through its 
banishment from intersubjective dialogue. Butler (2005:23) interweaves and 
hence extends the trajectory slightly further and moves Stolorow out of the 
dyadic setting into an overarching one which recognizes the “social workings 
of normativity that condition both subject production and intersubjective 
exchange”. What is visible, nameable, recognizable is subjected to and subject 
of normative frames or matrices.  
And trauma? 
Good question. (Pause) Would it be appropriate to suggest that trauma has 
been subjected to a process akin to colonialism? That feelings, experiences, 
were ‘colonised’, rendered mute and voiceless, become unnameable, because 
they fall outwith the ratified discourse? That ghosts hint at such reductive 
accounts of loss and repression? That ghosts are mere spectres, “just the sign, 
or the empirical evidence if you like, that tells you a haunting is taking place” 
(Gordon, 2008:8)? That notions pertaining to mourning are insufficiently 
supported by our normative frames?  
So many questions… (Pause) 
Ghosts, spectres, hauntings, mourning. Mourning. Mourning and 
Melancholia, as Freud would have it. 
Hmmm 




How could we possibly side-line ‘Trauer und Melancholie’, where Freud 
(1916/1946) develops a theory of mourning? And yes, it’s back to the German 
original publication – and the English translation, of course! Here goes: The 
libidinal attachment of the Ego to a no-more existent object can ultimately be 
relinquished, so Freud suggests, through a process whereby “jede einzelne der 
Erinnerungen und Erwartungen, in denen die Libido an das Objekt geknüpft war, 
wird eingestellt, überbesetzt und an ihr die Lösung der Libido vollzogen” 
(1916/1946:430). My own translation of the preceeding sentence reads thus: 
Each single one of the memories and expectations with which the libido was 
tied to the object will be adjusted, hypercathected, and through it, the 
detachment from the libido will be accomplished. Strachey’s (1917/1964:245) 
translation: “Each single one of the memories and expectations in which the 
libido is bound to the object is brought up and hypercathected, and 
detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect of it” seems to capture the 
sequential process of mourning Freud proposed; where the translation fails, in 
my view, is in its attention to the specificity of ‘wird eingestellt’  – a rather 
peculiar passive verb, which ‘brought up’ serves inadequately. My choice of 
the term ‘adjusted’, similarly to Shaun Whiteside’s (Freud, 2005:205) recent 
translation, evokes processes of calibrations, and seems much closer to its 
German original.  
And? 
What Freud develops in his paper is a theory whereby a freed libido, through 
the timely and time-consuming process of mourning, can ultimately be 
directed towards another object. “The fact is, however, that when the work of 
mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again” (Freud, 




1917/1964:245) barely addresses the minutiae of processes, apart from 
“demand[ing] that the libido as a whole sever its bonds with the object” 
(Freud, 2005:204). I am certainly not in favour of Freud’s categorical view, 
which seems to align itself too smoothly with my critique of 
autoethnographies of trauma and their central tenet of ‘moving on’, or 
‘healing’, rather than an iterative process of ‘working through’ towards a goal 
that is always already out of reach; but let us not forget that Freud’s theories 
are deeply “committed to the Enlightenment ideals of reason’s power” 
(Tauber, 2012:46) and the scientisation of psychoanalysis. Let us further not 
forget that he posits the process of mourning in contrast to that of melancholia, 
both of which are responses to irrevocable losses.  
And what are the differences between either processes? 
While both, melancholia and mourning can, according to Freud 
(1917/1964:244), be characterized in “profoundly painful dejection, cessation 
of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all 
activity”, one crucial element is missing in mourning. 
Go on… 
What is missing is “the reduction in the sense of self, expressed in self-
recrimination and self-directed insults, intensifying into the delusory 
expectation of punishment” (Freud, 2005:204). 
Melancholia become pathological because of some sort of propensity towards self-
denial?   
That’s how I read him. Freud’s exploration of the dissimilarity leads Ogden 
(2007:126f) to introduce “the simultaneity and interdependence of two 




unconscious aspects of loss in melancholia. One involves the nature of the 
melancholic’s tie to the object, and the other involves an alteration of the self 
in response to the loss of the object.” In contrast to mourning, so the argument 
goes, the melancholic is unable to be fully aware of what she has lost. 
To acknowledge loss of an other implies a careful recalibration not only of the other as 
other, but also of our intersubjectivity. (Pause) 
Undoubtedly melancholia attends to that which cannot be clearly delineated. 
Yet, I think Freud’s considerations in respect of melancholia bear on a slightly 
different aspect of self-other relationality. His (1917/1964:245) argument that 
“melancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from 
consciousness” underpins its vicarious aspect. Relegated to the unconscious, 
the melancholic abandons the process that distinguishes her from the 
mourner: hence instead of “withdrawal of the libido from this object and a 
displacement on to a new one” the libido “was withdrawn into the ego. There, 
however, it was not employed in any specific way, but served to establish an 
identification of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus the shadow of the 
object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special 
agency, as though it were an object, the forsaken object” (Freud, 1917/1964:249 
italics in original).  
The shadow of the object… I have often thought about what this might mean – to 
cauterize oneself against the experiences of loss, or, rather, to remain in some sense of 
symbiosis to the object. (Pause). What a thoroughly isolated and isolating experience.   
Weiss and Lang (2000) certainly think so, and draw on Freud to hone in on 
loss and depression. But let us for a moment return directly to Freud. The ego, 
to paraphrase him, is sucked dry; object loss is equated with ego loss and goes 




hand-in-hand with abandoning of object-cathexis. “The complex of 
melancholia behaves like an open wound, […], and empt[ies] the ego until it 
is totally impoverished” (Freud, 1917/1964:253).  
What I read into the last sentence is an unstillable pain which the melancholic is unable 
to ameliorate.  
I would not easily concur with your interpretation here! Could it not be argued 
that the wound is a signifier that something is at a loss without attending to 
the loss? In that sense it functions, if you will, as simulacrum. Melancholia is 
unable to mourn loss… 
Because the reality of it has not been acknowledged? 
Precisely. The “(shadow-like) relationship to an internal object [...] exists in a 
psychological domain outside time” (Ogden, 2007:135). And if it is outside of 
any temporal matrix it remains perpetually present. Maybe that is the crux in 
melancholia: there is no escape, no freeing from the object, in what (Gerson, 
2009:4) calls “the enduring presence of an absence”. The ego, by identifying 
with the lost object, attempts to bear what is unbearable. “Object loss”, says 
Roth (2007:38) “means that something catastrophic has happened to the 
subject’s internal connection with his object”.  
And in order to avert catastrophe to the sense of self, attachment to the internal object 
must be maintained at all costs? The melancholic would circuitously avoid loss… 
(Pause). 
Because “there is no loss; an external object (the abandoned object) is 
omnipotently replaced by an internal one (the ego-identified-with-the-object)” 
(Ogden, 2007:131)! Furthermore, were we to follow Roth, such internal object 




constancy allows for any substitution of the external object, and become 
“variations on the same theme – repeated examples of an unchanging 
original” (2007:39).  
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose?  
It makes sense to think of Roth’s quotation in the context of repetition 
compulsion and the return of the repressed. Any repetitive attachment to a 
substitution hooks onto the ‘shadow of the object’, and the libido turns once 
again into itself.  
The libidinal position which, as Freud (1917/1964:244) observes “people never 
willingly abandon […], not even, indeed, when […] a substitute is already 
beckoning to them”, retains its affective ties to the lost object. I think Freud’s 
‘substitute’ (1917/1964, 2005), which incidentally seems to be an adequate 
translation of the German original ‘Ersatz’ (1916/1946), hints at a different 
external object which the ego, freed from the libidinal attachment to the lost 
object, can seek. It has, as it were, procedurally severed its cathexis to the lost 
object. The allure of the ‘beckoning’ substitute brings to mind Freud’s 
emphatic stance on pleasure – after all, the libido is pleasure-seeking!  
But what, frankly, has all this got to do with trauma? And why do we continuously 
come back to Freud? 
We are drawing tentative lines between trauma and its reverberations, that is, 
phenomena like ghosts, hauntings, or silenced voices, which have its origins 
in a past that continuously shapes the present. And when Frosh (2013:38) 
suggests that “there is a lot in psychoanalysis that falls under the heading of 
‘haunting’,” it is not without reason that an episodic return to its founder is 
often called for. Something has absented itself from language, from conscious 




awareness, has been pushed into marginalia, has not been given its place, has 
not been mourned – and yet, it is perpetually present in its absence. ‘What on 
earth happened’ speaks to such places, speaks to the ambivalence in relation 
to knowledge that falls beyond the margins of signification. (Pause). Where 
were we? 
Libidinal attachment and object-loss. 
You do pay attention, after all! According to Ogden, the lost object survives, 
in part because its loss has not been ‘reality-tested’; it is “preserved in the form 
of an identification with it” (2007:130). In melancholia, the libidinal attachment 
to the now internalized object not only avoids the experience of loss, but it 
equally throws its shadow onto “the three-dimensional emotional life lived in 
the world of real external objects” (Ogden, 2007:131). Whether the internalized 
object serves as blueprint for a substitution, which inevitably will fail to deliver 
on its transferential request, as Roth implies, or whether it serves as guardian 
to a deeply shaded ego, which “renders the melancholic endlessly captive to 
it” (Ogden, 2007:131) – suffice to say that either interpretation imparts a sense 
of restriction and doom in negotiating the contemporaneity and spontaneity 
of life. The melancholic is, by foregrounding avoidance of loss, perpetually 
caught in its grasp. This position, I would argue, has an important bearing on 
reverberations of trauma. 
Say a bit more?  
The melancholic permanently unconsciously displaces the inevitability of loss, 
in contrast to those processes which underpin mourning and by which loss is 
tethered into temporality. Ghosts, hauntings, absence - these notions hint at a 
“dense site where history and subjectivity make social life. The ghost or the 




apparition is one form by which something lost, or barely visible […] makes 
itself known or apparent to us” (Gordon, 2008:8). Hence the argument could 
be upheld that the ghost is a constant reminder of a loss lived out in the present 
and in that sense ‘re-presents’ its perpetual loss. The ghost is tied into 
temporality on account of its sequential collapse: not only is the past 
continually present, but it functions as a haunting reminder that something is 
lost, or at a loss.   
In trauma, language is lost, at a loss…  
Trauma, loss, hauntings, ghosts, melancholia – something permeates all those 
frames within which I find myself now, but does it suffice to subsume it under 
the mantle of ‘unspeakability’? Is it enough to narrate? “Ghosts cannot be 
removed just by being spoken about; they can only be set free by some kind of 
action to bring them the justice they deserve” says Frosh (2013:4). And I ask 
myself if the issue at stake here alludes to unbearable otherness, and the 
‘speaking about’ is a denial of their alterity.  
What do you mean? 
When I narrate ghosts, I do so from the position of intersubjective experience. 
When I speak about them, I fear that I cannot but fail them in their otherness. 
Is the ‘justice they deserve’ akin to processes described by O’Loughlin as 
‘decolonising mindsets’ (2009)? Decolonization upends what has been 
marginalized, rendered mute or voiceless. Trauma, ghosts, hauntings all 
pertain to something unnameable, having been subjected to what Stolorow  
(2007) calls ‘banishment from human dialogue’. That such banishment is 
largely dependent on the particulars of what is visible and speakable prompts 
Butler (2010:xiii) to suggest that “when versions of reality are excluded or 




jettisoned to a domain of unreality, then spectres are produced that haunt the 
ratified version of reality”. 
I am lost. 
Maybe this is what happens when we deal with ghosts, when we lose 
ourselves amongst them. (Pause). Ghosts are reminders that something is 
amiss in the social ‘materiality’, and ‘speaking about’ does not attend to what 
has been collectively marginalized. However, and undoubtedly, “what is left 
unresolved in history works its way into the present as traumatic haunting 
that is profoundly social, yet is lived out in the deepest recesses of individuals’ 
lives” (Frosh, 2013:44). The ghosts itself is never just an individuated entity but 
embedded into a societal matrix.  
And what about ‘justice’? 
Avery Gordon’s (2008:64 original in italics) argument rests on the tenet that 
the “ghost is alive, so to speak. We are in relation to it and it has designs on us 
such that we must reckon with it graciously, attempting to offer it a hospitable 
memory out of a concern for justice.” A ‘hospitable’ memory opens up spaces for 
what has been muted, excluded, unvoiced. Remember the melancholic who 
unconsciously maintains her hold on loss by denying its very existence and 
forecloses any ‘gracious’ reparative rituals or gestures. I suggest that 
something akin to the complexities around trauma, ghosts and melancholia 
arise in relation to reverberations within which the vicissitudes of trauma can 
be theorized.  
Finally? 




Maybe? Yes finally, though not finitely! Generational reverberations speak to 
a liminal intersubjective space of barely existing yet tangible experiences, 
inhabited by what Abraham and Torok (1975/1994:140f original in italics) call 
‘phantoms’, and which they proceed to define loosely as “an occasion for 
torment […] – a memory […] buried without legal burial place.” Shame 
underpins such torment, the shame of a “concealed secret [which] always does 
return to haunt. To exorcise it one must express it in words. But how are we to 
accomplish this when the phantoms inhabiting our minds do so without our 
knowledge, embodying the unspeakable secret of . . . an other?” 
(1975/1994b:188 italics in original) 
And who might this ‘other’ be? 
The other is someone we love, argues Abraham (1975/1994a:171f), whose 
“concealment of some part of [his] life” is captured in the phantom. And 
because the phantom is an embodiment of ‘something unspeakable’ 
transmitted in its unspokenness, it remains linguistically unrepresentable - 
without justice. It hints, in its etherealness, at a gap or fissure. 
And what has love got to do with it? 
A fair point! I think that what Abraham calls ‘love’ is an indication of the 
psychosocial and affective relationships between, for example, mother and 
child, older and younger siblings, grandparents and grandchildren. Frosh’s 
(2013:39) ‘protective factor’ underpins the argument that “something is being 
preserved, some precious idealisation or maintenance of a bond.” The 
‘haunted’ is caught in a paradox: how to protect the unconscious secret which 
vies for symbolisation, and, given that any denouement bears on relationality, 
how to remain ignorant of one’s unconscious knowledge. Bollas’ ‘unthought 




known’ comes to mind, or knowledge pre symbolization. “Something speaks”, 
suggests Frosh (2013:39), “but even as we hear it we pretend that we do not 
know what it is.”  
Because to know? 
We cannot know, I think. To know would somehow violate the familial or 
parental secret. The shuttling between what Abraham calls ‘awareness-
unawareness’ gives at best rise to processes which show and hide “that which, 
in the depths of the unconscious, dwells as the living-dead knowledge of 
someone else’s secret.” (1975/1994b:188 italics in original).  
Living-dead - deadened, depleted, silenced – the realm of zombies, it seems. (Pause) 
But what is the significance of the secret? 
Torok’s (1968/1994:109) suggestion that the correlations of loss of love-object 
with libidinal increase arouses “shame, astonishment, hesitation” needs to be 
read against Freud’s libidinal pleasure theory. Increase in libido, so Torok 
(1968/1994:117) argues, can be understood as “a desperate and final attempt at 
introjection, a sudden amorous fulfilment with the object.”  
At the point of death of the other I feel desire?     
Precisely. The experience is however, as argued by Torok, (1968/1994:117) 
“struck with explicit condemnation and immediate repression, [and] its link 
to a desire for the dying or dead object is always severely censored.”  
And what is censored defies signification… (Pause). 
(Pause). It defies signification to the extent that the ‘lost object’ is denied its 
rightful and just place. Unspoken, marginalized, these tombs shelter 
encrypted familial secrets: “Nothing at all must filter to the outside world. The 




ego is given the task of cemetery guard. It stands fast there, keeping an eye on 
the comings and goings of the members of its immediate family who – for 
various reasons – might claim access to the tomb” (Nicolas Abraham & Torok, 
1971/1994:159). In short, it is not the loss or death of the object, but the secrecy 
within which loss occurred, which enforces unassimilated libidinal desires 
into the ‘psychic tomb’. The language connected to such pleasures or desires 
in relation to the object are similarly entombed, silenced, for the pleasures 
themselves cannot be introjected.  
I am not entirely sure if I can follow Abraham and Torok’s argument. ‘Nothing must 
filter to the outside world’ assumes a hermetically-guarded closedness.  
Could we agree on the tomb as metaphor? The crypt guards whatever falls 
outwith normative frames of reference. If the interdependent and 
intersubjective socio-cultural field is prohibitive of narratives pertaining to 
alterity, or subsumed under a cloak that favours a certain hegemony, then the 
issue at stake is less concerned with ‘intrapsychic secrecy’ but with conditional 
shifts which give words to those secrets. “The creation of cryptic enclaves in 
language marks the traces of refused mourning. They appear, so to speak, as 
the linguistic scars of trauma” suggests Schwab (2010:4). 
And the task of voicing the unnameable falls to subsequent generations. (Pause). 
Maybe it can only ever be attempted on the death of the previous one? Maybe the 
rendition into language is somewhat akin to the process of mourning?  
Maybe. (Pause). And ghosts, those voiceless hauntings of a previous, other 
generation, are reminders of an immense task – “to be haunted in the name of 
a will to heal is to allow the ghost to help you imagine what was lost that never 
even existed, really” (Gordon, 2008:57). ‘In the name of’ – is this not a demand 




towards recognition of an other whose voice has been hidden or excluded, a 
demand made to those of us who perpetually live in the presence of ghosts? 
And, irrespective of my contentions around the notion of ‘healing’, could it 
stand for nothing other than an engagement with the conditions that 
perpetuate ghosts’ seclusion? “I am invariably transformed by the encounters 
I undergo; recognition becomes the process  by which I become other than 
what I was and so cease to be able to return to what I was” says Butler 
(2005:26f). Encounters with ghosts recalibrate an extended intersubjectivity 
through offering them their due: they have a right to a place in the present, in 
the absence of their being, in my memory. (Pause). I think that ghosts have 
something important to say. I do not yet know what they tell me, but I imagine. 
There needs to be more listening into silences or gaps or fissures. 
Listening to the whispers of ghosts? 
Maybe – but how can I ever know? (Pause). And yet, do I stretch myself too 
far? But how far is too far? Is talking to ghosts too far? Are there not ghosts ‘in 
every nursery’ (Fraiberg, Adelson, & Shapiro, 1975)? Is an investigation into 
reparative gestures towards those who have been silenced too far? Is the re-
presentation of a world I barely know about but carry intuitive knowledge of 
too far? (Pause). Is this where we end up when we follow Freud (1916/1946, 
1917/1964, 2005) into ‘Mourning and Melancholia’? What does he mean when 
he postulates “that when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes 
free and uninhibited again” (1917/1964:245)? Completion “after a certain 
period of time” (2005:204) does not encapsulate the processes that lead to 
recognition of object loss and its introjection into the ego. Abraham and Torok 
(1972/1994:125) argue, on the other hand, a critical distinction between 




introjection and incorporation, where “incorporation denotes a fantasy, 
introjection a process.” Fantasy is set against the reality principle, through 
which loss of the object is acknowledged and finally introjected. In contrast, 
incorporation is an attempt to ingest ‘into the body’ (in + corpus) the whole or 
part of the object in order to repudiate its loss – encrypted the object remains 
unassimilated and ‘alive’ in death.   To swallow the object contests the very 
reality of its loss, which “if recognized as such, would effectively transform 
us” (Nicolas Abraham & Torok, 1972/1994:127). Introjection, to follow 
Abraham and Torok, leads to psychic growth, whereas incorporation 
perpetuates encrypted deadening silence: “Swallowed and preserved. 
Inexpressible mourning erects a tomb inside the subject” (1972/1994:130).  
A tomb you became witness to?  
How can I possibly answer you? Is there an answer that pays attention to 
precarious and ambiguous knowledge? Abraham and Torok seem categorical, 
mechanistical even, and, while arguing for an enlarged temporal and spatial 
matrix within which they attempt to locate transgenerational transmission of 
trauma, they overemphasize the specificity of ‘transmission’, with the 
singularity of a sender, the one whose onus it is to ‘transmit’, so to speak, and 
the receiver/s of said transmission. In suggesting that unconscious processes 
are transmitted from parent to child, Abraham and Torok operate from the 
premise of bounded individuated subjectivities – a foreign presence, passing 
on to the child the parents’ original trauma. Advancing along those lines, what 
‘transmission’ equally fails to describe, I suggest, is the intersubjective 
reciprocity by which sender and receiver are enmeshed in processes relating 
to trauma. And, furthermore, is there not also that in us which has never been 




in or of either of us? The Other as wholly Other? Butler’s (2005:83f) ‘enigma’, 
which “abide[s] with me as my own familiar alterity, my own private, or not 
so private, opacity”? Derrida, as quoted by Kirkby (2006:466) drives this very 
point home: “If I succeed ‘normally’ in the process of introjection then I am 
untrue to the Other, the Other simply becomes myself, and it’s a way of 
remembering the Other by forgetting the Other. The Other becomes part of 
myself and I have a narcissistic relation to the Other inside myself’’.  
Can we conceive of a way of mourning where the Other is not lost? 
Against the one where “each single one of the memories […] is brought up 
[…], and detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect of it” (Freud, 
1917/1964:245)? And does Freud’s trajectory not run counter to the one we 
developed before, the one which gives the lost their unmitigated due? We 
seem to circle endlessly around a theme which has defiance of certitude 
written into its very fabric. “In Derridean mourning we honour the otherness 
of the dead and our attachment to them; we do not abandon them and 
substitute another in their place” argues Kirkby (2006:464). Derrida seems to 
layer loss of the other, pentimento-like, by keeping the other inside without 
appropriation – they shine through in their otherness - without falling prey to 
the seeming reductionism of Freudian theory.  
The interweave of loss and otherness… (Pause). 
Are the words we speak in the wake of someone’s loss not always already 
given over to an engagement with alterity? The death of an other bears witness 
to an insurmountable relational shift, because the other becomes Other 
through her death, an unimaginable finitude. “One must always go before the 
other. […] One friend must always go before the other; one friend must always 




die first. There is no friendship without the possibility that one friend will die 
before the other […], their friendship will have been structured from the very 
beginning by the possibility that one of the two would see the other die, and 
so, surviving, would be left to bury, to commemorate, to mourn” (Derrida, 
Brault, & Naas, 2001). Loss and mourning is written into our relationality. 
Absence is written into the very fabric of our subjectivity. ‘Loss and otherness’ 
you say. The other is always already there. Derrida (2001:217), in his eulogy 
to, or about, Lyotard asks this very question: “But how can the survivor speak 
in friendship of the friend without a “we” indecently settling in, without an 
“us” incessantly slipping in?” And yet, does such pronunciation suffice in the 
name of ‘justice’? And whose justice does it serve? And is the abolition of a 
‘we’ not equally unjust?  
And ghosts, what are the ghosts? Are ghosts the reminders that there is something 
rotten… 
In the state of Denmark? The ghost of the king appears to Hamlet – the 
apparition of ghosts could be considered  “a breaking through of that which 
was occluded in history” (Frosh, 2013:52). Despite all marginalization and 
foreclosing, the ghost is a timely reminder that we are unequivocally 
connected to and with death and the dead. They are, if you will, forceful yet 
ephemeral prompts of our own historicity, and hence our socio-cultural 
embeddedness.   
So we mourn ghosts?  
No, ghosts are signs; they make visible a gap, a fissure; they point their fingers 
at ungrieved loss, “sustained by no regard, no testimony” says Butler 
(2010:15). She continues: “Grievability precedes and makes possible the 




apprehension of the living being as living, exposed to non-life from the start.” 
Our finitude is written into our being, and needs an intersubjective testimonial 
framing for our life to matter.  
And for the loss of life to matter? 
Yes, and for the loss of life to matter. “Mourning” says Leader (2009:8) 
“requires other people.” It is inscribed into an unconscious social codex which 
privileges an overt registration of absence, through rituals or eulogies, for 
example. A ‘testimony’, as Butler would say. Derrida’s (2001:214) exemplary 
collection of texts marking the deaths of his friends inevitably contain 
references to his difficulties in speaking death: “I feel at such a loss, unable to 
find public words for what is happening to us, for what has left speechless all 
those who had the good fortune to come near this great thinker” he declares 
in the wake, or maybe at the wake of Lyotard’s death. ‘Public’ words! Silence 
is the antithesis to what needs to take place, irrespective of whether we favour 
orthodox Freudian or post-Freudian theories or locate ourselves closer to 
intersubjective relationality. Articulations of loss bring me closer to what I have 
lost in the one I have lost, without either losing myself in the other or losing 
the other.  
And how would one achieve such delicate differentiation?  
Kirkby (2006:469) suggests a model drawn from Derrida which “offers respect 
for the (dead) Other as Other; it allows agency to the mourner in the possibility 
of an ongoing creative encounter with the Other in an externalising, 
productive, future-oriented memory.” Mourning could hence be read not as 
an iterative attachment to a past but as an iterative evocation of a past made 
visible in the present (Frosh, 2013). And maybe that is the nub – that our 




attachment to what is lost should prevent a complete appropriation, or 
introjection, to an extent that the gaps, which loss inevitably leaves behind, are 
smoothed over and become untraceable. Khanna (2008:51) warns us “of not 
putting trauma to rest, but allowing it to become something critical: to 
acknowledge the impossibility of mourning it or working through it, to not 
justify anything through it but to allow for a stance without alibi, and indeed 
without dignity to open up possibilities of critical agency and perhaps of 
trenchant critique.” (Pause). 
A stance without alibi (Pause). 
I read Khanna as a warning against those processes that foreclose further 
investment into our contextualized historicity. Does it suffice to call upon 
marginalized voices, ghosts even, given that in calling upon their voices we 
have already begun a process of re-appropriation? Without alibi, we stand 
defenceless, ethically naked – is this the position from which we can begin to 
engage with what needs to remain uncalibrated? And are we not always 
already implicated? “Colonialism not only oppressed its victims; it also stole 
their past, making it unmournable. The consequence is an encrypted thing that 
acts like a hole in history; something imagined and felt as absent, but denied 
being, a never-have-been that continues to haunt the present” (Frosh, 2013:54). 
I would suggest that the ‘hole’ could be seen as an ever present reminder of 
loss, a perpetual frame against which notions of postcolonization could be 
gauged: whose agency is evoked in the prefix post- or, is this the alibi which 
obscures critical agency? I am in no doubt that colonialism attempted to 
obliterate the basis from which oppressed peoples could ‘give an account’ 
(Butler, 2005) of themselves, by subjugating their subjectivity into a hegemonic 




canon of colonized/colonizer. What was lost in the process remained at a loss, 
“wiped out so thoroughly that even its loss cannot be known” (Frosh, 2013:55). 
Postcolonial hauntings attest to those gaps, which, I suggest, cannot be filled 
by calling upon empty rhetoric.  
Why do you assume that commemorative gestures are empty? 
Because they mostly are. They are, as you rightly say, gestures, or ‘manner of 
deportment’ (Oka) and have little bearing on a relationality that is not 
predicated upon a binary polarity. Are these gestures not often expressions of 
shame or guilt, which rarely challenge the contextual framework within which 
colonization took place? Do such practices not somehow legitimize rather than 
problematize the given of a social reality? And, before you ask, no, I do not 
know how to mitigate the pervasive undercurrents running through notions 
of post-colonialism or post-imperialism. Suffice to say, however, that the 
processes by which we externalize loss do not need to foreclose iteration, on 
the understanding that  “certain violent histories, individual or collective, will 
forever remain beyond repair and unforgivable” (Schwab, 2010:105).  
There is that which can never be forgiven. (Pause) I am thinking of our shared history. 
(Pause). 
(Pause). What is ‘that which’ but “the most perniciously inhuman form of the 
enactment of the myth of Western civilization’s superiority”(Schwab, 
2010:72)? (Pause). And should the enormity of Germany’s atrocities not 
impose an obligation on us - an obligation towards collective grief, an ethical 
commitment without ‘alibi’ towards those violated in its context? In that sense, 
the pervasive silence in Germany following the Shoah could be understood as 
a defensive mechanism not only to the trauma of insurmountable losses, but 




also to shame, to be called to account to a ‘collective responsibility’. “Only 
under conditions in which the loss would matter does the value of the life 
appear. Thus, grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters” attests 
Butler (2010:14). Loss… 
Can be theoretically held between various, at times paradoxical, positions. Let me see 
if I can recall most of them: mourning as severance of libidinal attachment to lost 
object, mourning through introjection of the lost object, mourning in recognition of 
the lost object’s ultimate alterity, melancholia as unassimilated libidinal desire, 
melancholia as preserved attachment to lost object, melancholia as encrypted lost 
object, melancholia as refusal by the lost object, melancholia as troubling the colonizing 
subject… 
Enough! What we can possibly surmise is the complex heterogeneity that 
inflects the field within which loss, trauma, mourning, melancholia and ghosts 
can be theorized. Loss, as Leader (2009:56f) argues needs another to become 
mournable, “some kind of recognition, some sense that it has been witnessed.” 
Such articulations or ‘dialogues of mourning’ enable a process whereby loss 
becomes not only mournable, but also re-presentable. Unmourned losses, on 
the other hand, foreclose symbolization, and return, so Leader (2009:81) “to 
haunt the next generation.” The entry under spectrality in Lucy’s (2004:111) 
Derrida Dictionary reads as follows: “spectrality You don’t have to believe in 
ghosts to be affected by them. The ghost is a powerful figure, regardless of 
whether or not you credit it with some kind of actual presence.” I have been 
left a legacy “of unbearable violence” (Schwab, 2010:3). Do you know what it 
is like to grow up in the wake of trauma and its vicissitudes? (Pause). Do you 




know what it is like to shy away from the gaze of the onlooker, to appear lost 
to the world, to look towards a beyond? 
(Pause) 
When Leader (2009:72) asks, in reference to the enormity of losses in WW I, 
that “the surplus of the dead – and bereaved – was far more extreme and 
concentrated than in earlier warfare, and so profound changes were forced 
onto society. What sense would it make for a community to mourn each dead 
soldier when the corpses were hardly even countable?” my answer is 
unequivocal: How can ‘surplus’ be contained, without mourning and hence 
‘containing’ individual loss? A death is a death is a death, to paraphrase 
Gertrude Stein. (Pause). Ghosts continue to rupture the thin membrane 
covering my “own involvement in and transferential relationship to a history 
of genocide – even if it is from the distance of a second generation” (Schwab, 
2010:10). Growing up has left indelible marks on me, growing up in the 
eradicated heartland of perverse and pervasive atrocities has defined my very 
being. I lived in exemplary silence, interrupted by utter mundaneness.   
A collective silence? 
A collective as well as an individual, or rather familial silence. Imagine a 
cauldron which bubbles ferociously yet whose surface belies its very nature, 
where the exposure or rupture would touch indiscriminately anything and 
anybody in its wake. The war generation attempted what was ultimately 
impossible: the fundamental repression of what it means to be accountable for 
more than six million deaths. Six million. On top of Germany’s own 
fundamental losses incurred through rapacious expansion warfare. “How, 
after all, can one mourn the loss of a few lives in one’s own family if your 




people were guilty of trying to exterminate a whole other people?” asks 
Schwab (2010:75). Her question, similarly to the one posed by Leader, cannot 
mitigate the unbearable burden imposed on those who follow. Whose deaths 
haunt me? Those who have been left in gaps, without justice, without their 
rightful place, nameless. These legacies haunt me, irrespective of whether they 
pertain to collective or private trauma and losses – as “the processing of 
trauma and transgenerational haunting, even after collective histories of war 
and genocide, is always mediated through intensely private individual 
histories.” (Schwab, 2010:13). (Pause). I am reminded of Butler’s (2005:78) 
narration, that the “prehistory interrupts the story I have to give of myself, 
makes every account of myself partial.” And maybe this is it, maybe the 
growing unease I sense in all those evocative first-person accounts and 
deliberations into ghosts and hauntings, into trauma and mourning is that 
they often seem to be too categorical, too cohesive and coherent.  
Even if they speak uncertainty? 
I am aware of the paradox in attempting to write myself into trauma which, 
by its very nature, is barely graspable. But more than that, I am concerned that 
the voices I hear in those narratives belie their intrinsic messiness: “What we're 
talking about sure is awful but our narrative voice seems to have it all worked 
out” says Tamas (2009:3). But how can I work out what ghosts tell me, if I don’t 
even know which voices I hear? Maybe I need to go back to the beginning – I 
need to go into the cracks and fissures, and begin to experiment with ways of 
listening to the ghosts, the hauntings of previous generations.  
How do you do that? 
That is, indeed, the question.  




Three.  Dear Departed: Knowing (about) Trauma 
 
Edinburgh, sometime in the Spring of 2014 
 
My Dear Departed 
I recall with deep fondness the times we spent together in the kitchen. Latterly, 
I found myself often opening the door to your room, half-expecting to discover 
an almost imperceptible change in the way the curtains were drawn, for 
example, to the side, tied with the ribbon you had brought back from one of 
your journeys, but was never recompensed with the jolt that such marginal 
difference evokes. Entering your room now reminds me of loss, loss of 
immediacy in the way we spun stories together, and reminds me of stories I 
told myself, for I did not yet know who could be called upon to listen. Not yet 
– a temporal shift between what had been and what was to be calls up a gap, 
into which a different kind of knowledge slips. And it is maybe in those 
marginal spaces, those fissures, barely perceptible, that I begin to locate what 
turned out to be your last question. How do you do that? you asked me last time 
we saw each other, which I took as an inquiry into the ‘howness’, for is it not 
the pragmatic nature of any inquiry that we attempt to satisfy with the 
ominous question of ‘how’, rather than a shift marginally further along the 
brief question, arresting the emphasis on ‘you’?  
I cannot say for certain if, what I consider at best a sleight of hearing, in the 
way that sentences always call for an act of interpretation, was caught by my 
inner ears, their hollow chambers suspended in the densest of bones, in a 
similar way to crypts guarding a past laid-to-rest, which, however, fails to be 




tethered to a definitive past, and furthermore, in a laying-to-rest, or if, 
strangely attracted by the consequences such hearing might entail, I followed 
my unconscious desire to hear, yet possibly ‘mishear’ the intention of your 
question.  
Were I to follow the latter, in the way that any academic investigation should 
not immediately foreclose conjectures on account of some ‘mishearing’, I 
would begin with a story about an ‘I-ness’ layered like gossamer filaments in 
and through what turns out to be but a possibility. When I narrate mere-ness, 
in the sense that what I purport to investigate is ultimately a supposition, albeit 
one which, were I to account for various analytical or psycho-social theories, 
has inflected those of us who have had the fortune (or maybe its opposite) to 
find ourselves in its grip, I do so under the proviso that what can be assigned 
to purported ‘knowledge-claims’ is ultimately of limited significance. The 
consideration under which an inquiry into ghostly hauntings could yield 
significant paradigmatic shifts is barely imaginable, yet to speak to a ‘barely’, 
in addition to ‘mere-ness’ and ‘I-ness’, sets in motion fleeting trains of thought, 
which pass, unencumbered by rigours of timetabling, each other, and change, 
in doing so, the topology of what is thinkable and unthinkable. So let me begin 
a tale already premised by an absence, which, by relative appearances, might 
well be considered almost irrelevant, yet which, for me, brought about the 
fragmentation of whatever I considered certain and secure. 
Silence.  
Silence. There exists a quality to the word which, depending on which side of 
an imagined binary I locate myself, has the propensity to arouse a gentle 
smoothing of troughs and peaks, a mellowing even, which Sarah Maitland 




(2009:26) describes as “a sort of stillness of heart and mind which is not a void 
but a rich space.” I remain of the opinion that silence can arrest me in my 
mundaneness through interrupting the dovetailing of experience and 
meaning-making. When silence forges itself into the interstices, it allows for 
spatial and temporal expansion, a panoramic view, taking in adjacent vistas 
and forgotten demarcations.  
And then, there is another silence, a different silence, in whose wake, and the 
signification of wake is less than incidental, darkness and despair condense 
significance to a tiny dot, invisible and unnoticeable even to those whose fate 
has planted them in its midst. Now you could argue, and I think you might 
not be alone in following such trajectory, that any investigation into the 
perfidious nature of silence needs to be carefully considered and attuned, an 
interjection to which I would most wholeheartedly agree. To do something in 
knowledge of its potentially detrimental outcome seems not only foolhardy, 
but plainly absurd. 
Yet, what is the knowledge I call upon to draw me to this conclusion other 
than a means to curtail a curiosity of such intensity that not to act on it could 
only be regarded as foolish? What I ask for now is really just a suspension of 
judgement, which should, or maybe rather could, be passed after you have 
familiarized yourself with the impossibility of a story left untold.  
My story is a story of silence, which, come to think of it, makes for an 
interesting opening, bearing in mind that such a story is ‘of’ silence, and not 
‘about’ silence, yet is by no means a silent story. What I believe you can 
surmise from my amblings is the difficulty I had, and continue to have, in 
marking the terrain I seek to lay bare. Informed by an image, you might recall, 




a haunting image, making a claim for attention, or rather, for attending to the 
striking significance in the way the little girl’s head was turned outside the 
frame. There she was. There I was, but, if truth be told, I was really somewhere 
else. It is from this terrain that I gather the various strands that have so far 
informed my endeavour, under the proviso that anytime we gather strands in 
a fashion, such gatherings are but one of the multitudes of narratives, of 
sometimes contradictory or contra-linear nature, bound to a spatial and 
temporal contextuality. I take consolation in Arendt’s (1998:97) suggestion that 
“action and speech […] are indeed the two activities whose end result will 
always be a story with enough coherence to be told, no matter how accidental 
or haphazard the single events and their causation may appear to be.” A 
ghostly story, laid before you through keystrokes executed in a particular way, 
at a particular time, discloses, to follow Arendt’s (1998:179) argument “the 
‘who’ in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is - his qualities, gifts, talents, 
and shortcomings, which he may display or hide - [which] is implicit in 
everything somebody says and does. It can be hidden only in complete silence 
and perfect passivity.”  
The impossibility of a story left untold - a story of silences, of mere-ness, I-
ness, bare-ness, a story of trauma, of ghosts and hauntings, of gaps and 
fissures, of imagined whispers, cannot easily be condensed into the gleam of a 
singularly coherent structure, shining bright in a world which is more often 
than not utterly “vague, diffuse or unspecific, slippery, emotional, ephemeral, 
elusive or indistinct” (Law, 2008:2). I speak of gleam, as it were, in relation to 
research that strives for a neatly packaged verifiable, independent, rigorous 
end product, one that ultimately seeks to represent a slice of ‘objective reality’ 
(Alvesson, 2009) - devoid of those who dared to leave marks on its shiny 




surface – in an endeavour of avoidance: polished to perfection by hands whose 
very imprint is a sign warranting erasure.  
‘I-ness’ leaves marks, hand marks, affective marks, displays, what Bochner 
(2000:270) calls “the self on the page, taking a measure of life’s limitations, of 
the cultural scripts that resist transformation, of contradictory feelings, 
ambivalence, and layers of subjectivity”. Could you, in all honesty, imagine a 
text moving itself along, for is that not really the implication of research which 
is “not interpreted, deciphered, or translated” (Bondi, 2012; Koro-Ljungberg & 
Barko, 2012:256; Richardson, 2008)? And if we dismiss such stance on the 
understanding that texts, of which research texts are but one example, not only 
implicate a writer in her affective embodiment, but equally implicate her in a 
wider socio-cultural locatedness, it seems that what is dovetailed into such 
descriptions is an inherent heterogeneity.  
Were you here, I imagine the question uppermost on your mind (!) might well 
be the one which concerns itself with clarity and linearity, a question I begin 
to cherish with something akin to glee, because in its immediacy I recognize 
joyful disobedience, or failure to comply. Do I run before I can walk? Maybe. 
Will I stumble? Possibly. But is that not partially the nature of research in 
which ‘methodological cleanliness’ (Law, 2008) encounters its own nemesis in 
that the field’s topology cannot ever be charted in its entirety? What avails 
itself is to a large extent dependent on a ‘seeking out’ and utilizing a variety of 
tropes through which the ‘it’ under investigation could be – apprehended, 
ascertained, made substantive meaning of, re-presented… You might gather 
through my hesitancy that I fail to subscribe to the possibility of a 
comprehensive and definitive mapping, a mapping devoid of palimpsests, of 




layered meanings, of contradictions, of absences, without wanting to evoke 
the black hole of relativism.  
How do you do that, you asked me, how do you begin to listen to ghosts? 
While on first reading a linkage of spectres with linearity seems oxymoronic, 
in the sense that ghosts and hauntings rarely avail themselves in clearly 
defined spaces, on closer inspection, if ‘inspection’ is the term with which a 
questionable presence can be apprehended, an ambiguity can be felt in 
silenced spaces or places pertaining, as Derrida would have it, to a power 
whose very existence “comes precisely from not being able to choose between 
‘whether or not’ – whether or not it is, for example” (Lucy, 2004:111). Writing 
into opacity undoubtedly creates sets of difficulties of which I am not yet 
aware. There it is, again – the ‘not yet’, as if I need to know before the act, the 
act of writing into a methodology which seeks to ‘know’ without knowing 
what can or cannot be known. “Writing” as Richardson (2008:1) says “is itself 
a method of inquiry that leads to new ideas—new concepts, maybe even 
theories. To engage this method one need only be willing to accept uncertainty 
for awhile (sic), and then take the risk of finding out things one didn’t know—
or even want to know.” 
Where to begin? In consideration to your question, may I suggest opening this 
methodological treasure trove to discover what, if anything, lies upmost? 
Through returning to what might have been an ambiguous ‘mishearing’, and 
in full awareness of an interpretive act called upon in the process of hearing, I 
commence in taking off the lid, so to speak, and slide myself into the 
methodology which favours unequivocally my own situated locatedness 
(Day, 2002; Reed-Danahay, 2002, 1997; Richardson, 2008; Spry, 2001). When 




Arendt’s (1998) ‘hiding in complete silence’ is not an option, what avails itself 
foremost is what Wall (2006:146) describes as “an emergent qualitative 
research method that allows the author to write in a highly personalized style, 
drawing on his or her experience to extend understanding about a societal 
phenomenon”, a method, I would like to add, which aims to attend to the 
reciprocity of writings as carriers of/ carried by socio-cultural inflections. Such 
writings have been at the forefront of texts which value the contextuality of 
the researcher leaving her aforementioned marks, and hail its ‘potentially 
provocative’ (Gannon, 2006) way of thinking in social sciences (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000; Ellis et al., 2011). Denzin‘s (2006:422) evocative stance that 
“ethnography is not an innocent practice. […] Through our writing and our 
talk, we enact the worlds we study” pays attention to our situated agency. But 
is Denzin’s addendum enough, does it suffice to ‘enact the worlds’ without 
due considerations of who is included in such enactments, and what might 
ultimately be exposed in or of the ‘worlds’ within which we are located? To 
carry the thought further, and in alignment with Della Pollock (1998:75), who 
wants “to explore some of the ways what we have come to call ‘performative 
writing’ […] by not recovering reference to a given or ‘old’ world but by 
writing into a new one”, can autoethnography deliver on Pollock’s accounts? 
Can autoethnography truly extend beyond the solipsism of an ‘auto’, even in 
its minimal form, as auto-ethnography, so to speak, (linking the post-classical 
Latin term of ‘self, oneself, one’s own’ framed within the ‘ethno’ – the study of 
peoples, cultures (Oka)), and begin not only to trouble the very premise on 
which such research is based, but equally challenge “routine representations 
of social/performative life” (Pollock, 1998:75)? Of course, I do hear Rolling’s 
(2004:549) definition of autoethnography as “a methodology that questions the 




authenticity of the voice that tells of an essential self”, but fail to be persuaded 
of its value as overarching methodological panacea.  
What is so deeply troublesome about the ‘auto’, you might ask, apart from 
what can often be taken as a presumption of an unambiguous subjectivity, 
rather than one which is iteratively performed and intersubjectively 
constructed? Furthermore, is it enough to declare a decentring of the authorial 
‘I’ without attending to the sedimented ground made up of densely-layered 
further reductive assumptions? It stands to reason that an unambiguous 
subjectivity pays heed to the privileging of a particular situatedness which 
locates me (ethnographically) at the interstices of academies, their prevailing 
normative research hegemonies, and the troublesome notion of context-
independency in the search for true and objective knowledge. But is the notion 
of ‘auto’ sufficiently implicated in what it shies away from, the Other, if you 
will, in all its heterogeneous serendipity: in my case, a first generation post-
war German woman, living in a country considered ‘enemy’ during her 
parents’ pivotal years, whose ghostly hauntings and residual trauma 
transmitted through previously silent or silenced generations yield to an 
embodied need to write not in order to know but in order to inquire into a 
possibility? It, frankly, does not suffice to be assured – on my limited 
understanding that in the end all assurances are nothing more than placatory 
and, dare I say, futile gestures – of autoethnography’s procedural sense of a 
subjectivity and its iterative attempt to extend towards a beyond, without 
bearing its own solipsistic foreclosure. And if assurances do not suffice, where 
do I go to from here?  




Furthermore, where do I go to in my search for writings which do immediately 
contest themselves in their claims to knowledge as foregone conclusion? 
Hamera’s (2011:318) notion that knowledge is ‘unfinalizeable’, “that there can 
never be a last word, only penultimate ones,” articulates something around 
the idealized finitude of discrete claims. Nothing, nothing can be foreclosed, 
after all, because “the limit of experience and self-understanding subverts any 
attempt of narrative unity and coherence”, so Jackson and Mazzei (2008a:303) 
contend. But, I ask you, how does one square the circle of writing continuously 
ambiguous subject positions invested in inconsistencies, paradoxes, shifts and 
failings without succumbing to the lure of tidiness and certitude, or similar 
ways of reductive representations; how does one write texts “wrapping 
themselves around each other in conflict, need, passion, necessity” (Pollock, 
1998:94), if not as “writing that unfolds with an insistent fear of its own 
representations, [that] often moves ‘nervously’ on the page, slips around” as 
Pelias (2013:400) reminds me? May it be in such ‘wrappings’ that I seek barely 
audible traces into narratives marked by absence, criss-crossing shifts in 
perspective between those who are, who have or had been, and those who 
were never to be; that I begin to seek a performatively-imbricated 
methodological possibility, as a way of attending to the ‘betweenness’ 
(McKenzie, 1998) rather than the discreteness of trauma, silence and ghosts?  
How do you do that, you asked me, how do you listen to ghosts? How do I, 
indeed, begin to listen to them? Were you here now, you would have heard by 
my intonation the ambiguity around which I continuously hesitate to position 
the declaration of an ‘I’, so aptly described by Butler (2005:74) as “besieged 
from the start by an enigmatic alterity that makes the elaboration of an ‘I’ a 
persistently difficult achievement.” The difficulty arises partially out of what 




Tamas (2009) calls  ‘loss of certainties’, which, like Gannon (2006:477) suggests, 
“destabilize[s] the authority of the self who writes and knows himself or 
herself as a discreet and autonomous subject”. What Gannon attests to is the 
inherent paradox of demanding an authorial subject position, the ‘I’, say, who 
stories “the body and memories of the autoethnographic writer at the scene of 
lived experience” (2006:475). Such temporal and spatial divergences trouble a 
linearly constructed continuity of an authorial definitiveness, or what 
Atkinson calls the “subject of interior subjectivity” (2013:28), in laying bare the 
necessary disjuncture between experience and re-presentation. The necessity 
arises, I suggest, not solely by reframing an immediacy into a linguistically 
mediated and contextualized text, but also by attending to the discourses 
available to invest myself into such frameworks. To speak an ‘I’ is, in short, 
nothing but contentious, yet, equally paradoxically, speaks to an inherent 
experiential perpetuity – as subject engaged in moving her fingers along the 
keyboard right now, constructing words and sentences, attempting to attend 
to certain questions, moving in a linear fashion from the left to the right side 
of a computer screen, all the while almost obliterating ghosts from view.  
Can you forgive me for being vague, for attempting to tether my thesis-writing 
subjectivity onto the possibility of becoming, rather than onto a binding 
proposition? The adjusting shift from the supposed rigour of methodological 
certitude towards a mere nuance might appear foolish, and, possibly - even 
likely - unnecessary. And yet, the dictate of the deeply troublesome auto does 
rub against this text, rubs against me in its demand to pay heed to articulations 
around a self, premised on an ‘I’ irrespective of its instability or inchoateness, 
rather than a ‘we’ with its inflection of ‘more than’ in all its relational 
complexities. The sentiment aligns itself easily with Spry’s (2011:506) 




suggestion, that “in writing this chapter […] I find a multiplicity and 
accountability in the performative-I, and a felt sense of liminality, of circularity, 
of in-betweenness […]. Different from an ethnographic-I, this is a troubled, 
sensual, contingent embodiment of communitas.” After all, where else but in 
the littoral space can I begin to engage with those who speak “in the interstices 
of the visible and the invisible” (Gordon, 2008:24)? 
The proverbial methodological chest has been partially unpacked and yields, 
on closer inspection, not only other layers warranting attention, but leakages 
into and out of aforementioned fields, for ghosts and hauntings rarely avail 
themselves without opaqueness. Such is the nature of my inquiry that at 
present nothing seems to be easily containable, and frankly, I would not want 
it any other way. ‘And how do you intend to proceed’, I hear you ask, urgency 
clenching your lips tight. ‘Easy, easy’, I would answer, not easy as in effortless, 
but with ease, in awareness of the impossibility of knowing where to arrive at: 
“I don’t know where this is taking me” says Wyatt (2013:167). I, too, begin this 
inquiry out of an embodied knowledge, a photographic catalyst, as it were, 
straining to speak and/or be heard against the grain of what needed to be kept 
at bay or, simply, repressed. I make attempts, many attempts, to grasp onto 
stories that bind “the space between two worlds, between love and loss” 
(Holman Jones, 2011:323), only to shy away from holding too tightly, from 
squeezing too firmly. Yet I know, if I ever know anything, that, in a similar 
fashion to Spry (2001:708), performative writings (and autoethnographies) are 
informed by “the body as the site from which the story is generated.” The 
‘body’, my body, is hence not solely the locus through which I “recognize[e] 
and interpret[…] the residue traces of culture inscribed on [my] hide” (Spry, 
2001:711), but locates me viscerally on a point in a particular temporal and 




spatial matrix. So far, so very autoethnographic, you may well muse, and I 
would smile and almost silently mutter that I told you so. Yet is what I propose 
as a ‘performatively-imbricated methodological possibility’ not similarly 
bound, and in that sense nothing more than a convoluted way of guaranteeing 
the inscription of alterity into the text? Can I tether the bindings onto what has 
been lost, what has become intangible, barely imaginable, only to surface again 
through “securing absence with the substitutional presence of words” 
(Pollock, 1998:82)? I don’t know. Of course, “not knowing does not stop you 
from looking for who and what is gone, for writing in and over lost texts” 
(Holman Jones, 2011:331). I am trying to understand, you see, in how far the 
very text you read right now does not already herald some sort of foreclosure 
of curiosity, even if, or possibly because it presents itself as a continuous move 
between relative imponderables, or shifting reconfigurations of uncertainty. 
And if that were so, have you slipped through my fingers, have I lost you as 
well?  
I alluded in the beginning of my letter to a curiosity of such intensity that not 
to follow its trail would be impossible. You could rightly argue, of course, that 
the term ‘trail’ implies an a priori, in that there has been something/someone 
whose marks have been left ‘on my hide’, and whose traces I am only just 
beginning to recognize as such, let alone make sense of (yet!). Ghosts do leave 
trails, ask something of me, I think, if only to follow them and see where they 
take me. Listening, hearing, speaking, looking – trails become the means by 
which I begin to recognize ghostly presences, but, paradoxically, it is in the 
absence of any noise that their presence becomes most apparent. Ghosts 
appear in silence. In silence. What methodological device can I conjure up to 




grasp at fleeting hauntings through the silences with which they seem to make 
themselves known?  
What appeared at the onset as a methodological chest seems to disappear in 
front of my eyes, as if the way the walls of said chest are held upright is solely 
determined by what is contained within, and as soon as I apply a specific 
methodological framework to the investigation, I fail in adhering to its 
parameters, so that I, ultimately, end up with a deconstructed mess! Is my 
suggestion read as willfully arbitrary when I argue that it does not suffice any 
more to embed myself wholeheartedly in autoethnography, even if, as Gannon 
suggests, in  “autoethnography the subject and object of research collapse into 
the body/thoughts/feelings of the (auto)ethnographer located in his or her 
particular space and time” (2006:475)? I long for words and writings which 
trouble clear-cut demarcations between subject/object, between 
body/thought/feeling, despite Gannon’s reassurance of collapsing 
dichotomies. But, I hear you ask, tell me about ways in which these ‘troubles’ 
could be re-presented, and I would answer with a slow rise of my shoulders 
as if to say – See? I told you its complex, complicated and confusing, isn’t it?  
And yet, to follow Pollock (1998:86), “performative writing does not project a 
self, even a radically destabilized one, as much as a relation of being and 
knowing that cuts back and forth across multiple ‘divisions’ among selves, 
contexts, affiliations”… Back and forth – akin to one of the paradoxical 
positions I continuously encounter in that the way I write myself into a text is 
enmeshed in otherness – a ‘knowledge’ arising from particular feelings, 
thoughts, always situated, always embodied, always socio-culturally 
contextualized, and through that very token always imbued with what is not 




mine. And yet, this is also the site through which I continuously re-configure 
myself, and by doing so, re-configure what is other. Butler (1997:28) puts it so 
eloquently when she argues that “the desire to persist in one’s own being 
requires submitting to a world of others that is fundamentally not one’s own. 
[…] Only by persisting in alterity does one persist in one’s ‘own’ being.”  
What I am at pains to offer is related to the problematic ways with which our 
emerging subjectivities are continuously undercut, a pain not unlike the one I 
encounter in negotiating, and sometimes failing, complex interrelationalities, 
because the pronunciation of ‘I am’ becomes contested territory as soon as it is 
uttered. Were you to ask me if my query on the notion of self with as much 
coherence as necessary to write a thesis on trauma, ghosts and silence is not 
really also a distracting device, I would vehemently shake my head and ask 
you to concede that the idea of writing spectres from a questionable or 
troublesome subject position would challenge anybody. Any body. My body 
- and with it a return to an embodied sense of unease in relation to a “notion 
of the self which often goes unexamined”(de Freitas & Paton, 2009:484). This 
is, in the words of St Pierre (1997), a ‘dilemma that will not go away”.   
In circling round what cannot be overarchingly premised, I give way to a 
process without an immediate set of resolutions. My circling is a substantive 
part of my inquiry, a way of writing and shifting without a definitive endpoint 
in sight. St Pierre (1997:408) calls it ‘nomadic inquiry’ (with a nod to Deleuze), 
as a way of “deterritorializ[ing] spaces in which to travel in the thinking that 
writing produces.” Writing in this way is as much product as process, and 
follows St Pierre’s meanderings into the text. But does such inquiry not extend 
itself beyond the demarcation of ‘thinking’? What I suggest now could be read 




as an overarching premise with which a fluid subjectivity iteratively performs 
herself, so that the written text can function as a temporary ‘resting place’, a 
refuge, say, a con-figuration amongst the myriad of other ones available at any 
given time. The function of writing is hence also always a means of becoming 
subject, in the way I attempt myself on this page, this ‘fabrication’, to follow 
Butler (1999:173 italics in original) who argues that “such acts, gestures, 
enactments, generally construed, are performative in the sense that the essence 
or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications 
manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive 
means.”  
My ‘methodological’ chest has broken its boundary, collapsed around the 
impossibility of containing or restraining. What started off as an inquiry into 
mere possibilities has turned into a topological evaluation of ruins – the “ruins 
of traditional epistemology and methodology, […] and sometimes paralyzing 
complications that have no easy resolution” (St.Pierre, 1997:404f) The 
appropriateness of the term ‘ruins’ runs like bitter-sweet liquor through my 
thoughts, seeps out of the story which cannot be left untold, and dissolves the 
margins of my so-called treasure trove of methodological wonders. And so my 
fingers continue the keyboard-dance, its rhythm dictated by the slowness or 
fastness of processes I barely, or maybe, rarely capture in the words which 
appear right now. Writing continues to be the sustenance through which I 
negotiate ruins, even methodological ones; I am impelled towards the practice 
of writing not solely because I don’t know any other way, but because I don’t 
know.   




What knowledge can be gained from such unknowable position, you might 
ask, to which I would answer that your question is questionable on account of 
its dismissal of what cannot yet be known. I fail to recognize the relevance in 
locating myself on the trajectory between the Scylla of overarching knowledge 
claims and the Charybdis of nebulous muddling without attention to the 
complex processes which underpin my practice. My practice, identified as a 
“moving labile event” by Gannon (2003:2). I imagine your smile right now, as 
if Gannon’s description puts your hesitancy at rest through offering sufficient 
stability in the possibility of an ‘event’ without falling prey to any pre-
determined fixicity. The tangibility of such event, in my case a thesis, is arising 
out of creative writing practices, subjected to and becoming subject through 
discourses and relationalities. In short: without writing as inquiry there will 
be no thesis. Is such a premise not breathtakingly beautiful?  
Were I to describe the elation I feel now, it would be akin to reaching a summit 
after a climb through clouds. I trust my self sufficiently to carry on climbing 
higher on a path which, at times, is barely visible. Boulders jut out, pose 
menacingly like guardians and resist any pushes. I squeeze myself into and 
through marginal gaps, one foot in front of the other, and find resting plateaus. 
Small stone circles draw me in, charcoal grey against the whiteness of the fog. 
I notice those circles not for the first time, but begin to take them in, make them 
my own, they “lodged [...] in my very bones” as St. Pierre (1997:410) says, and 
I begin to imagine people, engaged with each other, in thoughts, hands 
passing to hands, next to next to next, stones next to stones, stones on top of 
stones, gathering, building: building a matrix of theoretical constructs which 
trouble a unitary and unifying path to a supposed grail. Those who came 
before smoothed over some of the margins on positivist boulders, standing 




erect and solid in the way of the ones who seek different, fluid, marginal, non-
essentialist regimes of truths. Smoothly I can slip thereby through and into 
margins and fissures, into gaps in knowledge previously discarded as below 
standardized value quotient.   
An investigation into something that has yet to be found. How distant is such 
a premise from what Kvale (1995:20) calls the “THE TRINITY OF 
RELIABILITY, VALIDITY, AND GENERALIZATION”? Capitalized it stands 
in its glory, an evocation of times when social science adhered 
unquestioningly to theories laid down by its positivist’s cohort, and while 
hegemonic declarations have somewhat abated now, a substantial contingent 
of social science research continues to be invested in “verification of 
knowledge as reflection of an objective reality” (Kvale, 1995:37). Does it suffice 
to refer you back to preceding paragraphs in my letter, where I briefly debated 
the complexities arising out of our procedural “space of plurality, a space-
between-agents” as Dunne (2005:380) would have it, with its challenge to 
incontestable knowledge situated in ‘objective reality’? It might come as no 
surprise now to hear me speak about such contestation in almost categorical 
terms – besides, the irony is not lost on me, given that the term ‘categorical’ is 
premised on the Kantian imperative of reason as arbiter in all judgements. 
And yet, I do not want to dismiss outright notions of ‘knowledge’ and 
‘validity’ only because the terms have been appropriated by what Gergen 
(2013) terms ‘empiricist foundationalism’. Lather (1993:674) calls on the notion 
of validity as “incitement to discourse”, as investigation into the construction 
– and deconstruction - of “both hegemonic and oppositional codes”, in order 
to ‘reframe’ or invent “counter discourse/practices of legitimation” (1993:676). 
How far are investigations into ghostly whispers, silences, hauntings  




considered “counter-practices of authority” (Lather, 1993:677), I hear you ask, 
and, like before, I would almost shrug off your inquiry by asking you in turn 
if such counter-practices would not eventually assume their own normative 
hegemonies. We are always already implicated, or, as Lather argues, “it is not 
a matter of looking harder or more closely, but of seeing what frames our 
seeing – spaces of constructed visibility and incitements to see what constitute 
power/knowledge” (1993:675). ‘Looking harder or more closely’ would 
transfer, I suggest, the emphasis back onto the dichotomies of viewer/viewed 
with its implied binary demarcations. When Richardson (2008:1) argues that 
her lens “is more like a crystal than an eye-glass, thereby inviting refraction 
upon refraction”, she disrupts not only any assumptions about irreducible 
knowledge claims, but offers shifting, fluid and contextualized possibilities 
“for categorizing, conceptualizing, and revisioning.”  
Where have we got to, you may ask, as this question is never far from your 
mind, and, maybe more pressing, where do you need to go with your 
methodological framework in tatters and a thesis to write? Again, as before, 
the answer seems so blatantly obvious: not to be disheartened by a supposed 
lack of criteria which extensively drive hegemonic research, but to trust in 
practices which problematize the very conditions which grant them authority. 
And so I continue to repeat St. Pierre’s ‘circling’ of my methodological 
aftermath with its contested epistemological premises, and return to the 
opening of this letter, into the how-ness, into the ‘how do you do that’, and 
would like to begin with an address to you: 
You are a fabrication, a stylistic in(ter)vention. You are as ‘unreal’ in our 
dialogic encounter as you are here, on this page, in this particular thesis. 




Forgive me if my words shock you to what is often colloquially referred as the 
core, as if our subjectivity is densely compacted around a central more or less 
foundational or fixed part, and not, as I argue, continuously and fleetingly 
performed, constituted and contested through discursive practices. You might 
view me with suspicion now, consider me an ‘unreliable narrator’ (T. Murphy, 
2012), as if my contestations come as a surprise: were I to tell you that my 
in(ter)vention of you is driven by an overarching desire to give space (and 
voice) to the Other, the gap and its re-conciliation between subjectivities, 
would you feel less wounded? You might reject the significance by which I 
write you onto these pages in order to articulate the “performative process of 
critical narration that resists notions of individual coherency” (Spry, 2011:503); 
you might consider my practice patronizing and insulting. Nevertheless, I call 
upon you as the literary device through which I commit myself to alterity.  
We are all, as Britzman (1995:230) says, “textualized identities. [Our] voices 
create a cacophony and dialogic display of contradictory desires, fears, and 
literary tropes that, if carefully ‘read’, suggest just how slippery speaking, 
writing, and desiring subjectivity really are.” Research that attends to such 
inconsistencies, incoherences, heterogeneities makes visible the “dialogic 
processes involved in making meaningful connections with what is studied,” 
hence “the use of imagination as part of these dialectic processes is key in 
qualitative research” (Bresler, 2006:58). My imaginings of a ‘you’ as 
interlocutor become the means whereby I shuttle between various refractions 
or reflections, in search of phantoms, spectres, and hauntings. You are, if you 
will, my tenuous link to what or who has been absented, silenced.  




You might have guessed by now that your appearance is also an indicator for 
some of the methodological complexities which overarch the collapse of any 
epistemic certainties, in particular around the ‘subject/object dichotomy’ 
(Butler, 1999) with its ensuing knowledge claims. While I do not wish to 
propose that the evocation of the/a ‘you’ in this text necessarily and fully 
interrupts the hegemony of authorial voice, it nevertheless troubles its 
coherence and legitimacy; I suggest to think of it as part of the previously-
mentioned ‘wrappings’ by which homogeneity and certitude are destabilized 
and articulated. After all, “the goal of a dialectical interaction is not a greater 
understanding of existing meanings and interpretations. Rather, it is the actual 
reconceptualization of those meanings” (Sawyer & Norris, 2009:129f). Who is 
feeling, thinking, speaking, and writing – these questions invite us to query 
“our own premises […]. What can I know? How do I know what I know?” 
(Bochner & Ellis, 2003:508). Without doubt writings which paradoxically 
ground themselves in uncertainty shift the “borders of research orthodoxy 
[by] using explicit transgressive modes of expression and representation to 
question the exclusion of art, performance, and aesthetics in the constellation 
of knowledge” (Bochner & Ellis, 2003:507). Your evocation here on this page 
hence not only attends to familial and intimate silencing, but also to 
methodological absences, in that it speaks performatively to performative 
intersubjectivity.  
If I can remember correctly, ruins have an insidious way of germinating seeds 
long held tight in compacted soil, and why should, what I above called my 
methodological aftermath, be any different? Whether what I propose is called 
‘arts-based inquiry’ (Estrella & Forinash, 2007) or ‘art as inquiry’ (Bochner & 
Ellis, 2003) or ‘aesthetically based research’ (Bresler, 2006; White, 2011) or 




‘research at the boundaries between social science and the arts’ (Davidson, 
2012) or ‘critical arts-based research’ (Bagley & Castro-Salazar, 2012), the 
diverse nomenclature articulates the importance of art as a specific research-
driving component.  
Imagine: 
1997. The doors into the small sculpture studio of the Edinburgh College of 
Art in Lauriston Place open silently, I enter hesitantly, glance furtively along 
the lines of art students. The waiting crowd is sufficiently dense for me to slide 
into. I shuffle to the back.  
2001. I touch the doors to the studio, run my fingers over almost imperceptible 
grooves left by the many who came before me and who indubitably will come 
after. This place, these people, these materials, stone, iron, lead, graphite, have 
become as much home as any one I have known. I learn to speak another 
tongue, caress through visceral materiality what I cannot say in words, draw 
myself into mad frenzies and let ghosts fly. I leave with a smile.   
I have always held on to a language that offered flights of signification, of 
which this thesis is one example. Granted, the linearity of letters on this page, 
the carefully placed margins, commas, full stops (which I try to learn to be 
fond of but often fail to consider fully, intrusive as I find them, interruptive 
even, stopping me in my tracks, setting boundaries!) offers a different kind of 
tactility to the one I drew, and drew on. Would it be apt to describe my word-
lines in terms of artistic production, as drawings even, “artistic renderings 
[which] generate imaginative possibilities” (Pelias, 2013:398)? 
When White (2011:150) says that “the point of any writing, after all, is to be 
convincing”, I counter his proclamation with a bold ‘?’. Irrespective of ethical 




implications and of what might be gained, how could I ‘convince’ you of being 
a fabrication without turning my argument back to the contentious 
formulation of the subject, any subject. Are we not all, in that sense, 
fabrications? I shy away from acts of writing that might appropriate otherness. 
When unutterable experiences collapse under the burden of words, will you 
come to my aid in calling up ghosts without the supposed rigour of 
‘convincing’ rites of writing?  
Where does that leave me/you/us/this thesis? What have I not yet (!) spoken 
about, not because it is by no means irrelevant but because it has not yet 
appeared on the margins of thinking through the implications of  
performatively-imbricated writing as inquiry, writing that is “filled with 
longing for a lost subject/object that has disappeared into history and time” as 
Pollock (1998:84) suggests?  
Allow me to unravel a thread which has become more noticeable while 
rereading the last paragraphs, in fact, its absence thus far is all the more 
astounding as it infuses my argument of fluid intersubjectivity. When I 
shocked you above in the harsh proclamation that you were but a mere 
fabrication, I followed some of Butler’s (2005:81f italics in original) compelling 
writings into the nature of an ‘I’ coming into being, the ‘founding scene’ as she 
would have it, in the sense that “in the beginning I am my relation to you, 
ambiguously addressed and addressing, given over to a ‘you’ without whom 
I cannot be and upon whom I depend to survive.” I depend on you to survive. 
“I am mired, given over, and even the word dependency cannot do the job 
here.” You might hear through my words another kind of urgency, one that 
slides along towards an ethical interpellation of a ‘self’ in relation to ‘other’.  




My writings, or my words, sentences, here on this page, are never complete, 
or completed, because in order to tell them, I give over to what is not of me, or 
as Butler would have it, reconcile myself to be “haunted by that for which I 
have no definitive story” (Butler, 2001:27). Do you hear the murmurs of ghosts, 
the registration of something or someone at large, the tenuous link to a theme 
which I cannot let go of? I imagine you smiling right now, knowing enough of 
me to make allowances for my inability of letting go, another tedious ‘dog-
and-bone-story’, which has played its very own part in our relationship with 
each other. There is no letting go of you, for how could I configure a ‘self’ 
without a ‘you’ in whose presence such configuration finds its ethical 
inscription?  
Pressing for attention in the methodological pentimento of my writings is the 
ethical frame through which I ground myself, knowing that the proverbial 
ground is rarely more than an intersection on the forever changing temporal 
and spatial matrices. And yet, despite or maybe because of such an in-
conclusive subject position, I feel drawn towards an ethics which extends 
beyond the one that can be traced back to the Enlightenment and its reverence 
for universal truths, one that searches beyond “guidelines, practices, […], 
politics, protocols, proformas” (Halse & Honey, 2007:339f). How can I possibly 
make claims grounded in essentialism or pure reason when I fear their heavy 
weight would conflate any flights my ghosts and hauntings might make? And 
what about you, the one who has never left me, can you be slotted into a 
quantifiable codex? What kind of ethical framework might begin to address 
this complex interplay between various subjectivities?  




I want to call on another ‘You’ now, one whose ‘Y’ is capitalized, and hence 
stands somewhat apart from the familiarity of my primary addressee. I call on 
You, the reader of these words, these sentences, this thesis, towards whom I 
bear responsibilities. Levinas (1984:194) understands “responsibility as the 
essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity,” where the very 
notion of subjectivity can only ever be considered in an a priori of 
responsibility. Responsibility for the Other seems to be, in Levinas’ terms, an 
ontological presupposition; Other hence precedes being. Who is this ‘Other’, 
if not ultimately reconcilable to a slightly different version of a self, a 
subjectivity intended as ‘Same’, if you so wish? Against Davis’(1996:3) 
“otherness, or alterity, [which] appears as a temporary interruption to be 
eliminated as it is incorporated into or reduced to sameness”, Levinas’ Other 
is irreducibly Other. It is an Other in singularity and uniqueness, non-
appropriable, because “such a reduction amounts to a kind of subjective 
colonialism, where all the other’s desires are reduced to the desires of the 
“home country”, the self” (Nealon, 1997:129). What is it about Levinas’ Other 
that renounces such solipsistic concerns?   
I grapple around Levinasian notions of subjectivity, responsibility, ethics and 
the Other without concrete beginnings with which to unravel the threads 
informing his body of work; how infuriatingly appropriate in view of my 
methodological aftermath, you might well think! And yet, I am inclined to 
persevere with fragments which attend to the fragility of my ghostly writings, 
modes of thinking through what it means to consider “subjectivity […] not for 
itself” (Levinas, 1984:194). In any case, is the very notion of a subjectivity ‘for 
itself’ not oxymoronic, given that it is always embedded into what is not of 
me? The possibility of the subject can only ever be located in the matrix of what 




Butler (2005:8) calls “a social temporality”, in the interweave of the subject and 
its subjection to the Other.  
“Die Welt des Daseins ist Mitsein”3 proposes Heidegger (1993:118), and it is in 
the impossibility of being - without existentially being-with - that Levinas 
locates his ethics. I am because I am with - you, the other, another, the Other; 
and hence, to be is always already a carrier of ethical interpellation. “We share 
the world,” says Bauman (2000:84), “and so we willy-nilly affect each other’s 
lives; what we do or abstain from doing is not indifferent to the lives of others. 
That circumstance has already made us responsible for each other”.  How can 
I take on what Levinas so astutely demands of me in his implications of 
responsibility for the Other, irrespective of any reciprocity? To whom am I 
responsible, if not to all and everyone? And are there not more, I hear you ask, 
those whose tangential flights have led to hauntings and ghosts, without 
whom this thesis would not even be written? How can I possibly foretell if my 
responsibility will be bearable? There you have it, questions over questions 
without inklings of a definitive nature, let alone resolution, as if I could 
possibly draw a tight boundary around ethical considerations, when fleeting 
subjectivities are anything but demarcated. 
I continue to circle, in St. Pierre’s words, around ethics in the wake of a 
decentred and incohesive subject position, in the knowledge that any wake 
follows on from a loss, a loss of what I can ever know, or of what I might have 
known, yet “registered at levels that are not fully recoverable by 
consciousness” as Butler (2005:99) would have it. This, I assume, is part of the 
on-going dilemma around proclamations of a self in all her glorious 
                                                          
3 The world of being is being-with. 




heterogeneity, let alone in consideration of, and responsibility to, Other’s 
ultimate alterity. I imagine you here now, brows slightly contracted, as if what 
I have said so far leaves you bewildered, as if, in your puzzlement, you ask me 
to reframe those neat binary notions which set self against O/other. I cannot 
but bow my head slightly, and with a rather sheepish grin concede that you 
have a point, and yet, how can I not begin to think through ethical implications 
towards the O/other without its stranglehold on practices of dispossession and 
marginalization? The fundamental shift, from the O/other as subject to be 
rendered same, say, into the one which remains outwith the possibility of 
appropriation, marks my iterative indebtedness, irrespective of whether I take 
on such responsibility.  
What, you may ask, can one make of these reflections, without addressing the 
implications of their meanings in the context of living and writing this life, my 
life, through such embedded interrelationality – as performative self, 
performing her dynamic relational engagement, or as the contested and 
contestable auto in ethno? To whom, to quote Speedy (2008:52) do “I consider 
myself permanently accountable”? Speedy’s question sits uneasily: her 
permanence rubs against my post-structural base (the irony of liminality!) and 
fleeting, fluid subjectivities, let alone ghostly hauntings. And yet, what is 
readable here on the page is interlaced with permanence, because, unless I 
delete all and everything (and even then it is somehow retrievable), this text is 
text because of its permanence. I am, by the very process of writing, 
accountable, or in Levinasian terms responsible, regardless. Regardless of a 
subject position “inscribed and re-inscribed with discourses that the subject 
did not produce and that always remain, at least in part, opaque” (Davies et 
al., 2006:88). What a quagmire! I brood on relentless permanence in full view 




of its paradox, as if my life depended on it, as if my writing is weighted with 
the yoke of desolation and ultimate failure.  
When Levinasian parameters operate from what Butler (2005:86) calls the 
“primary scene, since it precedes and even conditions the spatio-temporal 
coordinates that circumscribe the ontological domain”, I remain wary of its 
incontestable, essentialist principles. And yet, by the same argument Levinas 
contests any assumptions which arise out of a primacy of sameness with its 
ubiquitous urge to denigrate unbridgeable difference. His Other falls outwith 
thought with its appropriation into the order of consciousness (Ziarek, 1993). 
As soon as I think Other, I fail Other. The yoke tightens…  
In thinking through my failings, my inabilities of resisting the pull of 
appropriation - Other, other, You, you - I rub against other pulls - intrinsic 
moral principles, apprehended through reasoning and universal truth(s), or 
other matrices which could serve as blueprints for “ethical  self-constitution” 
(Hofmeyr, 2006:114), in full knowledge (?) that the very notions of ethic and 
self are imploding. I feel disillusioned, harbour inappropriate positivist 
thoughts, wish for you and a magic wand, while writing ethics in the only way 
I know: fleeting, unsure, disruptive.   
How can I indeed write myself into an ethics of auto-ethnographic 
performativity which problematizes and destabilizes its authorial 
construction, yet offer more than mere lip-service to deconstructive gestures? 
In marking my language in such critical terms – mere lip-service – I 
immediately seem to betray my own contestations around the fallacy of 
seeking veracity and certainty, while the above mentioned Scylla of 
universality teases the Charybdis of nebulous muddling. What I am left with 




are messy feelings, straying around the imperatives of a should and the 
inability to do just so. “The ethical obligation of researchers […], then, is to 
practice a form of inquiry as circumscription, drawing the uncertain contours 
of what we do not know without filling in those spaces with the litany of things 
that we do” (Burdick & Sandlin, 2010:354 italics in original). Were I to consider 
ethics under such proviso, I would not necessarily berate myself for my 
inability of constructing coherent arguments, given that as soon as I think, or 
speak, or write, residual matter seeks what Deleuze calls “line of flight” (1996), 
or what Freud might define as “return of the repressed” (1923/1961), those 
remnants of instability with allusions to what cannot easily be slotted into 
definite boundaries. I am rather inclined to think about ethics in terms of 
interruptions, contestations, and means of pushing and being pushed to the 
margins of what is known, unknown, unknowable, maybe never to be known.  
To write is always already a transgression into alterity, a colonizing act which 
demands more than proscriptive and prescriptive procedures; in writing you 
I write me, in writing ghosts I write parents, family, lives lived and to be lived, 
and death.  
You were there, and now, now you are gone. My writing of you on these pages 
has been eclipsed by what shall never be again. Drawn into a relationship with 
other relationships, performed in accordance to a codex that spun as much on 
an axis of absence as of haunting presence. Never again? How I can speak to a 
‘never’ even if I had a penny for every full-stop? Even if I could avert my ears, 
batten down the hatches, how could I abandon the little child whose image is 
branded into my cells? Always already other - long before I grasped what such 
sentiments really mean. Always other. And yet… 




The winter you left behind has withdrawn its fierce claws, and a more lenient 
wind begins to breathe into open windows. I still miss you – even after all this 
time. When I open the door to your room now, it is without expectation: a 
glance, a smile, a closing. But - and here is the thing that keeps a flame alight - 
but when I walk on the red carpet, the ruby-red carpet, I imagine your toes 
burrowing into soft wool, remain and reminder in absence. 23rd September. A 
significant anniversary, a remarkable day, to be marked by, what do you 
think? - A celebratory glass of red wine? A stir around cooking pots?  A chat 
over the kitchen table?  
  








There comes a moment in the process of writing, when various disparate 
forms should come together, not necessarily to cohere as a whole, but 
nevertheless align themselves with or link into the possibility of thematic 
containment. I re-read the sentence. I halt, feel torn between what I know of 
the conventions of academic writing with its implicit demand of a ‘should’, 
positioned in contrast to the ubiquitous nature of what Benozzo, Bell, and 
Koro-Ljungberg (2013:309) identify as the “flow of (dis)connected thoughts, 
relationships, interactions, and events in the context of research”, and the 
disjuncture of rendering  “the unknown, deviant, and impossible” (2013:310) 
into a seemingly (causally?) defined concept. Familiar with the implications of 
tearing myself between demand and latent desire, I seek solace of sorts in what 
Richardson (2002:923) calls “writing as a method of inquiry” with its 
unpredictable and performative nature of becoming. I do so, in parts, because 
I am unsure in how far I can hold on to writings which, by their very nature, 
seem mercurial, and wedge them into a distinct conceptual frame. And I have 
been thinking of how to introduce the next chapter. How would it be, I 
imagine, to go back into the preceding chapters, resurrect the interlocutor, the 
wilful yet willing narrative partner I had fabricated, and try out a beginning 
like this: 
Welcome back (Pause) - I have really missed you, you know. 
(Pause) I feel slightly awkward now, sitting here with you again, as if we could just slip – 




-  of course we cannot! Time has passed, and while I have been here working at my 
thesis, you have - 
- hang on a minute. You seem to begrudge me my absence! Who was it, who did not take me into 
her methodology chapter? Not only did you barely acknowledge me, but then you tell me that I 
am “a fabrication, a stylistic intervention”. How do you think I feel right now? And then you 
tell me you missed me? 
I thought you could help me 
Hmm 
Please 
Hmm. I think you evoke me only when you’re stuck.  
Please (Pause). You know, you might have a point. But stuckness or stickiness enforces 
a different kind of engagement, a waiting of what might or might not happen, without 
knowing its possible outcome.  
I know that I don’t know?  
 
The dialogic form flows easily, almost too easily. It attaches itself onto a way 
of writing which gives poignancy to an overarching argument of 
intersubjective narrativity, not dissimilar to the way Tamas (2011; 2013) writes 
herself into a dialogic intersubjective frame. Her texts are evocative 
performative renderings, mainly drawing on genres like theatre or radio plays, 
and offer a creative polyphony of theoretical articulations. But the re-insertion 
of the interlocutor here seems somewhat clunky and unnecessary. “Form and 
content are inseparable” says Richardson (2002:923) and I wholeheartedly 
agree. It might be better, on reflection, to retain the dialogic form, yet to posit 
two characters in a therapy session (Tamas & Wyatt, 2013), and relink the 
psychoanalytic intersubjective ground back into the material of my thesis.  




Beginning No Two 
 
Monday morning 
(The sound of a door bell. A woman appears and opens a door) 
Good morning (She smiles and shows Dagmar into a consulting room) 
Oh hi, hi. Thank you. (Dagmar removes coat, scarf, shoes and lies down on a couch. The 
woman sits down in a chair) 
So (Pause) how are you? (Pause) 
For ages I would have said ‘fine, fine’ but now (Pause) it’s much more complex, no, I 
am aware that everything ripples into further circles and I am muddled. You know that 
most of my days are spent writing this thesis, which needs to be contained somehow, 
and I have given myself 60 weeks to finish, and I still have so much to do and write and  
Hmmm 
And I know that I struggle, because I never think I can do it all, and this does not work 
either because what I need to address is method and the way I generate material and 
the concomitant task of letting the reader in to the way of how my stories came into 
being and I have barely breathed now and feel as if I deflate before I ever begin. So 
that’s how I am (Pause).  
Would it help to acknowledge that I am also a stylistic intervention? That I operate out of a frame 
which attends not only to the contestable notion of singular voice, but also to intersubjectivity?  
Oh, for sure. I can barely maintain the fiction of coherence 
And hence where we are at is really right in the middle 
Muddle more likely 
Right in the middle of your epistemological groundings and your theoretical underpinnings. 
Quite funny, really, to fabricate a situation that positions you in an analyst’s session, as if I had 
all the answers!  




Nothing funny about that, or do you see me laughing? I am somehow stuck between 
where I am and where I have to be.  
What comes to mind? 
Frustration, data, explanation, data, linearity, uncertainty, data, data, data… you might 
not know it, but I let you in on a secret: I have a memory stick. Isn’t that funny? A tiny 
oddly-shaped plastic device, retaining photos, documents, writings, right at my 
fingertips, an aide-memoire to my increasingly fractured sense of what it is I need to do 
now. And then I read Delamont (2006) that “our duty is to go out and research the 
classic texts of 2050 or 2090 not sit in our homes focusing on ourselves” and I begin to 
think about the imponderable data I have been accruing and what Delamont calls lazy 
methodology, and I am anything but lazy and  
 
And I stumble. The dialogic form has become superfluous; it has somehow 
run its course, I think. In the beginning of my thesis, I needed the inscription 
of the fictional interlocutor as relational other, who helped me bring my 
theoretical underpinnings alive; in dialogue, the continuous reflexive voice 
pushed me into the margins, interrogated me and the texts I drew on. It 
brought form to my ontological base in that it unceasingly interwove 
subjectivities. In the subsequent chapter, written in the form of a letter, I 
withdrew from the immediacy of dialogic voices. While I evoked the 
interlocutor’s presence in that I commented on her absence, I made the choice 
of not giving her a definitive voice, not to let her speak overtly. By making the 
shift from the immediacy of direct speech into the more calibrated form of 
indirect dialogue, I sought to open myself to a way of writing which left spaces 
or gaps.  
This is where I am now. I familiarize myself again with those gaps, fissures. I 
sit at my desk, sun streaming through skylights. It is a clear autumnal day. 




Yesterday was different. I slept badly, waking during the hours of the wolf, 
those troubling hours which occupy the liminal space in between wakefulness 
and sleep, the phase of more death and births than at any other time. “I work 
the writer’s graveyard shift” says Lee (2005:934). “Three a.m., I wake […]. My 
mind buzzes with thought”. The next day I am good for nothing. And then I 
wait, almost lie in wait. I wait some more. Because I somehow know that what 
is around me shies away from the cacophony, from the polyvocality of  
thoughts – ghosts show themselves not in what is obvious but in or through 
what is hidden, secreted away, silenced. “Silence is an opaque zone made of 
broken words, phrases just mentioned, disjointed speech, no words” (Benozzo 
et al., 2013:312). In writing into silence, I tap into what I know, have known for 
a long time: there were not many around who bore those silences with me. On 
reflection, I don’t think there was anyone.  
Ghosts appear in aloneness. They have an uncanny knack of disrupting the 
mundaneness of domesticity, like the photo of the little girl I rediscovered 
while folding laundry, the photo whose absent presence I evoke on these 
pages, that I cannot/will not let go off, even if it pulls me into a direction I 
barely want to re-familiarize my self with. Demand and desire – I cannot for 
the life of me figure out who demands what of whom. Mercury, that’s what 
this amalgam is, seductive in its simplicity and treacherously deadly. Frosh 
(2013:17) soothes my angst-ridden explications: “There is something that we 
can relate to in it that is genuinely of ourselves and yet we cannot quite get 
there” he says, “ – there is always something a bit wrong.” I am not sure if this 
is really what lies at the heart of my inquiry, given the subliminal relationship 
I have with/to hauntings which somehow, almost, demand a due, possibly 
their due. Almost – a tease, a slippage into and out of liminality, the in betwixt. 




Ripples and intersections. Ghosts appear when I don’t think about them, when 
I ‘cannot quite get there’, they rise up on the wave of the return of what has 
been lying dormant in the unconscious.  
The paradox in writing ghosts is that they seem to shy away from conscious 
thought, are elusive to language which begins to pin them down. I settle back 
into my chair, in awareness of the irony of dedicating a substantial part of my 
thesis to silences and ghosts, who, by their very fabric defy linguistic 
calibrations!  
Let me begin again. Again – there it is, the four-letter word which offers itself 




I am sitting at my desk, open a book, and begin to read.  
OSWALD.  But it wasn’t. I soon realized that. I couldn’t work any more. I wanted to 
start on a big new picture. But my skill seemed to desert me, I felt paralysed, I couldn’t 
concentrate, I felt giddy, everything went round and round. Oh, I was in a terrible state! 
In the end I sent for the doctor… and I learnt the truth from him. 
MRS. ALVING.  What do you mean? 
OSWALD.  He was one of the leading doctors over there. I had to tell him how I felt. 
And then he started asking me a whole lot of questions that did not seem to have 
anything at all to do with it. I couldn’t understand what the man was getting at… 
MRS. ALVING.  Well! 
OSWALD.  At last he said: there’s been something worm-eaten about you since birth. 
He used that very word; ‘vermoulu’. 




MRS ALVING [tense].  What did he mean by that? 
OSWALD.  I couldn’t understand it either, and I asked him for a more detailed 
explanation. And then he said, the old cynic… [Clenches his fist.] Oh…! 
MRS ALVING.  What did he say? 
OSWALD.  He said: the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. 
MRS ALVING [rising slowly].  The sins of the fathers…! 
OSWALD.  I very nearly hit him in the face… 
MRS. ALVING [walks across the floor].  The sins of the fathers… 
 
I close the book; what I have just read calls me to attention, as in attending to 
the strata running through my thesis: the appearance of ghosts is dovetailed 
into silences which are interlinked with or born out of trauma’s vicissitudes. 
These terms are interknotted to the extent that I cannot disentangle them, 
speak to them as if they were separable. I admit to failing to see them in their 
separateness. I admit to fail. I smile.  
On returning to the brief extract of Ibsen’s  (2008:138) play Ghosts, written in 
1881, I am reminded that ghosts re-present, as calling to presence, my 
forefathers’ deeds, whose sins, I am inclined to think, have been to silence 
what Schwab (2010:1) calls “ ineradicable legacies”. This is not a jury sitting in 
judgement over the nature of sin. I do not want to sit in judgement over my 
father’s sin(s), whatever it/they may have been, or indeed my mother’s – I am 
writing this in acknowledgement of a barely tangible trajectory that began 
long before I was born, and whose endpoint remains, and will continue to 
remain uncharted.  




I am struck by the ubiquity of experiences which would much later be held in 
terms of intergenerational trauma. “The sins of the fathers are visited upon the 
children” as Oswald declares can be made sense of in terms of Fraiberg et al’s 
(1975:387) ‘Ghosts in the nursery’, those pervasive “visitors from the 
unremembered past of the parents; the uninvited guests at the christening”. 
Psychoanalytic theory supports the argument that the ‘visits’ upon Oswald 
and the subsequent ‘terrible state’ can be understood in terms of traumatic 
reverberations, as Akhtar (2009:293) suggests: “The parental inability to 
mourn, coupled with a desire to protect the offspring from the dark shadow 
of persecution, results in all sorts of subtle and gross avenues for a 
transgenerational transmission of trauma”.   
Might it be spurious to begin to think of Oswald’s description of his ailments 
or affliction in terms of what Breuer and Freud (1893/1956:6) conceptualized 
as early as 1895 thus: “Any experience which calls up distressing affects – such 
as those of fright, anxiety, shame or physical pain – may operate as a trauma 
of this kind”? And is such conceptualization not very similar to Oswald’s 
inability to work, ensuing paralysis, and lack of concentration? Was Ibsen 
merely tapping into the Zeitgeist of the late 19th century with its budding 
explorations into the nature of the mind? If the doctor Oswald sent for aligns 
himself with what later would be called psychoanalytic approach, the 
questions, on first reading, which “did not seem to have anything at all to do 
with it”, had everything to do with it, and add further layerings to narratives 
of trauma, silences, and ghosts. “I had to tell him how I felt” Oswald confides 
in his mother, in resonance of the more colloquial question of ‘So, how are you?’ 
in the therapy scenario above.  




So, how am I? I wish I could say that I am fine, that I am not befuddled by 
something that keeps on pinching my ‘performative, poststructural’ 
murmurings. What did my angst-ridden analysand shout out of sheer 
desperation? Frustration, data, explanation, data, linearity, uncertainty, data, data, 
data, which, on first hearing, might poke fun at the difficulties I encounter at 
the moment. I concede that the alignment of data with linearity and 
explanation falls into a specific bracket which is rarely disputed in much of 
science, even social science, or what St. Pierre (2013:223 italics in original) calls 
the “conventional humanist qualitative inquiry.” She goes on: “The meaning and 
function of data depend on the meaning and function of a constellation of 
other concepts with which it is imbricated, for example, the concepts reality, 
evidence, warrants, claims, reason, knowledge, and, of course, truth.”   
In speaking data, I intend to make a case in this thesis for knowledge which 
troubles classification and systemization, and, in doing so, refuses to yield to 
the dominancy of foundational epistemologies. My offerings are smaller, but 
by no means less relevant, and are identified, in the words of St. Pierre 
(1997:175) as “transgressive data – emotional data, dream data, sensual data”, 
to which I add ‘fictitious, that is, imaginative accounts, fictionalized accounts, 
and other flights of imagination’. My encounter with the photograph of the 
little girl, my re-encountering my self in the photograph, which was, and I 
would agree with Poulos (2009:47), ‘accidental’, demanded “a willingness to 
surrender to the creative, imaginative, spontaneous, apparently accidental 
signs and impulses that surge up and, from time to time, really grip us, take 
hold of us, call us out and throw us down, sweep us away, and carry us to 
places we may not have even imagined if we had tried to lay out a straight line 
to our eventual discoveries.”  




I am ‘taken hold of’ by an image I am loath to curtail in processes whereby a 
Eureka moment of signification leads – possibly? ... necessarily? - to a 
significant foreclosure, a shutting down of curiosity, perhaps, or of inklings 
pertaining to the insidious ways ghosts seem to haunt. And so I remain, chose 
to remain in an almost indescribable and fragile enmeshment of memory and 
imagination, where feats of creativity are anchored in a methodology which 
favours possible and uncertain performative articulations over structure and 
coherence, working, in the words of St. Pierre (1997:176), “on the verge of 
intelligibility with no guarantee of liberation.”  
No guarantee of liberation – “This is the stuff of night mares”, I wrote into my 
research diary more than a year ago, “of tearing into raw flesh which I had so 
carefully and laboriously tended to, in order not to feel what I felt as a young 
child. When I finally began to take in the image of the little girl, I did so bit by 
bit, with stolen glances like one looks at someone in the street whose 
appearance arrests one sufficiently in their unfamiliarity. And is it not in the 
brevity of those glances that the uncanny finds it foothold, and further 
lingering only cuts into deeply entrenched grooves? ‘She looks so odd, so 
strange’ one might think but never say. Her image is similar to those 
thousands of refugees whose faces bore witness to unspeakable atrocities. 
I look unlike a four-year-old child, unlike the images I took of my own 
children. I can barely describe the photo now; eyes open yet vacant, staring 
out of the frame into space, head slightly tilted downwards. I hold a doll 
whose painted face draws in the viewer. It is the doll which makes contact, 
which looks at the camera, as if this is really her photo and the little girl is just 
an accessory. The doll’s mouth extends into the rictus of an eerie semi-smile, 




as if to say, ‘see I told you so’. The juxtaposition could not be more capturing: 
a girl who by her very expression is deeply troubled, yet whose refuge out of 
the frame is pulled back by her creepy doll. I am unsure, and maybe never will 
know for sure, if my trouble arose out of the unavailability of my mother, 
whose life’s trajectory has not been easy to trace.  
And maybe this is the dilemma I continuously come up against, in that there 
is no clear line of flight I can chart in relation to my mother, no genealogical 
maternal provenances I can claim to belong to.” 
The process by which I feel myself enthralled by an image is accidental and 
unintentional; yet I seem to ‘know’ of a particular enfoldment into familial and 
historiographical matrices whose layers, I assume, have been instrumental in 
shaping my subjectivity. The use of data, like the entry into my research diary 
above, just adds another layer onto processes of ambiguous narrativization. 
What, after all, is data but a means of containing fluctuating accounts rendered 
into figurative language, imbricated with accident as much as with intent, 
imagination and narration of what can be considered real, intertwined with 
material in an enmeshment of subjectivities whose desire to fill and be filled 
speaks as much to absence as it does to presence? 
And so I feel (smugly) safe in contesting the calculability of what often appear 
to be foregone conclusions in the “effort to separate, tidy up, cut, classify, 
contain, clean up, and simplify data” (Benozzo et al., 2013:311). Intrigued and 
beguiled by what Barad (2012:208) calls “stepping out into the void, opening 
to possibilities, straying, going out of bounds, off the beaten path – diverging 
and touching down again, swerving and returning, not as consecutive moves 
but as experiments in in/determinacy”, I begin to feel slightly adrift, as if I 




could/ should not stray too far. When data are the supposed bedrock on which 
research locates its exemplary base, the ‘given’ underpinning through which I 
construct my argument, the site of my deliberations, interpretations, analyses, 
into what void do I step if I foreclose conventionality, forego the “inherent 
limitation implied in a conventional understanding of the doing of research” 
(Mazzei, 2003:357)?  
While I am quietly convinced of a certain righteousness with which I slide 
around and in between binaries, I cannot but notice the perpetual shifts 
between notions pertaining to steadfast interpretations and abject horror of 
their very implications. How fast do I “slip back into the comfort of spaces 
already arranged, secure, and coded” (Hofsess & Sonenberg, 2013:300). And, 
in consideration of such thoughts, what did I just do with/to Ibsen? Are my 
tentative interpretations not appropriations, drawing on ‘data’ fragments, 
“digging behind or beyond or beneath it” (MacLure, 2013:660)? I concede that 
psychoanalytic theory values and problematizes that which cannot be ‘kept in 
bounds’, that which ‘strays’, or ‘extends beyond the margins’. Mindful of the 
paradox of critiquing the seeming fixicity of interpretative practices on the one 
hand while simultaneously buttressing my interpretation with a specific and 
defined theory, I take recourse in its own paradox, given that psychoanalytic 
theory is firmly grounded in what remains elusive to any theorization, namely 
the unconscious.  
When words float, they are “so full of meaning that a single meaning cannot 
be self-evident, given” says St.Pierre (2013:224 italics in original). Of course, 
there is always more, always other, different, intangible – an abundance of 
words, meanings, resisting the primacy of representational certainty. But – 




and there is always a but - is this text, or indeed any text, not also implicated 
in the notion of what new materialist writers critique as “‘representationalism’ 
that has rendered material realities inaccessible behind linguistic or discourse 
systems that purportedly construct or ‘represent’ them “(MacLure, 2013:659)? 
Is my writing here, on this screen, not in and of itself a means of re-presenting, 
as making linguistically available, what drives me, and my thesis, today, now? 
How else would I attempt to declare or perform myself in the perpetual 
foldings, unfoldings, and refoldings of embodied writing? I share in some of 
Lather and St.Pierre’s (2013:629) pleasures of being “able to turn to what has 
become possible in the sense of ‘lines of flight’ that open up in not having to 
over-attend to external pressures and developments”, yet I feel somewhat 
vexed in corralling my imaginations into such an ubiquitous frame of 




Today the sky stretches a blue tablecloth from horizon to horizon. The sun 
reminds me of a hole I burnt through my finest dress when I still wore best 
dresses. Yellow it is, I think, or maybe red. I am not sure any more. I am 
playing with matches: strike it, light it, hold it for as long as you can, take 
the charred bit and let the flame run its length, smell the sulphur, the almost 
burned skin, let the piece of wood nestle in your hand. That’s the idea. Who 
came up with it I cannot say. I guess it was H. There we are, the two, 
hunched over. Ok, watch me, I say, as the sparkle of the first strike fizzles, 
and the yellow flame slowly gnaws at the woody sliver. Little fingers, I have, 




little hands holding fire, little fingers losing fire. A perfectly circular hole 
appears where the bulbous head of the match meets my dress. Oh no, I say, 
because - what can I say? I fold the dress into pleats, keep the holey bit 
tucked between my knees. No one will know, I tell myself, no one will know. 
 
What is St. Pierre’s ‘given’, but that which is contained in my awe, 
wonderment, frustration, my want to escape from the confines of space, my 
hums and coughs, surreptitious glances upwards, smiles, my sniffles because 
I have come down with a stinking cold, my moving a few digits over the 
keyboard, forming words into sentences, in order to speak to some of what is 
‘given’ and to more of what is left out. Entangled in my body, through my 
body, with slices of memory, with the noise of my neighbour’s keyboard, the 
elliptical way of writing, which, for the time being, has become my modus 
operandi, the smoothness of the desk and the slight indentations of wooden 
grooves, the smell of coffee, the rumble of my stomach, the footsteps on the 
carpeted floor, the low humming noise, entangled in what Lather and St.Pierre 
(2013:630) consider “language, the human, and the material not as separate 
entities mixed together but as completely imbricated ‘on the surface’“. On the 
surface suggests a denial of depth, of hierarchical ordering, of arboreal 
genealogy and operates in what Deleuze and Guattari (1996:9 italics in 
original) call multiplicities: “All multiplicities are flat,” they say, “in the sense 
that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a 
plane of consistency of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of this ‘plane’ 
increase with the number of connections that are made on it.” 




The way in which Deleuzian thought has problematized the continuous 
entanglement, as Barad (2003) would have it, or the embodied material 
imbrications as suggested by St.Pierre, leaves me thinking about other ways 
that “ask questions about the limits of our research practices and the kinds of 
knowledge production enabled and disabled by them” (Mazzei & McCoy, 
2010:503). I concur with St. Pierre (2013:225 italics by author) in her suggestion 
that “ontological approaches in [Deleuzian] philosophy do not assume there 
is a given, a real world (data) that can be gathered together (collected) and 
described (analyzed and known) as in logical positivism/empiricism nor do 
they assume, as in interpretive theories like phenomenology, that there is an 
underlying meaning in an already existing lifeworld that interpretation can bring to 
light and describe”. The trouble is that to engage in a not ‘looking 
behind/beyond’ feels risky, even if “interpretation is carried to infinity and 
never encounters anything to interpret that is not already itself an 
interpretation” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1996:114). Is this the point where the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian concept falls short? Language is always already 
embedded in iteration without finite interpretation – there is always more, 
always other – and contemporary psychoanalysis is firmly invested in 
challenging the reductive beliefs of interpretations as assumption of a ‘pre-
given underneath’. As Cheshire (2010:112) would have it, “everything is 
always breaking up to allow new trains of thought to emerge.”  
 
November (i) 
“So what about data?” asks St.Pierre (2013:226), and, in recognition of my 
methodological entanglement, the question of data has equally no finite 




answer, or, rather, its supposed finitude only ever rubs against what spills out, 
leaks, breaches boundaries. When “something called data cannot be separate 
from me” (St. Pierre, 2013:226 original in italics), the spell to remain trapped 
in binary territory is broken, and data “may be lived, sensed and done” as 
Benozzo, Bell, and Koro-Ljungberg (2013:309) would have it. Instead of the 
either/or dichotomy I contended with above, I find myself in the ‘in-betwixt’, 
in what Deleuze and Guattari (1996:25 original in italics) would consider a 
rhizome “always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. […] the 
fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and…and…and…’”  
And…and…and… - I am captivated in thinking through the possibilities such 
conceptual re-alignments can offer. “To continue a multiplicity is to move into 
a zone that is not logically predetermined but rather ‘invents by 
differentiating.’” (Rajchman, 2000:59). Research which invests itself in a 
modus of iterative differentiation and of entanglements, of always more, 
always other, carries a momentum which appears infinite, one that is 
“affirmative, experimental, idiosyncratic, nonreplicable […] that emerges in 
the doing” (St. Pierre, 2013:226). And what else would/should/can/do I 
possibly do but continue in what has been a way of becoming – rather than 
being – a means of moving with and into and through what is uncalibrated, 
unstable, uncertain – “a process ontology that privileges change and motion 
over stability” as Braidotti (2013:344) suggests.  
And yet I am unsettled by the and…and…and… because it aligns itself maybe 
too easily with more…more…more and, I fear, smoothly slips into a territory 
implicated in appropriation and colonization. The metaphor of the rhizome is 
infused with a materiality which marginalizes any organisms that stand in its 




way. It spreads out, grows perpendicularly to gravitational force: “Increase 
your territory by deterritorialization” Deleuze and Guattari recommend 
(1996:11). The trouble is that the term signifies more than the contextual 
unclasping from a previously held set of beliefs, or means of knowledge 
production. There is always other calling for attention, and, in the context of 
my historical locatedness, I cannot and will not forego Germany’s insidious 
means of expanding into neighbouring countries for the sake of the Deleuzo-
Guattarian argument. This is where I draw a line, draw the line.   
I sense a growing unease with conceptual frameworks which fail to attend to 
the specificity of signifiers. “We’ve no use for signifiers. […] Everything comes 
to turn on the letter” Deleuze and Guattari proclaim (1995:21). And yet, is 
language not always a means of conveyance, and hence an interplay between 
signs, signifiers and significations, and to deny its significance forecloses any 
further argument? It is in or through writing, speaking, thinking, we embed 
ourselves into “an act – situated within a larger practice of acts – that one 
performs for, to, even on an other, an allocutory deed, an acting for, in the face 
of, the other and sometimes by virtue of the language provided by the other” 
as Butler (2005:130 italics in original) so aptly puts it. This my line: while I 
contest reductive finitude, and agree with St.Pierre (2013:226) in “thinking 
connections rather than oppositions, movement rather than categorization”, 
Deleuzian concepts are, by their very terms, equally undergirded by linguistic, 
social, cultural and contextual calibrations. As Haraway (1988b:581) attests, 
the “god trick of seeing everything from nowhere” is a fallacy. We are always  
already caught in the act of signification.  
November (ii) 




Freud, as early as 1895, describes psychic life in terms of “not only [...] a zig-
zag, twisted line, but rather […] a ramifying system of lines and more 
particularly […] a converging one. It contains nodal points at which two or 
more threads meet and thereafter proceed as one; and as a rule several threads 
which run independently, or which are connected at various points by side-
paths, debouch into the nucleus” (1893-1895/1965:290). It would seem that his 
terminology, situated as it is in the biological concept of nodal points 
(rhizomes have nodes…), as well as in lines, or threads, is not too dissimilar 
from those who followed on a hundred years later, and serves as counterpoint 
to views which contest the unconscious’ highly unbounded nature.  
And what is ‘nomadic thought’ but an enmeshment into what psychoanalysis 
would call free association, or, as Bollas (2009:10) suggests, the place of 
“disseminating possibilities that open to infinity.” Open to infinity contests 
notions of definitiveness, of certitude, and instead attaches itself rather 
effortlessly to what is ceaselessly propagative in the unconscious. Framed in 
such way, psychoanalytic interpretations are tracings, markings of potential, 
threads, like a fine woollen line I see falling on the ground, crimson now, 
adrift… 
Can my drifting be understood in terms of a process which I can only describe 
as continuous becoming, imbricated in a continuous entanglement of in-
betweenness, enmeshed with what is and what is not of me? I concur with 
Cixous (1974/2000:27) that “I ask of writing what I ask of desire: that it have 
no relation to the logic which puts desire on the side of possession, of 
acquisition, or even of that consumption-consummation”, and I shy away 
from demands which reign in, or curtail on the grounds of the reductive 




normativity of positivism which devalues leakages, fluidity, liminality, and 
favours “the building of arguments on the basis of empirical evidence, a 
systemizable given, and an observable object” (Kristeva, 1984:14). And yet, I 
am aware that any shying away from articulates a movement towards which is 
equally delineated, even if its normative marks are less stratified.  
On further reflection, I am inclined to think intensities without restrictions as 
uncalibrated ground, which, in order to become needs that by which it can be 
calibrated. “The self that I am yet to be (at the point where grammar does not 
yet permit an ‘I’) is at the outset enthralled, even if to a scene of violence, an 
abandonment, a destitution, a mechanism of life support without which I 
cannot be, upon which my very being depends, which my very being, 
fundamentally and with an irreducible ambiguity is.” (Butler, 2005:81 italics in 
original). There is something in me which is not of me, and without which I 
cannot be. This is the calibration by which I become, or, I cannot become without 
that which ultimately contains me.  
I declare myself in need for calibration, in full knowledge that what creeps in 
by such practices is a possible re-centring into a more coherent subject 
position, the ‘I’ that speaks and writes these words on the pages just now. To 
locate myself in my restrictions, to say – this is the line I draw today, now, for 
now - in order to disclose part of myself, to disclose myself through a 
heterogeneity that underpins what Kristeva (1984:16) might call “the sum of 
unconscious, subjective, and social relations in gestures of confrontation and 
appropriation”, I wage and weigh, tighten, let go, more, less, 
and…and…and… These processes, while intense, are a far cry from the 
“intense quantities in their pure state, to a point that is almost unbearable – a 




celibate misery and glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry suspended 
between life and death, an intense feeling of transition, states of pure naked 
intensity” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013:30). Such inchoateness not only fills me 
with existential fear, but it assumes an unutterable position, being as it is 
“stripped of all shape and form”. It is here that I challenge the Deleuzo-
Guattarian premise: for what do Deleuze and Guattari do but draw on 
linguistic structures in order to locate themselves in their amorphous 
maelstrom, and hence make use of ‘signification’? In short: their argument 




At the beginning of this chapter I declared myself unable to find an entry into 
thinking conceptually about the intricacies of data within an ambiguous 
poststructural frame. I consider writing, to follow Richardson (2002), as 
invitation to imaginings. And while I pay heed to Behun’s (2010:132) warning 
that “there are many opportunities for the process to go wrong”, I take solace 
from Richardson’s (2002:923f) suggestion that “when we view writing as a 
method, we experience ‘language-in-use’, how we word the world […]. 
Writing as method of inquiry honors and encourages the trying, recognizing 
it as embryonic to the full-fledged attention to the significance of language”  
I would like to say that my need for tethering, for locating myself within a 
space whose margins are somewhat demarcated is unfamiliar, but I am not so 
sure any more. Given the ambivalent nature of my mother’s relationship to 
me, and my relationship to my mother, whose absence, even when she was 




present, foreclosed any articulation around loss, or death, need, want, desire, 
it stands to reason (sic) to seek out a ground, to seek differentiation, even if 
only in barely-readable yet nevertheless enabling traces through “this 
unlimited and unbound generating process, this unceasing operation of the 
drives towards, in, and through language” as Kristeva (1984:17) so aptly puts 
it.   
A ceaseless operation – within the embodied materiality of language I remind 
myself of the trinity of mute presence which is at the heart of this inquiry: 
trauma, ghosts and silence are entangled and intertwined not as inseparable 
alterity, but as palimpsests situated within heterogeneous matrices invested in 
the process of becoming. As such, attention needs to be paid, for example, to 
connectives including “geography, family, […], gender norms, aspirations, 
disappointments, hopes” (Mazzei, 2013:736), or to an interlinking inquiry into 
who silences whom by what means, to what effect. I equally remind myself of 
the impossibility of writing into silenced gaps with any modicum of certainty, 
apart from “seek[ing] the trace always already present” (Mazzei, 2003:360).  
Brief Encounters, or The Trace Always Already Present 
He sits on a bench. His hands, folded into the uneven weave of an overcoat. 
Dark, the coat is, a colour that swallows light. The spotted cravat nestles into 
his beard. By his feet rests a briefcase, its edges curling furtively against its 
content. He waits, barely moves. Trains pass.  
He glances up, slowly draws one hand to his pocket and takes out a cigar. 
The edge of his upper lip curves into smile: “Pleased to meet you, at last.” 
He lights his cigar, blows wisps of grey smoke into the air, extends his arm 
in a gesture that is as much convention as the crease in his impeccably 




pressed trousers. His grip is firm, uncompromising even, as he takes the 
other man’s hand in a swift movement and raises himself off the seat.  
The man is in his late 50, early 60s. He stops mid-track, looks unencumbered, 
uprighted. A thin smile cracks tightly pressed lips, fissures the horizontal 
line: “Heureux de vous rencontrer, Monsieur.” His voice is husky, following the 
raspy inhalation as he draws on his cigarette. “Me voila.” He wipes at a 
filament of tobacco, hunches his left shoulder. 
 
What more is there to say? To speak Deleuzian schizoanalysis is to speak 
psychoanalysis. To speak Anti-Oedipus is to speak Oedipus. To speak denial 
of signifier is to not speak at all. To speak is to mean, even if meaning is fluid, 
uncertain, folded and unfolded, pushed to the furthest margins and retracted. 
Infinite in its finitude.   
To speak is, maybe, already to love, though I am hovering over this sentence 
in case I feel too shy to let it stand. To speak is to love -  
To speak is to love - “I have to be a little bit in love with myself to write, 
exuberantly and excessively so for the writing to flow freely across the page” 
(Speedy, 2013:32). I cannot say for certain if, when my writings dry up, I love 
myself less, but what I can say is that in the moments, arbitrary as they may 
be, when my fingers fly over the keyboard, I experience a profound sense of 
wellbeing and contentment. 
To speak is to love – born into language, from the ambiguity of drives, 
“oriented and structured around the mother’s body” (Kristeva, 1984:27), who 




in turn mediates “the symbolic law organizing social relations”. My mother’s 
trace is present, even if it is ephemeral and barely registerable.  
To speak is to love – even if words fail at times, and ghosts take their place at 
the table of absence.  
How do ghosts speak? 
 
  




Five.  Ghost Talk: Writing Reverberations of Trauma 
 
Imaginations and Memories 
 
Imagine. And listen. Listen attentively, without assumptions. It isn’t easy, is it? To 
listen without prior knowledge of what it is you are meant to listen to. Trust me. That’s 
even more difficult, you say? I know, oh, how I know… But imagine, could you begin 
to imagine trusting me? What, after all, have you got to lose?  
What is there to lose? I am sitting at my desk in the office; the cold sun barely 
reaches the corners of the small office into which I have withdrawn. I sit at my 
computer, let my fingers rest on the keyboard. Nothing, nothing so far. 
Withdrawal – from what I cannot say for certain – maybe from extraneous 
interruptions, maybe from a cacophony of internal voices vying for attention. 
Who knows? I give myself over to their undistinguishable noise, until, one by 
one, they seem to die away, become silent, silenced. Nothing. An eternity of 
nothing. And then, a faint staccato of inhalation and exhalation, barely 
audible, whispers against my hair, my face. Imagine. Breathing, the “reciprocal 
exposure that precedes any initiative” (Cavarero, 2005:31), carrier of the 
inflection that I am always already caught in an enmeshment of subjectivity 
and alterity, an entanglement, as it were, of memory and imagination, of 
accountable and unaccountable traces, incomplete and fragmented.  Ghost 
talk.  
Imagine.  
My fingers move across the keys now, erase preceding sentences, hover, curl 
back on themselves, only to engage anew. Finite beginnings, they are, as if not 




all beginnings expose their inherent paradoxes: for what are beginnings but 
caesura on temporal and spatial trajectories? Beginnings arrest the breathing 
inferences of a past which perpetually casts itself into my stumbling narrative 
and offer an illusion of iterative coherence. They are, as Poulos suggests, 
responses, “a link in the chain of story-utterances that bind us through the 
ages” (2009:135), a rekindling of that which has been calling for attention, a 
grasp of something that makes itself known despite, or maybe because of 
overwhelming and deafening silences. Ghost talk.  
Imagine.  
I ‘began’ my imaginings many months ago when I stumbled upon the photo 
of the little girl, the photo that would not go away, no matter how hard I tried 
to ignore it, the photo that called me, that called on me to listen without 
assumptions, that asked me to trust in a process of unfolding and refolding 
and within the crevices and fissures of doing just so I found further gaps and 
silences and secrets, and still I feel bereft, stumble over words, cannot find the 
ones I need in order to narrate this little girl, as if her story is simply tellable, 
as if she could assuage my growing unease in narrating that which perpetually 
resists narration, as if coherent narration is not in itself illusory.  
I take hold of the photograph, “the evidence, after all” so Kuhn (2002:13) 
suggests, “material for interpretation – evidence in that sense: to be solved, 
like a riddle; read and decoded, like clues left behind at the scene of the crime. 
Evidence of this sort, though, can conceal, even as it purports to reveal, what 
it is evidence of. A photograph can certainly throw you off the scent.”  
Imagine. And listen.  




I am drawn back to the image, in what Hultman and Taguchi (2010:526) 
describe as “an anthropocentric gaze, a gaze that puts humans above other 
matter […], a kind of human supremacy or humanocentrism”, and, rather 
candidly, reign in what could be described as dissecting scrutiny. My view 
shifts to the doll, the plastic doll, whose forehead touches the little girl’s cheek. 
They sit close, warm human skin to cool plastic, a tableau of surreptitious 
surrender to the fantasy of maternal closeness, which sets the scene for a 
particular reading. In a touching image evocative of Madonna and Child, the 
doll, nestled in the arms of the girl, is turned towards the viewer; her plastic 
mouth, lips slightly upturned in an expression which hovers between mockery 
and pride, serves as underpinning to what can too easily be read as perfidious 
rendering of the primary relationship between mother and infant: for in this 
photo, it is the little girl, as mother, whose immutable gaze is directed outside 
the frame, who does not find it in her to look adoringly at her doll, her baby. 
It is the doll, in all her plastic rigidity which seems uncannily alive, and which 
claims attention against a maternal illusion, or, in Cain’s (2013:408) words, 
against “the phantom between life and death.”  
Imagine. And listen. 
The mother between life and death. 
Imagine. And listen. 
I do, I want to say, but I am caught, caught in the contradictions of in-
betwixtness of recollection, of memory, of imagination, of what is elusive to 
the light of the day and of what withdraws into deep shadows.  
Imagine. And listen. Between life and death.  




I need some guidance, I say, some way of making sense of what I know of the 
girl, and what I think I know of her. “As the veils of forgetfulness are drawn 
aside, layer upon layer of meaning and association peel away” says Kuhn 
(2002:6). To shed the membrane with which I have contained what, in the past, 
I thought of as utterly incomprehensible, carries the risk of exposing rawness, 
fissures, and gaps, shows up silences where language was often unwittingly, 
but sometimes purposefully obliterated. So, for the time being, I follow a scent 
laid out in the materiality of the photograph, in the brittleness of the wooden 
frame, which I know to be more than 50 years old. I turn it over, notice a deep 
gash in the faded paper covering the back, another wound of sorts, with 
slightly frayed edges, unstitchable. And regardless of what seems to be so 
readily available on the front of the photograph, the laceration on its reverse 
slips into yet another kind of knowledge, attaches itself as contrapuntal 
emphasis to the visible imagery, which intersects with an embodied and 
embedded sense of sadness, a hopeless tristesse, compacted through all-
pervasive silence.  
Imagine. And listen. Listen attentively.  
I do… I think I do.   
You imagine.  
I think I do more than that. I know and yet. And yet… 
What do you know of me? What do you know of those who are lost, whose low 
murmurs are barely audible? 
What can I do? What would you like me to do? 




Lend me your voice, “that still, small voice that lives within us and that knows, in the 




In the Beginning, or Ghost Talk No.1 
 
In the photograph I am three years old, maybe four. I grow up in Bottrop, a small town 
on the periphery of an industry instrumental in the behemoth of war machinery. Steel 
works and mines should have been my playing fields, as the ruinous shards of factories 
attest to. But the course of history does not run smoothly like the molten iron ore cast 
by the many exhausted workers who keep the ovens burning in order for other ovens 
to do their devilish deeds. Unimaginable deeds. 
The Wirtschaftswunder4 brings the economic boom on which my father rides into 
prosperity. Germany’s rise from darkness and desolation, from starvation and hunger, 
stretches the grip of its own history to breaking point: I grow up in the time of Stunde 
                                                          
4The Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle, refers to the decades under Konrad Adenhauer’s 
chancellorship in the wake of World War II, which saw West Germany engaged in an unprecedented 
stimulation of rebuilding its devastated landscapes and the restitution of its economy. As the period 
of increased prosperity was simultaneously characterized by a deep amnesia regarding the barbaric 
nature and scale of the atrocities committed during the Third Reich (Weiner, 2009), the suggestion 
stands to reason that to a large extent the efforts were of a compensatory nature in order to ward 
off feelings of guilt and shame (Schwab, 2010). The Mitscherlichs (1990) consider the explosive 
industrial development as displaced libidinal energy, by repressing and encapsulating any processes 
which had the potential to shatter the denial of responsibility. The seemingly seamless move from a 
belief in the ‘final solution’ towards a system based on democratic principles necessitated a psychic 
splitting in the population which sought to blame solely the NS and SS elite for the barbaric murder 
of millions. Jarausch’s (2010) observation, that hand-in-hand with the shift towards a more 
prosperous life, narratives in West Germany emerged whose focus was directed towards their own 
sufferings without attributing the essential linkage to its underlying cause, is a further example of 
such splitting.  




Null5, the fatally-flawed notion that life can continue as if nothing had happened. As 
if bomb craters are mere cracks in the pavement. As if the void can be plastered over. 
As if.  
My father’s lawyer’s practice grows from the small accountancy firm he inherited from 
his father into a much larger one. He works all hours, leaves the house before I wake 
and often comes home past my bedtime. My mother is the home-maker in our picture-
perfect little family: father, mother, and one daughter. I am left in the care of Regina, 
my nanny.  
Many years later we move from the flat I grow up in to an architect-designed house in 
the outskirts. For now, two bedrooms, a kitchen, a sitting room, a bathroom – and a 
yard where my dad parks his car – are the perimeters of my knowledge about the world. 
I play with neighbours’ children downstairs in front of the garage; we dig holes, shift 
small stones which derail our marbles. Glassy, the marbles are, slightly etched from 
their encounters with the dusty ground. 
I make friends with H. who has three siblings. We go to the same catholic primary 
school, sit at the same desk. We are inseparable, stay over at each other’s’ houses. She 
shares my bed, we giggle. I cannot fall asleep for a long time.  
I am five or six years old now. “Shall we dance?” my father asks me. He holds out his 
arm, bend slightly so I can touch his pointed elbow. My hand finds the hollow into 
which I slip my fingers and feel his starched shirt. We walk on to the dance floor, and 
begin our shimmy to the fast rhythms played by a band. I have become quite a mover, 
                                                          
5 The Stunde Null, or Zero Hour is a term widely used by the military and denotes the exact timing at 
which an operation is meant to commence. Zero Hour in this context indicates the beginnings of a 
new epoch, which sought to declare its irrevocable truncation from the ideology of National 
Socialism and the turn towards a new German state. The split, as observed by the Mitscherlichs 
(1990), is backed by a change in cathexis from the rapturous elation for the Third Reich and the 
Führer into a fervent denial of any responsibility for the atrocities committed.  




since my introduction to ballroom dancing during our winter holidays. I am allowed 
to skip school, ostensibly to recuperate from the mysterious illness that has befallen me 
and continues to play havoc. We drive to the Black Forest, draw pine scented air into 
our sooty lungs; I am rosy-cheeked when I dance with my dad. My mum tilts her head, 
looks approvingly at father and daughter, and smiles knowingly. Little girls playing 
at adults. 
I turn 12. I outgrow my body but have not yet found the body I can grow into. Neither 
fish nor meat, we say in German. I fall into the in-betwixt, the neither/nor which by 
now has become strangely familiar. I become unmanageable, don’t want to play but 
don’t not want to play either. I am sent away to a catholic boarding school, solemn 
reminder of what happens to little girls who won’t do as they are told. A Kinderheim 
for the recalcitrant. But this time there is no cake at the end of my stay, but breakfasts, 
lunches, and suppers in the dining hall, supervised by Mater Superior, whose eyes 




The flight to London is booked. My father drives me to the airport, his small and 
delicate hands tightened around the steering wheel. The little finger on his right hand 
is slightly crooked, carries a subcutaneous metal fragment from an incident sometime 
around the early 1940s, thousands of miles to the east. He barely looks across, keeps 
his eyes on the motorway. “Let us know when you arrive” he says. I nod. He glances 
at me. “Yeah, sure.”   




What can I say about my flights? With hindsight, I cannot even tell if the initial forays 
into borderlands were not in some way precursors to what by now feels like an 
irrevocable exile. The finitude with which I declare myself in those terms has been hard 
fought over. For a long time I did not know if I would eventually return to Germany, 
if the draw of the familiar, of the contested notion of a home (italicized), would 
endanger my tentative attachment to a landscape which I declined to acknowledge as 
such for many years. Home.  
“Questions without answers must be asked very slowly” (2009:159) says Michaels; 
despite all that I know, or that I think I know, what eludes me is that which can rarely 
be given over to words. The irrecoverable sadness of the little girl seems to break 
through compacted sedimentations of grief in a longing that is as heartbreakingly futile 
as it is utterly vital. For many years I did not know that I had questions in me, that in 
order to make sense of feelings I had no words for, I had relied on a language which 
had left me speechless.  
 
November 2013 
I am sitting at my desk, night has fallen and the slightly nausea-inducing strip 
lights in the office barely cast shadows. It is late, maybe too late, to do more, 
yet it is in and through the process of writing, of casting words on the screen 
that I find some sense of solidity. Sentences appear sequentially in spite of 
what I can only describe as the erratic nature of thought, in a process not 
dissimilar to Deleuzian and Guattarian (1996:3f) lines of flight, where 
“comparative rates of flow on these lines produce phenomena of relative 
slowness and viscosity, or, on the contrary, of acceleration and rupture”. These 
squiggly little lines, which, come to think of it, I only know as letters through 




imbricated cultural conventions (German is only marginally different from 
English) move across the whiteness of the computer screen and offer a 
perfunctory means of rendering into language what had previously been 
surreptitiously silenced.  
 




Again, I imagine I can hear a plea, spoken in such a small voice that I fail to 
register for how long it has been hiding in the fissures on the threshold of 
speech. Are the words more, please not already “pregnant with ancient 
meanings that might need to be broken down in order to find the piece of 
history trapped inside” (Lopez-Corvo, 2006:15)? What is contained in the more, 
but an overwhelming desire to be given over to language in an act that speaks 
as much to shards of memory as it does to concealment? “Nothing erases the 
immoral act. Not forgiveness. Not confession” (Michaels, 2009). Such 
unquestionable foreclosure, to which I deeply bow my head, leaves me not 
only with a sense of inevitability because it does not offer any absolution, but 
it propels me to repeat, ad absurdum, that which has been thrown to the 
wolves of silence. And so I ruminate, seek out words which flesh out skeletal 
remains even, yes, even if evil is ineradicable.  
More, please… 
My parents rarely spoke to me about the time of their youth and young 
adolescence, and if, on occasion, they did so, it was never with any clear sense 




of reflective condemnation I had wished for. They both belonged to the Hitler 
Youth, the organization through which the majority of what became known as 
‘cannon fodder’ was recruited. It pains me to think of my father in those 
material terms, as ‘fodder‘, one hands out to animals, to be consumed and 
excreted. He was to become an officer candidate, called to fight Russia at the 
Eastern Front aged 17, maybe 18, one of one hundred young men in his 
squadron of which two returned. Two returned! He was wounded, from then 
on carried shrapnel as others carry reliquaries, embedded in his finger, elbow, 
buttock. I would often glance at those marks, but never put my fingers into the 
furrowed grooves – I somehow shied away from what they might have 
yielded, what kind of deed they might have exposed of which I knew so very 
little at the time. Much later on, my father would occasionally speak about the 
day he was shot, about the hours crawling back to behind enemy lines and the 
way his boot retained all the blood until it flooded the floor of the field 
hospital. Deemed too ill to continue warfare, he was sent back to Germany to 
an institution for the treatment of invalids. Factually, he spoke, then this, then 
this, then this, even after all these years. I say even but by then I knew enough 
about him to recognize that in order to continue living the way he did, it was 
facts not affects he clung to. And, of course, that is not the way our lives pan 
out. Surreptitiously, remnants of what needed to be forgotten creep back. “All 
people experience affects – and it is hard to imagine a human being who would 
not have at least something of an emotional life” says Bollas (2009:42). My 
father’s reluctance or more likely repression in the face of such devastating 
experiences, the processes by which he sustained and contained himself, was 
through what I now recognize as searing, or cauterizing of wounds: to speak 
feeling had become utterly alien.  




I cannot say with any conviction if that had not always been so, if his emotional 
paucity was not always already embedded in a family matrix which guarded 
against feelings with iron railings, but I have my suspicions: I have faint 
memories of my paternal grandparents, born in the last decade of the 19th 
Century, faint, in part because time washes memory into opacity, but maybe 
also because I am unable to reconcile their presence with an emotive response. 
I cannot grasp them, get hold of them, however fleetingly. It is as if their 
presence calls forth a great absence.  
In contrast, my maternal grandparents retain a vividness I recall with pleasure: 
endless games of Mühle6 with my grandfather, who taught me to lose well 
until one day I beat him. We’d sit in the sitting room, bent over the board, the 
smell of his cigar hovering until my granny would chide him by looks alone, 
muttering something about the child and had he thought about the filthy air and 
how could he smoke something so vile. Her sandwiches were infinitely superior to 
the ones I got at home, because she spread them with margarine, not butter as 
my mother used to… 
This young asthmatic man, who would become my father, met and fell in love 
with my mother at a time when talk of dark shadows began to be considered 
treason. When Hitler rose to power in 1933 my parents were seven and nine 
years old. They were eight and ten when Hitler annexed the Rhineland with 
the aim of gaining Lebensraum7 and occupied Austria, followed by Poland. By 
                                                          
6 Nine Men Morris – a strategic board game whose history dates back to the Roman Empire. The 
board consists of 24 points on a vertically and horizontally aligned grid. The game is played by two 
players, placing nine black and white pieces, or ‘men’, on vacant points in order to connect three of 
their own men in a line – the mill. Any successful mill allows for one of the opponent’s piece to be 
taken off the board. The player who is reduced to only two of his own pieces loses the game.  
7 The term Lebensraum, as ‘living environment’, or habitat, needs be considered initially in the 
context of a growing imperialism, through which the exodus overseas was meant to be stemmed, 




the time they were sweethearts and in secondary school, Hitler had invaded 
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and part of France. Their 
formative years were lived under a regime that usurped, appropriated, 
occupied, greedily seized whatever stood in its way, driven by the hyperbole 
of unlimited expansionism for the sake of annihilation of otherness, 
domination, and ‘Aryan purity’. Both parents followed, together with their 
peers and friends, the national-socialist youth movement, which “for the 
majority of young Germans […] was synonymous with freedom and 
adventure, not dictatorship, speaking-ban and oppression” (Aly, 2005:12 
translation by author). 
More, please 
Even  now? 
Even now 
What can I speak of with some sense of certainty? That neither my paternal 
nor my maternal grandparents were members of the NSDAP 8 , that their 
family homes were not caught in the homogenizing grip of Nazi propaganda? 
That my father’s father forbade any photo of Hitler to be hung in the house, 
that my mother’s father aroused sufficient suspicion to be incarcerated for 
failing to greet his secondary class with the obligatory Heil Hitler salute? That 
even now, after all these years, I cannot bring myself to write these two 
italicized words without hovering over the keyboard, tightening my lips, that 
                                                          
and to which the appropriation of colonies seemed to offer a solution. The term is thus from the 
beginning embedded in a territorial claim and is offered as justification for Germany’s expansion at 
the beginning of the 20th Century into Central Europe. Hitler’s Lebensraum myth is underpinned by a 
drive towards unfettered annexation and ‘Germanization’ of all eastern territories down to the Black 
Sea and the Caucasus.  
8 National Socialist German Workers Party, the Nazi party 




my repulsion is so deep that I fear being tainted by those words, that all evil 
pivots around their pronunciation, that I want to flee?  
But are these declarations, no matter how earnest, or good-willing, or heartfelt 
they might be, not also arbiters of what still cannot be declared? Because it will 
never be declared? Because behind all that is spoken of lies that which cannot 
be spoken of, not because it is unspeakable but because it would shatter a 
phantasy? Denial, in the form of  a “defence against collectively-held guilt – 
be it the guilt of action or the guilt of acquiescence- has left traces” argue the 
Mitscherlichs (1990:24 translation by author). Traces are all I have, slippages, 
scattered through a language which is intend on severing the relational 
attachment to its past - the Stunde Null of a phantasmagorical disavowal of 
lived lives.   
Little is available to render fragmentary shards into a more cohesive narrative, 
to write with some sense of conviction. But, of course, in St.Pierre’s (1997:175) 
terms, I am continuously on shaky grounds, where “nothing is innocent and 
[…] everything is dangerous.” Nothing is innocent – the story of culpability 
runs through my people’s historicity like a varicose vein, visible, painful, and 
it has left indelible marks.  
 
 … and Children, or Ghost Talk No.3 
 
And we, how are we written into those stains or slivers?  
“One can look deeply for meaning or one can invent it” (Michaels, 2009:136). I 
cannot say with an iota of certainty if, ultimately, we are not always caught in 
between what we know, what we think we know and what we wish we know, 




and maybe also what we wish we didn’t know. Can I even begin to make 
proclamations which are prefaced by the solidity of an I know…, without 
giving over to what is continually slipping through my fingers like mercury? 
I am unable to fathom my self in the sweeping expanse of a familial ‘we’, yet I 
know enough of my mother’s surreptitious absences to recognize a perfidious 
slope into a world which is as much populated by the living as it is by the 
dead.  
And we…  
Little one, I want to say, ‘we’ have a place in imagination, through the 
vicissitudes I carry on me, in me, undeclared and undeclarable. These marks 
are remnants of some sort of antecedent, of something that has etched itself on 
to and through the fabric of what it means to live, to live through times like 
those, and times like these. They don’t stay still, those marks, but wander 
across and find other resting places, other lives on which to leave inscriptions. 
The difficulty is that there is no clear way, no certain way to decipher these 
indelible marks. All one can do, I think, is proceed with grace, and caution, 
and care. And a willingness to err into territory that has almost but vanished… 
where nothing is at it seems, where feelings are kept in hibernation, and where 
talk is sparse.  
Nothing is as it seems 
No, I say, and yet, have I not known from a young age that what was put on 
show - mother, father and child - is only a fragment of the story? I say I know, 
but I don’t think that articulations around knowledge are particularly 
meaningful here. What I know feeds shifting proclamations of self and not-self, 
the ‘subject-in-process’ enmeshed in a multiplicity of layerings where 




meanings are continuously “on the move in the thresholds” (Alecia Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2013:265).  
Nothing is as it seems.  
Nothing is as it seems. I let the sentence run through me like an electrifying 
current. I tingle. Because what I have taken to be part of the story might have 
just been part of a story. I say just not in order to denigrate the importance of 
the former, but to give myself over to what has not been scripted into the 
familial narrative. What has been omitted. What has been invisible to others, 
or, more likely, what has been rendered invisible. What frightens the hell out 
of me, and keeps on pulling at my heartstrings in equal measures.  
Is there more? 
More, always more. 
When my parents married in June 1951, they were 27 and 25 years old. I see a 
picture of a beaming bride, dressed in a shiny wedding dress made from 
curtain materials, smiling for the camera. Within a few months, my mother 
would be pregnant with their first baby.  
In the spring of 1978, during a passionate affair with a Dane, my gynaecologist 
asks me the question: Could you be pregnant, Dagmar? 25 I am, a student in 
Aachen, with a busy social life, friends and lovers, and the word hovers like 
an intrusion into the world I know. And yet, I also feel somewhat thrilled that 
my body might be receptive, that conception is not impossible. Without 
definitive diagnosis and after a quick injection (What for? Oh, just some 
hormones to aide you on your way), I am dismissed.  




A few days later I call emergency services and schlepp myself to the nearest 
A&E. Blood runs into my mattress, unstoppably. Dane lover hurries back from 
a birthday party, we drive to hospital, confirmation of pregnancy, Dilation 
&Curettage, in and out in a day. An attempt of a little ghost, a few cells, not 
yet formed, but.  
When my mother spontaneously aborted, her daughters’ sex was already 
determinable. Abort – etymologically connected to Latin abortio disappear, be 
lost, miscarry. I’m not sure if any term is kinder - maybe kindness is missing 
from the disappearance and loss of her firstborn; three more were to follow. 
My own miscarriage remains invisible – heavy blood loss precipitates the 
passing of the small sac of matter – and I am none the wiser. My pregnancy is 
confirmed after the affirmation of its spontaneous termination. Finished, 
before I have time to acquaint myself, what would I mourn for? How can I 
fantasize myself into foetal sacs and what ifs, when all that connects me to 
her/him is the liminal moment of a terminated possibility?  
An attempt 
Of a little ghost 
A few cells 









After all these times, she said, and now. She turned to him, her eyes alight with 
a longing she had no longer thought possible. Hans put his hand on her 
shoulder, let it lie there for a further few seconds. Come sit down Hannelore, 
he said. She sat down on a kitchen chair, stretched her arms along the yellow 
embroidery on the cloth, her breasts touching the hard edge of the table. Yes, 
she said, he is quite sure, it is early days but he is, he is sure. She looked up 
and smiled. He sat down opposite her, cupped his hand around the tips of her 
fingers. So what do we, I mean, and what? His voice was hesitant, unbelieving. 
I should be fine this time, she said, and you know, we have done. She looked 
across to a pair of red children’s shoes drying by the range. I know, he said, 
but remember. How could she have forgotten? Three times it had happened 
before, joy to be followed by aches which took more than time to dull. This 
time, she said, this time it will be. In the end it was not so. She was admitted 
to hospital. Another girl they told her. It would have been their fifth. How 
often can a heart break before it breaks for good?  
 
Resurrection, or Ghost Talk No 4 
 
“What kind of case is the case of a ghost?” asks Gordon (2008:24f), and fashions 
an answer by suggesting  it as “a case of inarticulate experiences, of symptoms 
and screen memories, of spiralling affects, of more than one story at a time, of 
the traffic in domains of experience that are anything but transparent and 
referential.” For a long time I have been enmeshed in stories whose voices shy 
away from the obvious, but they speak, nevertheless, into my body with an 
intensity that I have begun to understand as haunting. What they have to say, 
I suggest, needs not only a place to be spoken into, but a space where the 




possibility of imagination can offer itself up as antidote to the foreclosure 
through silence.  
Nothing is as it seems. 
And yet, such is the nature of ghosts and hauntings that I can neither be sure 
of their provenances, nor of their motives, and the readiness with which I 
proclaim some sort of embodied resonance might be an insidious way of 
inveiglement, a callous way of appropriation. Then I close the doors, so to 
speak, but the knockings continue, louder, louder, and no matter how much I 
yearn for the habitual silences, I feel myself caught on the perpetual threshold 
of whispers and screams. What to do, little one, what to do?  
Nothing is as it seems. 
And so I imagine, and write my imaginations here on this screen, at this stage 
in my life, and the words don’t abate, they come fast, and then I erase them 
only to pick others, other words, other sentences, and I cannot configure who 
speaks what, or who speaks through whom, as if the voices running through 
me or away with me need to come to the end of their exhalation, as if careful 
syphoning is all that is needed, as if I only have to provide the hands and 
language would appear, miracle-like, in front of me, and I would be able to 
say, yup, that’s it, that’s definitely it, I have found the way to write 
intergenerational reverberations of trauma, and look, how neatly it all appears, 
and sure, it all makes sense, doesn’t it. It all makes sense. Doesn’t it. It doesn’t. 
Nothing is as it seems. 
Nothing is as it seems. Because tidiness and control and neatness rests on the 
premise of a confined authorial voice, one who orchestrates her own 




confinement through a fictitious and futile autonomy, an erasure, if you will, 
of intersubjectivity and intertextuality (Wilson & Oberg, 2002). Ghosts seek 
articulations in conferment of the ‘inter’ into an ‘intra’, into a space of temporal 
articulations. 
 
9th May 2012 
Dear sisters 
I do not know your names, but have thought about writing to you for a 
while now. You might indeed have not been named, but I reckon they 
talked about you all a lot. Maybe they even talked to you, growing 
imperceptibly and then noticeably. I need to address you first, you, the 
eldest child of Hannelore and Hans -you must have been so wanted after 
the terror of our parents’ war. This sounds all terribly formal, doesn’t it? 
I imagine you now with Mum’s light blond hair; maybe you have her 
bright blue eyes as well, hopefully her sense of humour and compassion. 
At the moment I feel closest to you, more so than to our other sisters. You 
were the forerunner, and then you stopped in your track.  
I feel odd speaking about an ‘our’, our sisters, have never needed to use 
either word. I am really not sure what to say, apart from letting you 
appear now here on this page. How to be with close and intimate others, 
siblings, sisters – I have never had the privilege to negotiate these 
complexities. Hey, I know about those things from friends with siblings, 
and my own children! Sure I had Mammi and Papa, but that’s a 
somewhat different minefield indeed, isn’t it?  




Gosh, I write to you in English – now that’s truly a surprise! Speaking to 
ghosts is slightly crazy… irrespective of the language I use.  
Got to go, this is just too odd 
Dagmar 
Nothing is as it seems 
 
14th May 2012 
Dear oldest sister 
I wanted to let you know that writing to you feels less odd, though I 
would prefer it if I knew how to address you. ‘Oldest sister’ is 
insufficient, and does not offer the kind of projective hook onto which I 
can attach my desire to know you better. So here I’m writing to a ghost 
and puzzle how to address her! 
You have come closer, or maybe I have allowed myself to open up to the 
possibility of having had siblings… In any case, irrespective of name or 
not, I encounter a paradox I find quite perplexing: you were born more 
than one year before me, we have always been spatially and temporally 
separated by a substantial period, and yet I feel a close pull towards you, 
possibly more than to our sisters who have come after me. I have not 
shared time with you, have never been in close proximity – as I have with 
our younger sisters. I was alive while they were alive too. It seems as if 
that thought is too big to think at the moment, as if by refusing to think 
it, I can keep the others at bay. And so I talk to you, who has always been 
absent.  




But fantasies have a funny way of inhabiting vacant spaces. There is just 
no way of unthinking a thought, and thus a possibility. I don’t know any 
more how to close the lid on those delicious and frightful imaginings, 
keep myself from fantasising what it is like for my small voice to travel 
into the amniotic fluid. Did they hear me? Do they hear me? 
I am the only surviving girl with one older and three younger sisters. I 
am one of five.  
I have prized open a cold tomb of silence. 
With love Dagmar 
Nothing is as it seems 
 
I am three, four years old. I sit with my mummy. She strokes my hair, gently, her 
fingers smoothing the stray wisps which escape the clasp. She does this often, mummy, 
carefully arranging me in a fashion that makes her eyes shine. Sometimes her eyes 
shine so bright that she looks away. 
I can never know if the silence surrounding my parent’s still born daughters 
is imposed, in that they did not find a receptive other – in each other – who 
could bear further loss. Whether recent communal trauma had been of a 
magnitude that any surplus could not be absorbed into the dominant cultural 
narrative of Germany in the 1950s, or whether my father’s recent return from 
the unimaginable horrors on the Russian front disabled any attempt to 
validate what had happened on his return – these considerations add another 
strand into the intertextuality with which I narrate fragmented memories.  




Mummy does not speak much to me. Her bright-red lips move but I cannot hear any 
sound. I watch her carefully, just in case. Just in case some words escape. 
To give birth to death, simultaneously, is a threshold experience the influence 
of which on “degree, range and intensity of […] emotional angst and long-
term psychological outcomes” can be abated, so Cacciatore (2011:204) suggests 
through “ritualization”. The deaths of my siblings remained unvalidated by 
our immediate families, silenced into a non-event, “an intangible loss with no 
visible object to mourn and no public acknowledgement of the loss” (F. 
Murphy & Philpin, 2010:535). Silence surrounded my mother’s passage from 
pregnancy to non-pregnancy (Frost, Bradley, Levitas, Smith, & Garcia, 2007): 
without processes by which losses could be externalized, without a frame by 
which her relational loss could have been socially acknowledged (Doka, 2002), 
might she have carried within her an unspoken script of blame which spoke 
as much to anxiety of a mother-not-to-be as to the ideological base shaping her 
adolescence when Aryan doctrines permeated intimate relationships? Was 
what happened to her only to be expected, given that her bloodline was 
considered tainted long before she was born? And is this very line not equally 
disenfranchised, barely traceable now, after more than a Century of carefully 
guarding against exposure? Hearsay has made surreptitious connections to 
Ravenna, Rabbinical ancestry, conversion to Catholicism in order to fight in 
wars, clandestinely told from uncle to nieces, mothers to daughters. I cannot 
say when these beans began to be spilled, so to speak, when it was almost 




alright again to speak into the imago of Aryan purity with its fallacious 
attempts to cleanse itself of European inflections.9  
Sometimes she leaves me, and I cry. When she returns, the whites of her eyes are not 
as white as before. I never ask why and she never tells.  
 
 
25th February 2014 
Dear Dagmar 
This is us, even though the proclamation of an ‘us’ in relation to ghosts 
is somewhat fraught. What can we say that has not yet been said? 
When you found something of us in you, you opened yourself to the 
possibility of siblingship and kinship, and brought your fantasies to 
bear on how to write us into your thesis. You gave us space, despite 
tacit constraints that sought to foreclose the insertion of trauma’s 
descendants into narrativizable forms. We were given a voice, we were 
                                                          
9 My grandmother’s genealogical documents omit that she would have been considered a Second 
Degree Mischling, a mongrel (of mixed race with one Jewish grandparent), by the Nazi party. 
Through crucial omission of her maternal lineage, the Advenas, she was able to hide her non-Aryan 
descent, and was not subject, to my knowledge, to infamous discriminations. The term first or 
second degree Mischling, initially used by racial theorist in the nineteenth century (Gelbin & 
Fersterer, 2005),  was employed by the Nazi party as indicator of a skewed origin in relation to racial 
purity criteria.  
The construction of the German Aryan myth in the lead-up to and during the Third Reich is 
countered by a rising number of mixed marriages, i.e. marriages between Christians and Jews 
(Monteath, 2008). An argument could hence be upheld which posits the ideology of Nazism and its 
preponderance of racial purity in substantive tension with the effects of such increase, so much so 
that narratives pertaining to the racial purity codex were continuously inflected with what was not 
considered pure, or Aryan.    
 




given breath, in order “to feel possibility” (Poulos, 2006:103 italics in 
original).  
You too, breathed into the possibility of life after loss - your life, not 
ours.  
Farewell, little one 
 
Nothing is as it seems 
When nothing is as it seems, I find myself afloat among the possibility of 
inhabiting places whose inscriptions carried different names, irrespective of 
whether articulations around narrativizability of loss were foreclosed from the 
onset. With no overt gestures to account for what must have been traumatic 
or haunting experiences, hidden traces were carried, subterfuge-like, to be left 
at the door of those who came after, after the events.  
Let me tell you a dream now, I say, a dream I had on the 17th January 2012, 
about a house I used to live in. The kitchen is full of people I don’t know very 
well. There is a lot going on, folk passing each other, talking animatedly and 
loudly, and I notice my ex-husband amongst the crowd. I am by myself. My 
attention is taken up by a crumbling wall, and the brickwork underneath. On 
closer inspection I notice small caves, similar to the ones I have seen of cave 
dwellers. Something moves; it is a small creature which I initially take for a 
bird. It is a shrivelled up, dark and horrible little manikin, which moves 
slowly. I am utterly dismayed, more so because no one else seems to pay any 
attention or think its presence weird. My ex-husband passes by with two more 
creatures, this time they have grown to the size of a doll. I flee into my 




bedroom and find myself in a similar scene: one wall is dismantled and in 
chaos, inhabited by these golems. “But where can I sleep?” I cry and awake.  
Nothing is as it seems 
The pronouncement of an ‘us’, of siblingship and sisterhood, had only entered 
my awareness once I began to write my sisters into a script. The dream that 
finds me scared of little black golems could be representative, in Freud’s 
(1916:211) terms, of “not always actual wishes. They may also be dead, 
discarded, covered, and repressed wishes, which we must nevertheless credit 
with a sort of continuous existence on account of their reappearance in the 
dream.” 
What, after all, are the golems, exposed to the world in the broken bricks, but 
an inference from the unconscious, the interpretation of which finds some 
resonance with aspects of lived experiences? Bondi’s (2014:335) suggestion 
that “in a psychoanalytic register, the centrality of the unconscious means that 
what any of us might say about ourselves is always a cover story that 
dissembles, perhaps seeking to conceal other, potentially more significant 
truths” problematizes the covert/overt aspects which become apparent in my 
dream. The put-together nature of the dream, the “conglomeration of psychic 
images”, as Freud (1916:87) would have it, is grounded in the familiarity of a 
known setting and its evocations of joyful, horrendous, happy, painful, and 
often rather ordinary memories. It offers a space for the known relationality I 
lived as mother to my children, as wife to my then husband, operating from 
the central premise that we are, from the start, deeply embedded in 
relationality. “We are so in the thick of relationality that it is almost impossible 
to appreciate fully its contours and inner workings” says Mitchell (2003:xiii). 




And yet, I am alone, or possibly, and rather more accurately, I feel alone. Any 
speculation as to the genealogy of such intrinsic aloneness must surely be 
offered in relation to my parents, and the echoes of their own traumatic 
experiences they were at pains to keep at bay.  
Trauma remains at an unassimilable loss – a loss of words, of language, of 
experience and its affective corollary, tainting, as van de Kolk, McFarlane and 
Weisaeth (2007:4) suggest, “all other experiences”. It speaks to an intra- and 
subsequent interpsychic collapse, the reverberations of which remain palpable 
in subsequent generations. My sense of loneliness, amongst the melee of 
known and unknown visitors, could be thought of as an indicator to a prior 
relational rupture, the blue-print, as it were, to any and all relationships that 
were to follow.  
If, as Sklar (2011:92) suggests, and with which I would concur, “the dream acts 
as a specific observation platform into the internal world”, my internal world 
was certainly peopled, but I failed to grasp the significance of their reciprocal 
relational availability. They were, as it were, simply the background against 
which I felt alone, or maybe, al(l) one…, the Heideggerian Befindlichkeit that 
Stolorow (2007:2) defines as “both how one feels and the situation within 
which one is feeling – a felt sense of oneself in a situation.” 
It might indeed be considered too reductive to lay the origins of my 
fragmented and rather underdeveloped interrelationality solely at the door of 
my parents, who were caught, I imagine, in a turmoil which far exceeded their 
own meaning-making; to gauge in how far their parents, my grandparents, 
who lived through the First World War, passed on some of their own 
interrelational idiosyncrasies must necessarily remain the scope of 




speculations. Fraiberg et al’s ‘Ghosts in the Nursery’ (1975:390) do not make 
any clear-cut generational distinctions, presenting, as they do “pathways into 
understanding the repetitions of the past in the present” -  from such 
standpoint the enormity of living through, and surviving two World Wars 
surely must have had a bearing on intersubjective interdependency.  
I cannot say if my mother’s experiences in the wake of the non-wake for her 
stillborn babies became the benchmarks which foreclosed a generative 
attunement towards me, her sole surviving daughter. Bollas (2011:60) argues 
that “the trauma-evolving child is already a self developing along very 
particular lines, such as those conceptualized by Fairbairn in his theory of the 
infant’s internalization of the bad object, where the aim is to control the 
negative effect of bad parenting by taking the negating objects into oneself”, 
and I find myself caught in the trap of assuaging my dead mother in her 
inability to parent any differently. The split between what I am able to assign 
to cognition, in the sense of ‘mum couldn’t do any better, because…’ is 
interlaced by the need to find traits inscripted with the ‘good enough, the good 
enough mother’, yet such notions fail to grasp the complex and perplexing 
affective responses I continue to reconcile myself with.  
The utter mundaneness of the dream’s location in a kitchen (which rather 
uncannily is taken up again in the setting of my opening chapter), is the 
background to what Bollas (1987:280) called ‘the unthought known’, “a term 
to stand for that which is known but has not yet been thought, if by thought 
we mean that which has been mentally processed accurately.” While I shy 
away from the finitudes of accuracy, what Bollas speaks to is a lived, embodied 
knowledge which has, so far, not yet been breached by language, but is 




registered as unconscious inscription nevertheless. Am I, in my dream, the 
only one who sees what had been hidden in the fabric of the building, or is the 
exposure of the golems for the others a mere fait accompli, nothing to get 
worked up about because they had known all along? Is what I have always 
already ‘known’ finally being known? 
The crumbling wall with its revelation of black shrivelled golems calls to mind 
Torok’s (1975/1994:181 italics in original) crypt inhabited by the phantom, “a 
formation in the dynamic unconscious that is found there not because of the 
subject’s own repression but on account of a direct empathy with the unconscious 
or the rejected psychic matter of a parental object.” I would not, as Torok seems to 
argue, categorically rule out that unconscious attunement to parental legacies 
does not instigate further unconscious shifts, not because the encrypted 
material cannot easily slide into an a priori vacancy, but because it does it so 
readily. What I suggest is that the processes, whereby ‘direct empathy’ can 
become un/known are always already embedded in our psychosocial and 
affective relationships. The account whereby my mother failed to give her 
account needs to be placed in its wider intersubjective framing which 
foreclosed, for familial and socio-cultural reasons, I imagine, the necessary 
testimonials, in the form of eulogies, or other rituals to take place. She, simply, 
had to give up on mourning… 
I re-read the last sentence, a brutal reminder of a thin membrane of in-
betwixtness: I envisage my mother holding her baby daughter, holding me, 
alive, lively, and with each embrace she is reminded of the one who came 
before and those who come after – steeped in deaths which had no place 
amongst the living. In that sense, the suggestion that the crypt, or tomb, can 




be thought of as metaphor of “live burials of sorts, [which] contain the secrets 
of violent histories, the losses, violations and atrocities that must be denied” 
(Schwab, 2010:4), extends the parameters within which the ‘crumbling walls’ 
in my dream can be made meaning of: the golems mark an investiture, a 
return, to follow Freud (1923-1925/ 1961) of what needed to be repressed 
within the interpsychic frame of the family dyad, which was, in no small way, 
supported by the collective failure to speak to an overarching and suffocating 
Germanic denial. It might be indeed too reductive to think of the golems solely 
in respect of my mother’s stillbirths, but to begin a foregrounding of sorts 
which addresses what Schwab (2010:79) calls “traumatic amnesia […] 
inscribed as cultural practice.” Might it be so, that the extensions by which the 
denial of private mourning practices dovetailed smoothly into a collective 
taboo vis-à-vis any public acknowledgement thereof, laid the bedrock where, 
collectively, “memories of an immoral past and atrocious acts” (Karstedt, 
2009:28) were assigned to silence? That such entombment would not only 
foreclose possible acts of remembrance but, by virtue of the very foreclosure, 
provide the perfect frame for keeping at bay what should never be exposed? 
“The process of mourning”, as proposed by the Mitscherlichs (1990:83 
translation by author) “can only be achieved when we know what it is we need 
to let go of,” through an act of “empathic opening of our whole beings so that 
we recognize ourselves in those horrific scenes where 100, 500, 1000 corpses 
lay in front of us, corpses of those we have killed.”  
The discovery of the uncovered golems, grotesque as they are, may hence hint 
at what is now overtly at stake: “Following the ghosts is about making a 
contact that changes you,” warns Gordon (2008:22), “and refashions the social 
relations in which you are located. It is about putting life back in where only a 




vague memory or a bare trace was visible to those who bothered to look.” In 
my dream, I not only bothered to look, but I could not avert my eyes. Freud’s 
(1916:183) suggestion that essential element of dreams can be understood as 
“trains of thought reaching back into childhood” seems to be in support of 
what I have been covertly privy to from my very early years: that the insight 
into a different numerical ordering as second of five, versus the lived 
experience as first with no equal brought about a slide into less defined 
locatedness should not astonish me. And yet, I am unsure of how I feel about 
the recalibration, or rather, if what I feel as hovering in the liminality between 
elation, joy, reticence, anger, grief, guilt, is sufficiently defined to be of value. 
The weave with which I find myself enmeshed has been laced with what Barad 
(2010:244) calls “heterogeneous iterations all: past, present, and future, not in 
a relation of linear unfolding, but threaded through one another in a nonlinear 
enfolding.” To be enfolded in a wish to be one amongst others calls forth the 
possibility at the same time as its censorship; such ‘what if…’ scenarios, 
hovering at the edge of consciousness, irrespective of their wretched or 
exciting nature, leave marks in the fold.  
It is, possibly, the nature of marks that some of the most obvious ones seem to 
slip out of sight, to the extent that the more I attempt to trace them in their 
entirety, the more they seem to be bent on avoidance. To speak sisterhood, or 
siblings, remains unavailable to significant tracings – I know but I don’t know 
– until the dream awakens me in abject horror: what has been put under 
erasure through clenching concealment finds its apotheosis in humanoid 
golems, comes for me with such a force that even now the imagery remains as 
vivid as the night I dreamt. It might be too simplistic to consider the horrific 
figures in the context of usurpation, in the narcissistic inflection of eternal 




prima, not secunda inter pares, but I am willing to admit that such thoughts 
had crossed my mind. Yet, on the heel of such trajectory follows one whose 
articulations are more treacherous to bear. 
Nothing is as it seems 
Replacement child. I am left with traces of inscriptions, traces, which I see in 
the photo of the little girl who I should know intimately and who evades me 
at every turn. It makes sense to begin to think in terms of a double-bind, a bind 
that links my creative aliveness irrevocably into a matrix of death. I am the 
one, if you will, who got away, who defied the tacit rule laid down by my older 
sister and those three others who were to follow. While, in “the narrowest 
sense, a replacement child is a child born to parents who have experienced the 
death of a child and then conceived a second child in order to fill the void left 
by the loss of the first” (Anisfeld & Richards, 2000:303), I am fearful to be 
swept along the undercurrent running through the substitutional proficiency 
such mathematical equation evokes. And yet, would I not easily shrug off the 
implication of such definition if something did not stick, did not find a place 
to do its deeds? Indeed, do my writings not tell of different stories, in that they 
trouble what has been secreted away in ambiguities and silences, trouble the 
little girl who would avert her eyes at all costs, trouble me in my sense of who 
I am/was (Schellinski, 2014), but also in the sense of who I was for my mother?  
Nothing is as it seems 
On further, and possibly rather speculative reflection, in how far could my 
mother’s repetitive investiture in becoming pregnant at least another three 
times be read as indictment of insufficiency, my insufficiency, to replace their 
first-born, the one who can and could never be replaced, no matter at what 




costs? Schellinski (2014:198) suggests that the diversion from loss towards 
hope “often condemned another human being to a life akin to death – destined 
to live the life of another human being whom she or he was not”; and 
irrespective of how often my parents tried, I was the only one they were able 
to bear…  
The overarching ambivalence I feel in respect of my mother and of my sisters 
needs to find a place on these pages, an ambivalence that, surprisingly, speaks 
equally, and in no uncertain terms, about guilt: I am, after all, guilty of 
surviving, and continue to this day, but increasingly less so, to feel the 
dampening effect such considerations evoke. Survivor guilt, researched 
initially in the wake of the Shoah, “the key modern trauma for Jews” as Frosh 
(2013:119) puts it, makes linkages between the direct survivors as well as the 
descendants of those whose fate was sealed in the gas chambers. “Survivors 
and their children often had to fill the void of entire families replacing whole 
generations” (Schellinski, 2014). How could I possibly recognize myself in 
such exceptional terminology, if what I offer is a mere smudge on Germany’s 
deeply stained slate? But could it inform some of the vacillations I experience 
specifically in relation to my mother, who would be ever so close only to 
quickly absent herself again? After all, so Schwab (2010:121) assures us, “the 
replacement child confronts the bitter irony that the ideal child is a dead 
child.” And yet, interlayered with refrains of guilt is a deepening sense of 
purposive aliveness, of stoic tenacity even, and I recognize something of that 
nature when I think about my early childhood years. I seem to have held on 
for dear life, despite, and at times struggling with, the silent battlefield within 
which I found myself. Eros and Thanatos, indeed. 




An argument could easily be made that posits the surviving child, for the very 
fact of her survival, in a conflictual relationship with her dead sibling/s. “There 
is probably no nursery without violent conflicts between the inhabitants, 
actuated by rivalry for the love of the parents” suggests Freud (1922:173). It 
stands to reason that the complexities, and questions, arising out of such 
observations are further accentuated in the case of dead siblings. While the 
proximity of love and hate between siblings has been psychoanalytically 
explored and the ensuing feelings of guilt posited in early infancy, “with 
harmonious development” so argues Jaffe (1970:312), “these impulses are 
overcome and, so, too, are the guilt feelings they aroused.” But, in the case of 
sibling death, the very trajectory is truncated, and the Freudian ‘reality 
principle’, in the sense that wishes do generally not kill, is foreclosed.  
What am I left with, little one, what am I left with? 
Nothing is as it seems 
I am sitting at my desk, re-read myself back into the perfidious trajectory of 
replacement, as if all that was required was an exchange, of sorts, a slipping 
out of one into another… what?... skin, perhaps? And what sort of skin was I 
meant to slip into, if not the one whose colour was opaque, barely visible 
against the backdrop of mundane familiarity? And is this process of slipping, 
or zipping, not altogether another one, one I recognize as ‘dis-placement’, an 
estrangement of sorts, or exposé of the conflictual ground I continued to find 
myself on? I could not be, but I could not not be either.  
The maelstrom of melancholic attachment to the past is taking hold, inveigles 
itself into the midst of my writings, seems to caress me with carefully 
calibrated sentences. And, possibly, this is another strand in the weave of 




trauma’s reverberations, exposed in the hide-and-seek of this inquiry, as if all 
I needed to do is dismantle the walls, expose what has been hidden behind or 
in the cladding, narrate the show-and-tell, and all would make sense…But, as 
Sklar (2011:9 italics by author) so astutely reminds me, “the symptoms are 
there as a covering structure to enable some sense of not fragmenting.” Were I 
to extrapolate further, is the estrangement I have felt in relation to my self a 
necessity, say, a safeguarding against the draw of joining those who came 
before and after me, the extent of which I could never be aware of? Could the 
suggestion hold that, as much as I tried to negotiate my place at the table of 
death in the form of childhood anorexia, I ultimately sought not to join in their 
danse macabre, yet carried within me embodied fragments of their songs?  
Nothing is as it seems 
I take Frosh’s (2013:39) warning to heart: “One thing to note” he says, “is that 
we should probably be cautious about how much we can understand.” And I 
am unsure if what has been running through my writings with such unerring 
constancy is not contained in Frosh’s words, in the way that the almost 
intangible collapses around proclamations of certainty. What I have begun to 
reconcile myself to is possibility – or rather, a recognition of possibility rather 
than of verity, which accounts for untied and untie-able strands in stories for 
which I have no story. And any attempt, in Butler’s (2001:27) words “to give a 
sequential account for that which cannot, finally, be grasped in sequential 
terms” is but ‘provisional’.  
I am not sure if these days, the predictability of the office with the low hum of 
tepid radiators does not act as such a provisional space, a repository, of sorts, 
within which I can begin to become…. I say ‘become’ because under all that is 




humming to be known, in Sklar’s (2011:27) words the “domain captured by 
living and partly living” lies that which will be elusive to any processes of 
signification. It is, as Butler (2005:54) suggests, the nature of the unconscious 
that “to understand the unconscious […] is to understand what cannot belong, 
properly speaking, to me, precisely because it defies the rhetoric of belonging, 
is a way of being dispossessed through the address of the other from the start.” 
And just as in my dream which found me at the brink of despair on seeing the 
mannikins speak in their abject Otherness to my subjective alterity, and where, 
uncannily, a reminder is imbricated into the dream’s fabric which forecloses 
the possibility of blissful ignorance – sleep – I cannot but know that what I 
only ever know are mere further condensations, traces, strands. 
Ghosts talk, indeed. 
Ghost talk.  
 
Tales Untold, or Ghost Talk No.5 
 
I. 
The woman moves over slowly, takes the child by the hand. Take off your coat, 
she says, and your scarf. It is warm here, she says, see, I lit a fire. The child 
looks at the flames, turns away. Come, she says, sit on my knee. She extends 
her arms. Sit with me, she says, close, close. The child sits down, folds her 
small hands into her lap. Together they watch the sparks. The embers cast a 
soft red glow.  
Once upon a time, the woman says, there was a little girl who had woken from 
a sleep so deep that it had lasted many moons. She looked around her room 




and did not recognize it any more. And when she looked into her mirror, she 
did not know the girl who looked back. “Will someone know who I am?” she 
asked the girl in the mirror. Alas, there was no answer. So, without further 
ado, she took her only treasure, a golden net, and began on her journey. She 
asked anyone who passed her way, but try as she might, no one knew who she 
was. The little girl sat down and began to cry.  
Now an old man had watched her from his window. “Why do you cry?” he 
enquired, and the girl told him her story.  “Can you help me find me?” she 
asked. The old man looked at her, took her hand, and answered: “Little girls 
who are lost do not need to search on their own. I will go with you until you 
find what you are looking for”. 
And so they set off and soon came to a shore, where a boat was tethered to a 
post. They got in and cast themselves off. For many days and many nights they 
crossed a dark sea. They fought storms and high waves. The little girl would 
get giddy and reach for the old man’s hand. “Hold me”, she would say, “the 
shaky dark frightens me”. And he would hold her until night turned into day 
and the little girl feared less.  In this way, they continued on their voyage, until, 
one day, the colour of the sea turned light blue. When the little girl and the old 
man viewed the horizon, they saw land in the far distance. “That is where I 
want to go”, she said. Alas, when they reached the shore, they saw that all was 
wasteland. Wherever they turned, all was rubble. Every house had been burnt 
to cinders, and gaping holes opened to more ruins. They found not one soul. 
All was quiet, not even the birds sang. “I am scared of the silence”, the little 
girl said, and the old man reached out to hold her hand. “Fear not”, he said, “I 
am with you. You are not alone”. And so they walked on. The journey took 




them to the tops of mountains and into valleys, where springs turned into 
burns and burns into rivers which fed the oceans, but still they did not 
encounter anyone. Silence was everywhere.  
While they were walking, through valleys and fields, through rubble and 
ruined towns, theirs were the only sounds you could hear. Then, one day, they 
stopped in their tracks, for in the distance they saw a house, a proper house. It 
was not too big and not too small, but it stood upright amongst all the ruins. 
“That is where I want to go”, the little girl said. And so they walked on until 
they could see that right in the middle of the house was an entrance. A lock 
hung outside. The old man took out a key; it fitted the lock perfectly. They 
heaved and shoved, until, finally, the door gave way with an almighty groan. 
And my, what a sight beckoned them! As far as their eyes could see, the house 
was filled to the brim with every word imaginable, long and large words, 
teeny tiny ones were jumbled on shelves upon shelves which were bending 
under the heavy weight. Imagine her delight! Here, in the midst of silence, was 
a house filled to the brim with every word that had ever been thought, and 
some that had yet been unthought. “I have never seen so many words in my 
life”, the little girl said, her eyes shining. With outstretched arms she raced 
along the shelves, her small fingers drawing fine lines in the settled dust. The 
old man looked at her kindly. “Shall we play with them?” he suggested, 
smilingly. “Play with them?” the little girl laughed out loud, but then asked 
shyly: “But, but how can I possibly play?” So the old man raised himself onto 
tiptoes, reached up to the highest shelf and carefully placed a word into her 
small hands. “Here”, he said, “and mind that you don’t drop it”. In her palm 
the little girl held a teeny tiny word which weighed more than she had ever 
carried in her life. Carefully she placed it onto the floor. There it sat in its shiny 




blackness. “RAW” she read aloud. “Look at it upside down and back to front”, 
the old man suggested. The little girl did a handstand and flipped sideways. 
“Oh my” she exclaimed “now I know why it weighs more than I have ever 
known. Why, such a teeny, tiny, mighty word”.  She sat down on her heels, 
her lips quivering. Gently the old man touched her shoulder. “Shall we place 
it in your net?” he asked.  
And so the old man and the little girl began their game. They dusted the 
cobwebs off many words, or washed them in warm water – my, how those 
words shone like magic lanterns!  All the while, they would carefully gather 
words in her golden net. Often she would climb up to the highest shelves, 
nimbly easing long words out of the jumble of tinsy-tiny ones, some heavy as 
lead, or sharp as razors, others light as feathers, or squishy as marshmallows. 
Imagine her joy when sunlight would appear through the walls and dust 
would dance like shooting stars!  “Here I come” she would shout happily, 
sitting astride words so light that she could float down to the ground, bathed 
in warming sunshine. And the old man would smile at her antics. Imagine, 
some words were so soft that they used them as blankets, and others were 
round as balls, which caused no end of fun.  At other times, the old man would 
ease heavy words from the little girl’s grasp, fists opening into his old hands, 
and the word would land on the floor with a loud ‘thump’. Such days were 
not filled with smiles, but with drops, which would glisten on the girl’s cheeks. 
In this way, they would spend many, many days. And while the net grew 
wider and wider with more and more words, it grew lighter and lighter, and 
began to hover like a golden cloud.  




One day, while taking a rest, the little girl looked longingly at her golden net 
which was by now filled with almost every word imaginable. How lightly it 
floated above the highest shelves! With the greatest of care, she eased it 
through the large entrance. And, do you know, with an almighty swish, words 
upon words upon words jostled and bumped and shoved and pushed until 
they rose high above the house. Up and down they drifted, spreading far and 
further into the distance. Well, imagine the little girl’s amazement! Open-
mouthed she stood, watching in awe and wonder. Never had she seen such 
spectacle! “Come, come” she shouted excitedly, “watch our words float out.” 
But no one answered, no one heeded her call. “Where are you? Are you 
playing hide-and-seek?” the little girl asked in a much smaller voice. 
Hurriedly she turned round and began her search. “Where are you?” she 
pleaded, “Answer me, please. I cannot hear you.” Into the furthest and darkest 
corners of the house the girl ventured, alas, the old man was nowhere to be 
found.   
The sun was beginning to set, casting a soft glow over all it touched. 
“Whatever have I done?” the little girl cried desperately, “Not only have I 
released all the words we have ever gathered together, but now my one and 
only friend is gone forever.” She clutched her golden net, which had lain rather 
dishevelled in the doorway, and curled up beside it. She tossed and turned, 
yet sleep evaded her. Being drenched in tiredness, her body eventually 
succumbed. But no sooner had she closed her eyes when she felt a warm draft 
caressing her tired body. “Endlich,” a voice breathed, “endlich haben wir dich 
gefunden.”10 
                                                          
10 Finally, finally we have found you 




With an almighty startle, the little girl sat up straight. Up she bolted, fearing 
the worst of the worst. Against the encroaching darkness she was able to 
discern figures, four female figures, whose smiles set the little girl alight. Her 
heart skipped a few beats. For in their faces the little girl recognized a face that 
had looked back from her own mirror many, many moons ago. “But,” she 
whispered, “aber…” The eldest drew the little girl into her arms, cheek to 
cheek they held each other and did not let go. 
And yet… 
… And yet, the longer the four women sit close to the little girl, the more she 
feels an encroaching coldness creeping stealthily into the core of her very 
being.  Her heart skips more beats, and each beat becomes fainter, like an echo 
which responds until there is no more to answer. Her rosy wiggly toes feel 
numb and seem to turn into bluish-white shards of bone right in front of her 
eyes.  Against her fading strength, the little girl clutches the golden net tightly, 
but to no avail; it slips slowly through her grasp.  
By now the moon has risen like a silver shaving in the night sky, casting a dim 
light onto the world.  And, you know, by its eerie glow the scene is 
unremarkable, for what is so special about a few women and a child sitting 
closely together? But, look carefully, ever so carefully, can you see? In the 
midst of nearness there are deaths, four deaths, many deaths, with a very 
particular claim on the little girl: for had they not each turned into bare 
vestiges of what it means to be alive? Their skin shines translucent against 
darkness, as if lit by a tiny, icy quivering flame. Rigid they sit, mouths agape, 
breathless. Soundless. Slowly, ever so slowly, they tense their grip, tighter and 
tighter they shift until the little girl is interwoven right into their indiscernible 




midst.  How easy it would be to surrender, the girl thinks, to give in to 
blackness beyond anything she has ever known.  
Try as she might to keep her eyes open, her lids become steel shutters whose 
mechanism is set to close for good. With an almighty and desperate effort she 
bends her aching head, and eases herself little by little, inch by inch, out of the 
ghosts’ clutch. A shattering scream fills the night air, as the girl is released. She 
lies still, ever so still, but after a while begins to unfold herself gently, right 
down to the very tips of her fingers and toes. Deeply she fills her lungs, her 
chest rising and falling in rhythm with her beating heart. Dudumm, dudumm, 
dudumm.  She remains on the ground for a very long time, in fear of the ghouls 
with their almighty grasp. Never before has she suffered such fright, she 
thinks.  But, eventually, as is so often the case, curiosity gets the better of her, 
and the girl opens her eyes, tearing aside the veil of darkness.  
Sunlight floods her body, rushes in between bones and skin, lightening the 
thick and sombre flow of blood, and she rejoices in aches coloured by pleasure. 
“I am alive” she thinks, “I am – where am I?!” Held lightly in her golden net, 
she finds herself floating on a breeze, down, down through the open window 
right into the room she had awoken in, once upon a time. Up she jumps, 
excitedly, when she catches sight of someone in the mirror. “Is it? Is it really?” 
– She breaks into an almighty smile, and is immediately rewarded by its 
return. She smiles again, and again, and each time, the girl in the mirror does 
exactly the same. “Pleased to meet you” they say to each other, and “You are 
so very welcome”.  She turns to the window, and smiles into the world. “Yes”, 
she shouts, “yes, yes, yes…” 




And the net, the golden net? Well, if you look ever so carefully, you can see it 
hanging right next to the mirror. Amongst its delicate strands are shapes, 
many shapes, gossamer-thin, lace-like, shiny.   
 
II. 
What is there to remember? What is there to remember if we were told as a child? What 
we were told as a child? Was ‘Once Upon a Time’ an insidious opening to tales that 
needed to be shut away, burnt to cinders in the great fire of 1933?11   
And yet, the words came so easy: Once upon a time. They appeared almost 
effortlessly, if one can ever say such thing about the process of writing. And 
then I waited, lay in wait for what was to follow. There is a certain sing-song 
quality to these words, a literary lullaby, evocation of place and time long ago. 
The stories developing out of such opening lines delve deep into marginal 
territory “where magic is woven in a world outside the physical daily world 
inhabited during the waking day” (Walker, 2010:83). The tales hover, if you 
will, on a threshold, and slide in between that which is available to conscious 
processes and the larger arena of that which remains outside awareness.  
We have been writing ourselves into perfidious times and places, haven’t we? Times 
which continue to bear on those whose mute cries can be heard in silent places. Do you 
remember, we write, but where do we begin? I mean, where do we begin? “History is 
                                                          
11 On May 10th 1933, thousands of books were burnt in university towns all over Germany. The act of 
cultural barbarism (Ritchie, 1988) was initiated by student bodies, many of whom were in support of  
‘cleansing’ Germany’s cultural aesthetics from influences of authors who were supposedly 
undermining the nascent Third Reich with ‘un-German’ literature (Fishburn, 2007).  




amoral: events occurred. But memory is moral: what we consciously remember is what 
our conscience remembers”(Michaels, 2009:138).      
Would it be appropriate to assume that when my parents attempted to divert 
troubling imagery, “formless, nameless anxieties, and […] chaotic, angry, and 
even violent fantasies”, as argued by the psychoanalyst Bettelheim (1991:7), it 
was done on the flawed premise that “only conscious reality or pleasant and 
wish-fulfilling images should be presented to the child – that he should only 
be exposed to the sunny side of things”? But, he continues, “such one-sided 
fare nourishes the mind only in a one sided-way, and real life is not all sunny.” 
Sunniness - the term forges an allegiance with cyclical weather events over 
which we have very little influence, but which define us nevertheless.  
Do you remember, do you remember the times we sit in the back of the car on one of 
our excursions, and the sun is wrapped in a shroud of fine dust, and trees and broken 
houses, and broken factory walls rise out of the fog only to disappear in the blink of an 
eye? And do you remember that no matter how hard we try to reach up to the huge 
button in the sky, our arms are never long enough to take off her blanket so she can 
shine, shine, shine? And that, after a while our lids feel heavy, but we cannot sleep? 
Do you remember? Do you? 
I cannot even say if my laconic response to such experiences was peculiar – it 
was merely a given. Without narrative to flesh out a possibility of meaning, 
not because ruinous cities were in themselves meaningless, but because they 
contested the simplicity of a ‘new beginning’, I was left with imagery beyond 
calibration. In contrast to Warner’s (1995:XI) description of a tale-teller who 
“nourishes them on talk, […] wraps them in language; […] banishes 
melancholy by refusing silence”, my tale-tellers were mute. Given that my 




parents were unable to find a language with which to speak their own 
experiences, I am inclined to believe that they were in the grip of a psychic 
trauma on a scale which “tends to linger and is not metabolized in one 
generation; its effects are passed on to subsequent generations” (Akhtar, 
2009:229).  
And then Mammi and Papa sing to us, do you remember? About little Hans who goes 
out into the world, all alone? But his mother cries so much that he immediately returns 
home. I can still hear the melody, even after all these years. We sit on Mammi’s knee, 
right in the front of the car, do you remember? And, do you remember how we can 
never really understand when Mammi’s lips shrink into a trace, a line in her face? 
Because, the strange thing is, we are not “trying to understand the silent witnessing 
of the child exposed to stories not meant for her ears”(Schwab, 2010:45), are we? We 
are trying to make meaning of the silent witnessing of silent stories slipped into small 
and silent bodies. Aren’t we? Aren’t we? 
To say that I wrote the tale my parents were unable to tell might also be ‘a way 
of posing a question’, to paraphrase Warner (1995), about the beliefs and 
values which shaped my, and countless others’ upbringing in the wake of 
World War II. I narrated a tale pertaining to somewhat idiosyncratic 
experiences “embedded in material circumstance” (1995:XVIII), or context, 
within which I interwove other less clearly definable accounts, “that is, the 
dark monsters residing in the unconscious” (Bettelheim, 1991:121). My fairy 
tale transgressed, I suggest, the specificity of defined boundaries in favour of 
memetic inflections, and began to speak to the uncanny silences surrounding 
the beginnings of the Zero Hour in the wake of WW II.  




Why uncanny? Or, more appropriately, what was unheimlich about my tale? 
Unheimlich, so wholly inadequately translated into ‘uncanny’, speaks to home, 
the un-home-ly, beyond home yet bound into it.  When Freud (1917-1920/1947) 
wrote his seminal paper on Das Unheimliche, the uncanny, he distinguished it 
from other forms of anxiety provocations. Unheimlich was set as antonym to 
heimisch, heimlich, meaning familiar and known, and became something to be 
feared because it was unknown. However, as not everything that was 
unknown or novel provoked anxiety, Freud assumed that the shift into the 
uncanny operated beyond the binary equation of unknown to anxiety. Honing 
in on the lexical definition of heimlich, Freud began to argue that heimlich 
connoted with notions of clandestine or surreptitious engagement. The 
signifier was not tethered solely to what was considered familiar and homely, 
but also to what was covert, furtive and secretive. And it is in these 
overlappings between what is so intrinsically familiar yet strangely 
disconnected and out of sorts that the heart of the uncanny lies: “Unheimlich 
ist irgendwie eine Art von heimlich”12 suggested Freud (1917-1920/1947:237). 
It may be, so he concluded, that the Unheimliche is the exposure of what was 
meant to remain secretive, and the prefix ‘un’ is simply a mark of repression.  
My fairy story spoke to trauma and terror, and it spoke to repression, of which 
Freud (Freud, 1915/1946:253) said: ”Wir dürfen uns vorstellen, daß das 
Verdrängte einen kontinuierlichen Druck in der Richtung zum Bewußten 
ausübt”13. It seems almost spurious to assume I could claim some sort of 
definitive knowledge around the kind of repression my parents were 
unconsciously engaged with – such story will most certainly remain 
                                                          
12 Uncanny is in some way a form of clandestine 
13 We may assume that the repressed exerts a continuous pressure in the direction of the conscious 




unwritten! I am inclined to think that as a young child I became witness to the 
effects of repression without means of bearing what I became witness to. I 
knew without necessarily knowing what I had knowledge of. But I simply 
failed to thrive.  
Do you remember when we are three or four years old, and Mammi gets us ready. Why 
don’t you bring your doll, she says, but I don’t like to. I don’t like her. She never closes 
her eyes, do you remember? And we go outside and walk along the pavement, hand-
in-hand we walk, and Mammi carries the spooky doll with no name, and we wear coats 
with furry collars which tickle our cheeks. And the sun shines this time, or? And then, 
you remember, we enter a shop. A man takes us into a dark room. And you know how 
much I hate the dark, and we are afraid, we are so terribly afraid. And Mammi, she 
watches every move, was it Mammi? And the man says Sit down, and we hover on 
the edge of a high chair, and he says Take off your coats and we don’t and he says Look 
at the camera and smile and we don’t, and, remember, we tighten our lips and look 
away just like Mammi does.    
I located the protagonist of my tale in a soundless land, in an environment 
without language. My imagery was primarily informed by a framework which 
underscores the role of language for thinking through trauma in relation to its 
unspeakability (Nicholas Abraham & Torok, 1994; Barnaby, 2012; Brison, 2008; 
Caruth, 1996; Clough, 2009). In my story, language had been erased, or in 
Freudian terms repressed, because what it needed to speak was inarticulable. 
To narrate a self from a position which forecloses its very performance 
problematizes the dilemma of an embodied, yet unspeakable, knowledge. My 
own knowledge was of a kind which, to follow Uotinen (2011:1308) “requires 
the existence of a body, but, surprisingly, it seems that bodily knowledge does 




not necessarily presume consciousness.” Such embodied traumatic 
knowledge acts seemingly in defiance of what can be narrated, embedded as 
it is in the unconscious, from which it perpetually returns. Freud terms such 
endeavour (Freud, 1920/2003) ‘repetition compulsion’, as a way of describing 
how experiences vie iteratively for meaning making. That the little girl in my 
tale seemingly knew her way through chaos and devastation in order to arrive 
at the house full of words is not entirely surprising. After all, she knew about 
absences, deaths and voids, about repression of language and its vicarious 
implication on the subject, about unnarratability, about “excess of an 
unorderable cognitive chaos” (Kristeva, 1989:33).  
Living in close proximity to what was unspeakable because it was not spoken 
about cast a shadow over the familiar and known. Freud’s (1917/1964) 
‘shadow of the object’ is the trope through which he sought to account for his 
observations around loss as central component in mourning as well as 
melancholia. In melancholia, the lost object had been internalized to the extent 
that it became the blueprint for other relational configurations. In that sense, 
it threw its shadow onto “the three-dimensional emotional life lived in the 
world of real external objects” (Ogden, 2007:131). There were no words which 
pertained to the ubiquitous lacunae, the silenced absences. There were no 
words or stories relating to “death, to corpses and to the return of the dead, to 
ghosts and ghouls” (Freud, 1917-1920/1947:254 translation by author). These 
shadows turned out to be the ones who demanded their due, they haunted 
through an “enduring presence of an absence” (Gerson, 2009:4). When, once 
upon a time, I could have written myself into a home, or a place which felt 
heimisch, the security of the space had been inverted and thrown into doubt, 
became unheimlich, uncanny.  




Do you remember how afraid you were of the dark, little one, how terrified you were of 
the night? That you did not know whom to call on? And that you did not know any 
more if crying would be any good? And, no matter how hard you squeezed, no tears 
would flow? And do you remember the nights they went out and left you alone, you 
weren’t really all alone, were you? There were others but you could not fathom them, 
ghostly they were, almost invisible.  
When I wrote my fairytale, little did I recognize that this tale was not entirely 
mine to tell. My story was simply dovetailed into the tale of an imago, an 
idealization of what I believed my parents needed me to be; the notion of 
imago, as the child’s “unconscious prototypical figure which orientates the 
subject’s way of apprehending others” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1988:211) borne 
out of “relational and/or fantasied experience” (Watkins Jr, 2013:66), troubles 
a somewhat similar terrain to the substitutional proficiency of the replacement 
child, but its contestations seem more insidious.  Leclaire’s (1998:2 original in 
italics) argument does not pull any punches: “Psychoanalytic practice,” he 
says, “is based upon bringing to the fore the constant work of a power of death – 
the death of the wonderful (or terrifying) child who, from generation to generation, 
bears witness to parents’ dreams and desires. There can be no life without killing that 
strange, original image in which everyone’s birth is inscribed.” The layering of an 
original imago, in the sense of Leclaire’s (1998:34) “phantasy of perfect 
obedience to the primary narcissistic representation” is foreclosed, but 
possibly not abandoned, in the death of a child: I imagine that a weave of 
interlapping imagoes, replacements and phantasies is imbricated in births 
following such death, the unconscious repercussions of which are, at times, 
not easy to bear.  




Undoubtedly, my birth was underwritten by an entrenched anxiety, not only 
in fearful expectation arising out of my parent’s intimate trauma, but also in 
the context of an aftermath to an unmeasurable and abject war. The trajectory, 
I believe, was hence as follows: if, unconsciously, I partook in the phantasy of 
being fearless, then I would somehow keep us all safe. A safe life, a liveable 
life, a secure life, a good life – these notions were parameters my parents 
attempted to adhere to, and to which I, too, felt an unobjectionable obligation. 
While death could not always be denied (I recall the suicide of an elderly 
neighbour one Christmas day – her blood left faint traces in the pristine snow), 
a hastily shut front door to its immediate proximity was preferred, in 
particular when I was around. Of course, and paradoxically, my very presence 
became a continuous reminder of more intimate losses, deaths so close that no 
door would have held back its reckoning: I rarely left my mother’s side, lived 
by what Leclaire (1998:33) calls “the figure of the-child-kept-alive-for-[her]-
mother’s-solace”, the sine qua non of replacement phantasies. And as 
inscribed into the script, I intuitively abided by the assimilated rule of 
silencing what was traumatic and terrifying. There just were no words.   
Do you remember, little one, that you never spoke about the red snow? That you never 
told a single soul? That you always kept mum, in order to keep mum?  
In contrast to my imago of narcissistic omnipotence, I was anything but an 
adventurous or fearless child; I withdrew into the world of fantasy and would 
seek excitements by proxy: curled up in a corner, I would read children’s 
fiction about the Famous Five (whose dubious political undertones were lost 
on me. I enjoyed them for what I took them to be: escape mechanisms into a 
world where grown-ups did not feature), or any other stories which attended 




principally to my unconscious desire to flee from a familial situation I just 
could not make sense of. The need to repress what cannot be assimilated has 
been theorized by Freud as early as 1896 and developed further in his seminal 
work “Die Verdrängung” 14  (1915/1946, 1915/1964b) in 1915. Freud saw 
repression primarily as response to trauma, and I am in no doubt that its 
vicissitudes shaped our family narrative: whatever bad had happened, as long 
as we don’t talk about it, it cannot divert us from the rigid trajectory of safety 
and security at all costs.   
Once upon a time I wrote, and inserted into my tale less noticeable filaments. 
Into the heart of courageous adventure, of almost foolhardy recklessness, I 
inscribed their inversions. To speak dread, and worst of the worst would 
shatter, I feared, the phantasmagory the little girl needed to keep the ghouls at 
bay. And, given that she learnt early on to repress anxiety at all costs, her 
language was invested in the phantasy of upholding a powerful imago.   
And now, little one, what now? Where do words like fear and anxiety sit on the merry-
go-round of our tale? Do they sit in a tight embrace with phantasies of courage? Do 
they vie for attention only to pull you in all directions? But, and here is the paradox, 
are they not always embedded in each other in a barely differentiable in-betweenness - 
and to speak one, speaks the other, even if, yes, even if we wish it were otherwise.  
 
  
                                                          
 
14 Repression 




Six.  And Then: Untellings, or Echoes of Echoes 
 
So there we are, I say, there we are.  
There is a certain finitude in the opening sentence, isn’t there, a breezy sort of 
exhalation, in a similar way to the gentle expulsion of breath without the 
immediacy of urgent inhalation, and I find myself in the gap between one and 
the other, a resting place, of sorts. And maybe, maybe, this is where I am, 
where we are, you and I, together, in a place without obvious demarcations of 
what is one, what is the other. What is the ‘we’ after all but an inflection of the 
fluidity of enmeshment, of in-betweenness, with which I continuously write 
myself into texts whose authorship is troubled and troublesome?  
And neither, frankly, can I fathom if what I refer to as a ‘there’ could be 
apprehended as a place, in opposition to a ‘here’, or if it is rather invested in 
an overarching gesture of circumference, a showing, say, for the time being, of 
who or what I speak to/through when voices crackle like parchment.  
In reflecting on the gossamer threads interwoven into the fabric of this thesis, 
the sheer mere-ness of fleeting disposition with which I am perpetually 
entangled, I cannot but ask if this writing, somehow, suffices, if it allows for 
tentative arcs to be drawn across a divide that is as much defined by the 
unsayable as it is by that which yields itself to language.  
Little did I know. Little did I know that my inquiry would offer itself on a 
threshold – the threshold of the almost inaudible against the background of 
the always already, that what I became witness to had as much to do with 
familial idiosyncrasies as with abject perversity. I began, but I think I had 
begun before I had even thought of beginnings. In the thick of it, that’s where 




I was, if truth be told. What is writing but an attempt of making some sort of 
sense of the thickness within which we find ourselves? I knew, but I did not 
know what it was I knew; now I know more, but I never know all that I know…  
Yet, because I ‘knew’, I somehow began, or rather, I narrated my beginnings 
in words, in sentences, in chapters. I formulated my thoughts around the 
discovery of an image, the photo that vied for something to be done with it, to 
it - it did not offer anything else but a cut against the grain of the dominant 
familial discourse of picture-perfect little family. It offered a constellation 
which troubled my ‘taken-for-grantedness’ in a disruptive and rather uncanny 
way, and evoked a haunting presence. The chapters which unfolded in the 
process of writing this thesis had as much to do with loss of a priori 
assumptions and certitude, as they had to do with silences and loss, with ruins, 
absence, memory, and ghosts, always ghosts.  
Writing into and through such matter carried the risk of smoothing over 
uncalibrated and uncalibratable excess, to the extent that the linearity of an 
argument, say, erases the fine permutations interwoven within texts, and 
obscure the necessary marginalia and palimpsests without which words 
would not be held. I say would not be held, but, it might well be that they could 
not be held. Because are we not, in line with Gannon (2002:671), always 
“partial and contingent, fragmented and transitory”? In writing myself into 
vexing and perplexing hauntings, I sought partial re-conciliation with 
fragmentary embodied knowledge, with traces curving back into lives lived, 
and lives unlived, even if such conciliatory gestures can possibly only ever 
grasp at what remains ungraspable.  




This is an ending, of sorts, an ending to these writings, for the time being, but 
not an ending of the kind that leaves nothing further to inquire into. What I 
have done through the process of writing might be described as an unfolding 
and refolding – of dis-synchronicities, of gaps, of fissures and fragments, in a 
fashion which initially drew me, and continues to do so, to psychoanalytic 
theory. I barely registered what it was I was in search of, apart from a 
theoretical resonance with which I could not only begin to, fleetingly, make 
sense of memory-shards set in a barren field of silence, but also, and possibly 
even more so, of the perplexing dissonance between my embodied experiences 
and the rarely spoken of undercurrents bearing on my childhood and 
adolescence.  
Echoes of silence: writing into reverberations of trauma – the title bares itself in the 
tonal solipsism of an echo with its reverberations, that is, as act caught in its own 
ricochets. I would like to lay claim to the title, in terms of conscious choice, 
but, frankly, I am not so sure: it seems that the title had chosen me, that words 
had attached themselves to something that needed to come into language, long 
before I knew what kind of language was asked of me. I am struck by the fate 
of Echo, one of the nymphs in Greek mythology, whose beautiful voice and 
entertaining stories beguiled Zeus’ wife Hera, to the extent that she paid 
insufficient attention to her husband’s sexual cavorting: furious of having been 
cuckolded, Hera curses Echo through taking away her speech – all she is left 
with are repetitious repetitions.   
Echoes resonate solely with themselves, they are dependent on a system 
inaccessible to interference, inaccessible to an other. My reverberations spoke 
to a hermetically-sealed impenetrableness, where nothing shifted because 




nothing was shiftable, and lives were lived in an orderly and predictable 
fashion.  
Picture-perfect, indeed.  
Writing not only interrupts, but has the capacity of prizing open this tightly-
bound echo chamber. Against the restrictive and constrictive values of 
resonance, writing, I argue, offers a response. Performative writing has the 
propensity of exploding, of shattering, the rigours within which silence is held. 
It is unruly, uncertain, unpredictable; it is written into/through the body, the 
knowing body, even if language is, sometimes, obfuscated. “In the comfort of 
incoherency and incompleteness, I began to find relief” writes Spry (2011:503), 
“I began to experience rupture and fragmentation as a form and function of 
performative ethnographic representation.” Could an argument be upheld 
that posits psychoanalytic theory into a frame of reference not dissimilar to the 
one above, in the sense that incoherency is evoked in relation to the 
unconscious with its repetitious returns of what has been repressed? That, at 
times, I am not making sense of/to my self, and find these vestiges to a past 
strangely comforting, even if I am left clueless? At other times, I am perplexed, 
dumbfounded even, cannot not make sense, and am left in utter chaos.  
Performative writing into psychoanalysis gives due attention to the complex 
machinations at play in our unconscious. “A strong experience in the present 
awakens in the creative writer a memory of an earlier experience (usually 
belonging to his childhood) from which there now proceeds a wish which 
finds fulfilment in the creative work.” While Freud’s (1907/1962:151) 
continuous interweave of the past in the present is relatively tightly calibrated 
in terms of what could easily be thought of as solipsistic agency, a more 




generous, Butlerian (2005:37) reading would extend his argument towards 
“the ‘I’ [who] can tell neither the story of its own emergence not the conditions 
of its own possibility without bearing witness to a state of affairs to which one 
could not have been present.” The social matrices Butler makes reference to 
are not only deeply imbued with alterity, but they also enforce a repositioning 
of self in isolation towards one always already in relation, albeit one 
imbricated with and articulated through incompletion.  
The vein running through my theoretical underpinnings can hence be read as 
an endeavour to trace traces, traces, which, as Freud (1907/1962:49 italics by 
author) argues, are “only repressed because they are associated with the 
release of feelings which ought not to occur.” But could the propensity for 
sabotaging that which is forbidden by its very opposite not be one of the tenets 
of psychoanalysis? And, furthermore, is the very act of writing into 
reverberations, into traces, not always already imbued with the presence of an 
alterity, in an enmeshment of absence and presence, of voices, of bodies, of 
stories told and untold? 
Writings, irrespective of whether they are ‘factual’, I propose, are always 
fictional, in that they re-present a temporality and spatiality that is non-
narratable. “I am always recuperating, reconstructing”, says Butler (2005:39) 
“and I am left to fictionalize and fabulate origins I cannot know.” Could this 
be considered leverage in the argument of silences as haunting presence, the 
origins of which remain unknowable – after all, is this not the gap into which 
ghostly hauntings slip? And, if that were so, were not written into my body 
other fabulated accounts, “cajoling [me] to reconsider […] because cajoling is 




in the nature of the ghost, the very distinction between there and not there.” 
(Gordon, 2008:6)?  
The fallacy here is that the cajoling Gordon speaks about rarely ends in such 
definitive distinctions – this thesis is infused with the indistinct and 
indistinguishable nature of ghosts in the aftermath of traumatic experiences – 
it is infused with authorial presences whose voices speak – through me, with 
me, at me – the ‘I’ who is writing now, writing these last few paragraphs, the 
‘I’ who might have been, the ‘I’ who remembered even if what I remembered 
was different to the remembrances of others, the ‘I’ who performed herself in 
the embrace of fiction, born, as it were, out of shards, of fragments, out of a 
loss of narratability, out of that which was held by gossamer threads. 
 
Fallacious Accounts 
She looked at the baton in her hand. Had she not held on to it for many years? Her 
fingers had accommodated its weight, had bent themselves in an almost perfect O 
around the smooth circumference. She looked closer, inspected the barely visible 
indentations in the wood, the marks left in slightly darkened grooves. This baton 
mattered, had mattered more than she had cared to admit, even to herself. And now?  
It is on account of writings which are “partial, incomplete, and [...] always 
in a process of retelling and remembering” (Alecia  Jackson & Mazzei, 
2013:262), that I return to the critique I made in respect of autoethnographic 
accounts of trauma, premised, as it were, to a large extent on the healing 
trope. When ‘autoethnography-as-therapy’ (Gannon, 2006), mapped out by 
Ellis, Adams and Bochner (2011:280 italics by author) in the suggestion that 




the writing process can be “therapeutic for participants and readers” through 
which, moreover, we can “purge our burden”, is considered the sine qua non, 
to what extent is it premised on a reductive, but equally quite astute 
mis/understanding of what is taken to be therapy’s task? When the 
argument is upheld that proposes therapy as the patient’s great enabler - to 
heal, to feel better, to cope, to move on – the “universal healing technology 
that has already brought a transcendent ‘cure’ to earthlings” as Cushman 
(1995:6f) rather provocatively puts it, to what extent is the ‘cure’, 
“permeated by the philosophy of self-contained individualism” driven by 
the shift from medical ‘pathology’ discourses towards those underpinned 
by ‘empowerment and self-realization’? It is these individuated subject 
positions Giorgio (2009:151 italics by author) calls upon when she says: 
“When we speak, or may I add write, we assert our own order onto the mess 
of trauma; we regain control over our lives by acknowledging and sharing 
with others our truths.”  
She suspected that batons were used as incitements to gain order, to divide what 
squelched and spluttered from what was neatly packaged. Looking down at her feet, 
she bent forwards, and drew a few squiggles in the mud. She drew more. And more.  
There is more, always more: “In a good narrative, the reader will learn, 
benefit, and be guided by the story, as a good narrative conveys meanings 
that help us cope with our experiences” (C. S. Davis & Warren-Findlow, 
2011:570 italics by author); “It is about the process of writing memory, and 
coming out the other end. It is about narrative healing.” And further on: 
“When I need expansion, or understanding, or healing, I turn to 
autoethnography” Poulos (2012:324 italics by author).  




The fixicity with which narrativization of trauma is suggested as ultimate 
healing panacea fails, I fear, to acknowledge that there is, simply, no 
neatness or tidiness to trauma, no means of speaking it for the very last time. 
She smiled. Let the baton fall. Stepped over. And walked on. 
 
 
… And, of course, how can there be an ‘I’ without a ‘you/You’, not solely in 
the sense of the stylistic invention, or fabrication alongside/against whom I 
struggled with in the howness of these writings; in writing you, I also attended 
to an alterity which, as Freud (1916:486) would have it is the basis of our 
psychic life. “The unconscious is the real psychic” he says, “its inner nature is 
just as unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is just as 
imperfectly reported to us through the data of consciousness as is the external 
world through the indications of our sensory organs.” Unknown, 
unknowable, imperfect. 
So, where are we now, I say, where are we now? 
I am sitting in the office, strip-light plays hide-and-seek with the sun, 
outshining each other; just now I rest my fingers on keys which have played 
immeasurable music. I truly did not know that I had it in me, or rather, that 
what I had in me was part of a wider discourse around pernicious trauma and 
its generational inflections. I wrote myself into fissures, into gaps and 
breakages, I fabricated compositions, if you will, of my inquiry, particular 
genres which, I hope, aligned concepts and creative configurations. But, of 




course, as St. Pierre (1997:408) says, “as I write, I think, I learn, and I change 
my mind about what I think.”  
It is fallacious to imagine what I would change now at the end, after the event 
of writing what I have written, so to speak, not because my writing is perfect, 
or coherent – far from it – but because such interjection pays scant attention to 
the procedural nature of continuous and iterative changes or shifts I had been 
subjected to, or rather, by which I became, and continue to become subject. 
That such iterations were part of fragments with which I narrated what fell 
outwith the margins of narratability should not be seen as a reductionist ploy, 
but rather as an acceptance of the limitations of narration: are we not always 
invested in an assumption of coherence, in the way we linearly construct 
ourselves through the stories we tell, even if, or maybe particularly if what we 
tell is fused with absences and silences?  
This thesis, in all its exemplary fragmented messiness contributes to writings 
of a nature which pay tribute to such paradigmatic heterogeneity, by 
attempting to temporarily defuse the boundaries between the stability of 
binaries – absence/presence, self/other, individual/social, being/becoming, 
cohesive/fragmented, dominant/marginal and any permutations arising out of 
those dichotomies, given that they operate on an a priori assumption that 
forecloses, I argued, investigations into meaning-making which attend “to the 
unthought, unspoken, unthinkable and unspeakable” (Aranda, Zeeman, 
Scholes, & Morales, 2012:553). As such, this text made a case for enmeshed 
knowledge, driven by the thematic entanglement of a specific triad - trauma, 
silence, ghosts – and its equally entangled epistemic inquiry; it offered, I 




suggested, one way of iteratively, yet only ever momentarily, destabilizing 
homogenous knowledge. There is, indeed, no finitude to destabilization. 
Psychoanalysis was the trope through which I began to investigate uncanny 
appearances of ghosts, apparitions in the gap between discourses and the very 
lack they unconsciously failed to articulate – articulations around loss – where 
familial, social, national, cultural losses were cast into the shadow of silence. I 
swept in a wide arc, in a trajectory that followed monadic autonomy into 
intersubjective relationality, by which I sought to theorize what I understood 
as reverberations of trauma, under which ghosts and hauntings could be made 
meaning of. What followed in its wake was a (necessary) collapse of 
methodological certainties, to the extent that in further cyclical unfoldings, I 
began to trouble, and was troubled by, an autoethnography premised on an 
unambiguous discrete subjectivity, one which, I feared, foreclosed to a large 
extent the multifarious complexities at play in my genre of textual devices 
(Atkinson, 2013). When the ‘auto’ in my writing was foregrounded in an 
iterative heterogeneous performative sense of self, I am left wondering now if 
the term ‘autoethnography’ suffices in undergirding writing practices which 
yield to fragments, inconsistencies and paradoxes. Writings without 
resolutions, without finitude, without linearly constructed cohesion, 
unknowable writings, as it were, that arose in the wake of Poulos’ (2009) 
‘accidental’ discoveries. But, frankly, what is ‘accidental’ in the discovery of 
the haunting photo, whose very presence spoke to a perfidious absence, the 
magnitude of which I was at pains - at pains - to keep at bay? In recognizing 
an irrefutable tangent from what was barely to what was never spoken of, I 
unfolded myself in memories and imaginings of familiar silences, wrote 
myself into an embodied and situated knowledge that spoke as much to 




familial as to socio-cultural and historical contextures. The personal is indeed 
always political.  
Each of the chapters I wrote in pursuit of an inquiry into something I did not 
know how to inquire into from the outset is fashioned in a way that, I hope, 
interrupted and problematized discursive theoretical parameters. I utilized 
specific genres, invested in “the process and the product of constructing 
knowledge” (Bhattacharya, 2013:611f), “moving in multiple directions, 
producing multidimensional knowledge, and developing contradictions and 
tensions, all the while playing with form and content to provoke people into 
dialoguing.”  
My play took me into writing theory as dialogue - an interlocutor set in 
conversation with a protagonist - whose roles, as reflections into meandering 
investigations were developed over the course of Kitchen Conversations. 
Shuttling between one voice and another, as other, was primarily informed by 
a way of rendering visible the underpinnings of an intersubjectively framed 
psychoanalysis, and I carried the evocations of the other into all subsequent 
chapters: Dear Departed can hence be read as a refrain on an irrevocable 
presence in absence, on the way that the other is continuously implicated in 
the formation of self, as Kristeva (1991:182) would argue, so that “on the basis 
of the other, I become reconciled with my own other-foreignness, that I play 
on it and live by it.” To write ghosts and hauntings can be understood, I 
suggest, not only as an act of conciliation with these fleeting concatenations of 
past and present, these spatial and temporal fugitives, but equally as an act of 
re-conciliation with the heterogeneity of the unconscious, parts of which will 
remain forever irreconcilable - the knowledge of non-knowledge, so to speak. 




And while alterity in the chapter Monday is woven into the text through 
repetitious enmeshment with what defies calibration, Ghost Talk opens the 
window onto a densely populated silence, which reverberates with lost or 
never-heard voices. “The experience of the loss of a loved one is complex and 
comprises many intersecting layers of heterogeneous origin: some of them are 
of linguistic provenance and character, others are of the purely nonreflected 
experiential. The latter consist of sheer pain, suffering made of ache, throbbing 
resulting from the simple experience of being severed from the loved one, 
regardless of our convictions about and beliefs and interpretations of the 
‘nature’ of (any) connections with and attachment to the other: […], the 
experience of grieving itself is that of pure suffering inflicted by the sensation 
of being severed from the loved one” (Kolozova, 2014:127).  
That’s where I am, I say, that’s where we are. 
I could and, indeed, would not deny that the continuous invocations of other, 
and the Other, were hinting at an inherent loss in my narrative, in the sense 
that while writing into otherness, I fabulated a presence that has, for most of 
my childhood and adolescence, been absent. The irony is that while my 
parents fought their own battles, silent battles, with what they were, I imagine, 
unable to resurrect into language, and sought recourse, or possibly oblivion, 
in work and alcohol, I was somehow left on the battlefield. The textual 
fabulations, say, infused with past and present selves, with fragments, 
memories, with conjectures and seeming facticities served not only as 
reminder of the lacunae I needed to live by, but also as arcs, tentatively 
bridging gaps between fragmented ‘not-yet-narrations’ of trauma and its 
aftermath, for the sake of semi-coherent narrativization. Does the argument 




hold that such endeavour cannot be anything but reductive? Possibly. Because 
is the heel of narratability not somehow always positioned in the ground of 
what resists narration? And is any narration, irrespective of its coherence, not 
always full of absence? My attempts to write into what defies narratability (not 
solely in terms of the personal story, but also in view of Germany’s war and 
post-war experiences) does not foreclose what I think of as an inherent 
paradox: we live by a contentious, yet taken-for-granted assumption that our 
lives are story-able to the extent we often wish them to be – as alignments on 
an almost uninterrupted trajectory from a beginning through a middle to an 
end - and that these stories make sense, that they offer a modicum of 
coherence, that they give meaning to our experiences. Trauma shatters that 
assumption, opens up substantial cracks and gaps in narrativization, and 
fragments the coherence of meaning-making. While Cohen’s (2013:55 italics 
by author) argument that “you can be haunted only by the incomprehensible” 
seems too reductive - because, after all, hauntings can appear as ‘unknown 
knowledge staking a claim for recognition’ – what ghosts hold up are 
substantial fractures in the narrative frame, or, to put it another way, the 
deeper and wider the fissure the more it is populated by hauntings and ghosts. 
These spectres slip under the calibrated radar of certitude, of singularity, of 
conclusion and finitude, enmesh themselves as much with what is not spoken 
of as with what needs to be kept at bay at all costs, and what, possibly, can 
never be spoken of. 
“Our steps are dogged by past and future; we are never left alone, “says Frosh 
(2013:166). And, maybe, this ‘non-aloneness’ is part of the enduring aliveness 
of hauntings and ghosts, part of the uncanny realization that something 
remains at stake, has not been given over – I would like to write ‘to words’, or 




‘to recognition’, but I shy away from the invocation of such definitive gestures. 
And yet, and yet, was it not so that my writings into silence, into hauntings 
and ghosts were ways of writings into what was at stake, into an absence 
demanding its due? Does it suffice to declare writing acts of that nature as acts 
of writing into what has been lying dormant in the field of ungrieved loss? Did 
I write because I needed to right? And what did I ‘right’ if not overtly 
registering an absence, perdition even? My argument is that through 
performative writing I did not only externalize a process – the process of 
becoming witness – but offered, if you will, an intersubjective testimonial 
frame within which processes of mourning can be thought of.  
But, of course, such overt proclamations break the tight boundaries within 
which unspeakable knowledge has been secreted away; it violates its very 
foundations. Writing exposes, transgresses, as Cixous (1981/2000:97) would 
have it: “Am I transgressing by writing what I am writing? Or by not writing 
what I am not writing? Or both? What law(s) am I transgressing? […] I think 
that one transgresses (1) the law of silence that must observed […] in the face 
of almost everything.” Were I to consider my thesis in the light of Cixous’ 
question, what I wrote could indeed be understood in such contested terms – 
of the codex to keep hidden what did not fit the familial paradigm, which was 
itself deeply embedded in lack: when I left Germany in the 1970s, the then 
palpable lack of discursive engagement with Germany’s recent unspeakable 
past continued to cast its deep shadows. Much has changed in the intervening 
years. To write can, I suggest, now simply be understood in terms of a 
declaration of wilful contamination – an overflow out of what was so neatly 
and so deadly declared tabula rasa.  




And now, I ask, and now? 
I sit at my desk, fingers poised, arms slightly extended to rest on the keyboard. 
It is cold outside. It is slightly warmer inside. This is the ‘now’, the non-
graspable instant which dissolves as soon as it is uttered. “The performative I 
puts experience under erasure” says Denzin (2013:38); Dear Norman, I’d like 
to say, it is not so much experience that has been put under erasure, but the 
telling thereof, the assumption that there is indeed only one story to tell, that 
the authorial voice speaks eloquently and longingly of coherence, in full view 
– imagine - of its inherent myth. That the story of my mother’s grief for her 
lost children, for example, could only be told in recognition “however dimly, 
[of] the possibility that her silence had nothing at all to do with the loss of her 
child[ren], but rather had to do with the weight of her living child[..] – or more 
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